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Abstract
Chapter 2 of this thesis employs a dynamic general equilibrium with Tay-
lor wage contracts to show that the use of strict inflation targeting as a
disinflation policy may result in a slump in production and a considerable
increase in macroeconomic volatility. Important determinants of the magni-
tude of the macroeconomic oscillations in the post-disinflation state of the
economy turn out to be the size of the reduction in the inflation rate and the
degree of returns to labor in the production function. In the special case of
constant returns, the oscillations are large and permanent.
Chapter 3 of this thesis extends the above analysis to an open-economy
setting demonstrating that the exchange rate can act as a stabilizer by effec-
tively relieving wages from part of the burden of reducing the inflation rate.
The more the economy is open, the smaller the magnitude of the macroeco-
nomic oscillations will be after the disinflation policy is applied. The policy
is shown to be infeasible for all practical purposes in a closed economy with
constant returns to scale when the full nonlinear model is considered.
Chapter 4 of this thesis employs a Markov switching framework to allow
for an interesting alternative characterization of macroeconomic news effects
on the foreign exchange market. The chapter finds strong evidence for the
presence of nonlinear regime switching between a high-volatility and a low-
volatility state driven by monetary policy announcements that come as a
surprise to the market. It also uncovers significant market positioning prior
to the announcements, indicating a limiting of risk exposure by market par-
ticipants who are unsure about the precise outcome of the policy decisions.
Chapter 5 of this thesis investigates the impact of monetary shocks on
the direction and the composition of international capital flows. It identifies
monetary policy shocks in a structural VAR via the pure sign restrictions
approach. There are two key findings. First, a US monetary easing causes net
capital inflows and a worsening of the US trade balance. Second, monetary
policy shocks induce a negative conditional correlation between capital flows
in bonds and equity securities. Intriguingly, they cause a negative conditional
correlation between equity flows and equity returns but a positive conditional
correlation between bond flows and bond returns.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A growing number of both theoretical and applied economists have devoted
their time to the study of the conduct of monetary policy in recent years.
Two developments stand out as factors increasing this interest.
First and foremost, progress in macroeconomic theory has been remark-
able, with a new generation of quantitative models developed under the New
Keynesian paradigm that can be used to explicitly study the impact of sta-
bilization policies on economic welfare. Perhaps most importantly, these
models can claim sufficient realism to be of interest to policymakers around
the globe (Woodford, 2006). The origin of this influential literature lies in
the synthesis of two independent theories of macroeconomic modelling. In
particular, it is grounded in the idea to enrich real business cycle models
of dynamic individual optimization (Prescott, 1986) with Keynesian con-
cepts such as nominal price rigidity and the inefficiency of aggregate fluc-
tuations. The latter had previously been developed in static models gener-
ating ultimately qualitative rather than quantitative implications (Mankiw
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and Romer, 1991). The development of tightly structured macroeconomic
models based on explicit theoretical microfoundations and capable of suc-
cessfully capturing macroeconomic time series data (Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans, 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2003) have led to a comeback of the
quantitative assessment of the optimal conduct of monetary policy (Gali,
2007).
The second reason for the popularity of the field is progress in the pro-
fession of central banking itself. A growing number of central banks have
come to organize monetary policy around an explicit set of objectives. One
way of specifying such objectives is via an explicit inflation forecast target-
ing rule as, for example, followed by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and
the Bank of England. Increased efforts to communicate policy goals to the
general public also emphasize the importance of a clear framework to guide
policy decisions (Woodford, 2006). In the light of these facts, it has become
increasingly common to use structural macroeconomic models in policymak-
ing institutions around the globe. These developments not only point to the
success of the newly developed quantitative models but also illustrate how
far the profession has come from initial efforts to organize monetary policy
on an almost entirely informal basis.
The optimality of price stability as an objective for monetary policy has
been at the core of this renewed interest in the study of its conduct. As
demonstrated in Woodford (2003) among others, the presence of inflation not
only signals an inefficient level of economic activity but also incurs a more
direct cost by leading to an inefficient allocation of resources and suboptimal
quantities of goods produced and consumed. From a modelling perspective,
2
this result holds in a broad class of sticky price dynamic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005; Gali and Gertler,
1999; Woodford, 1999). At the same time, it is important to notice that there
are good arguments in favour of stabilizing inflation at a strictly positive rate
(e.g. in order to avoid the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates) and at
the medium-term horizon (Gali, 2008). For example, Svensson (2000) shows
that strict inflation targeting, a policy tolerating only minor deviations from
target, leads to substantially more output volatility than a more flexible rule
that targets inflation at a longer horizon.
Chapter 2 of this study somewhat reinforces this result by showing that
the sub-optimality of strict inflation targeting may be even more severe when
the policy is adopted as a disinflation policy, i.e. if it is applied to reduce
the prevailing inflation rate to a lower level.1 The chapter is motivated
by the idea that inflation targeting differs from other disinflation policies in
important respects. In particular, a strict interpretation of an inflation target
allows the policymaker to tolerate only minor deviations from target. But
adjusting the policy instrument such that the inflation rate is reduced to a
new target and defending this target rigorously must preserve inflationary
distortions such as wage and price differentials to an exceptional degree (see
also Yun, 2005). The chapter employs a dynamic general equilibrium with
Taylor wage contracts to show that the use of strict inflation targeting as a
1Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) show that in a general class of sticky price dynamic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models, consumer welfare can be well approximated by a
quadratic loss function in inflation and real activity. It can be shown that welfare losses
are then proportional to a discounted sum of squared deviations of the current inflation
rate from a moving average of recent past inflation rates, rather than deviations from
zero (Sheedy, 2005). Giannoni and Woodford (2005) conclude that inflation should not be
reduced too abruptly if it has been allowed to exceed its optimal long-run level.
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disinflation policy may result in a slump in output and a considerable increase
in macroeconomic volatility. Important determinants of the magnitude of
the macroeconomic oscillations in the post-disinflation state turn out to be
the size of the reduction in the inflation rate and the degree of returns to
labour. In Chapter 3, the analysis is extended to an open-economy setting
demonstrating that the exchange rate can act as a stabilizer by effectively
relieving wages from part of the burden of reducing the inflation rate. The
more the economy is open, the smaller the magnitude of the macroeconomic
oscillations will be after the disinflation policy is applied.
A key merit of an inflation targeting regime under price stability is that
it is believed to successfully anchor private sector expectations. Dating back
to the rational expectations revolution, it is a well-accepted belief that man-
aging private sector expectations successfully is crucial for the optimal func-
tioning of the monetary transmission mechanism. From a macro modeling
perspective, the reason is that current values of aggregate output and infla-
tion depend not only on the central bank’s current choice of the short-term
interest rate, but also on the anticipated future path of this instrument (see
Woodford, 2003). The practical implication is that the central bank’s ability
to manage private sector expectations about its future policy settings has
important consequences for its overall effectiveness. Partially on the grounds
of this understanding, an extensive literature developed that investigates the
role of central bank communication in managing expectations (see Blinder et
al (2008) for an excellent survey). The reaction of asset prices to monetary
policy announcements and communication can not only be an important in-
dicator of success in this context but can also allow uncovering important
4
insights about the microstructure of the respective financial markets (see
Sarno and Taylor, 2003).
Chapter 4 of this thesis contributes to this literature by employing a
Markov switching framework in order to allow for an alternative characteri-
zation of macroeconomic news effects on the foreign exchange market. The
underlying hypothesis for the choice of the model is that monetary policy
announcements do not simply affect the market as shocks to an otherwise
continuous process. On the contrary, news effects may change the entire data
generating process underlying a market’s dynamics. An econometric speci-
fication allowing for regime switches therefore appears appropriate. Indeed,
one particular benefit of applying such a model is that it facilitates a plausi-
ble interpretation of observed nonlinearities. In this chapter, we find strong
evidence for nonlinear regime switching between a high-volatility ”informed
trading” state and a low-volatility ”liquidity trading” state driven by mone-
tary policy announcements that come as a surprise to the market. We also
uncover significant market positioning prior to the announcement, indicating
a limiting of risk exposure by market participants.
In Chapter 5, this thesis continues to analyze the impact of monetary pol-
icy on financial markets but returns to the macro perspective. The chapter
investigates the impact of monetary shocks on the direction and the compo-
sition of international capital flows. It employs a standard structural VAR
specification to identify monetary policy shocks, relying on sign restrictions
imposed on the impulse response functions of a few macroeconomic variables,
following closely Canova and De Nicolo (2002) and Uhlig (2005). The empir-
ical analysis yields two key findings. First, US monetary policy shocks exert
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a statistically and economically meaningful effect on US capital flows and
the trade balance. An exogenous easing of US monetary policy by 100 basis
points induces net capital inflows and a worsening of the US trade balance
of around 1% of GDP after 8 quarters. The second main result focuses on
the effect of monetary policy shocks on the composition of US capital flows.
Intriguingly, it is found that an exogenous US monetary policy easing causes
net inflows in debt securities, foreign direct investment (FDI) and other in-
vestment, while inducing net outflows in portfolio equities from the United
States. Monetary policy shocks thus entail a conditional negative correla-
tion between flows in portfolio equity and debt. A key for understanding
this conditional correlation is the effect of monetary policy shocks on asset
prices. While a monetary policy easing implies a decrease in short-term (and
long-term) interest rates, it also causes the above mentioned increase in rel-
ative equity returns. Overall, our evidence suggests that monetary policy
shocks induce negative conditional correlations between flows in bonds and
equity securities. Moreover, they cause a negative conditional correlation be-
tween equity flows and equity returns and a positive conditional correlation
between bond flows and bond returns.
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Chapter 2
Strict Inflation Targeting as a
Means of Achieving
Disinflation: A Basic Analysis
2.1 Introduction
Inflation targeting has become increasingly popular as a monetary policy
regime. A distinctive feature of many emerging market economies among
the inflation targeters regards the level of the inflation rate exhibited at the
time of adoption of the policy. Industrial countries have adopted inflation
targeting at inflation rates at least broadly consistent with price stability.
In contrast, emerging market economies such as Mexico, Hungary or Poland
exhibited initial inflation rates of around 10 percent or more.1 This study
1See Landerretche (2001), Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002), Levin et al (2004), Roger
and Stone (2005) and Batini et al (2006)
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is concerned with the macroeconomic effects of the explicit use of inflation
targeting as a disinflation regime. The argument I make is that a strict
inflation targeting policy employed for the purpose of disinflation may pre-
serve inflationary distortions to an unusually large degree. In the model I
employ, these excess distortions not only cause slumps in real activity, but
may additionally increase macroeconomic volatility.
An extensive literature has analyzed inflation targeting with regard to
its properties as a monetary policy regime under price stability. Its ad-
vantages have been documented by, among others, Bernanke and Mishkin
(1997), Svensson (1997) and Svensson and Woodford (2003). In an early
contribution, Svensson (2000) differentiates between flexible and strict infla-
tion targeting and shows that the former creates substantially less output
variability than a strict interpretation of the policy, as it effectively targets
inflation at a longer horizon. The present paper somewhat reinforces this
result by showing that the sub-optimality of strict inflation targeting may be
even more severe in the context of a disinflation episode. Yun (2005) applies
a similar line of reasoning as I do in this paper. He shows that the zero
inflation optimality result (Woodford, 1999; Gali, 2000) must be refined in
the presence of initial price dispersion.2 The reason is that the pre-existing
price dispersion adversely affects real activity in the economy and converges
2Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) show that in a general class of sticky price dynamic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models, consumer welfare can be well approximated by a
quadratic loss function in inflation and real activity. It can be shown that welfare losses
are then proportional to a discounted sum of squared deviations of the current inflation
rate from a moving average of recent past inflation rates, rather than deviations from
zero (Sheedy, 2005). Giannoni and Woodford (2005) conclude that inflation should not be
reduced too abruptly if it has been allowed to exceed its optimal long-run level.
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faster under alternative policies.3
The literature on the real effects of disinflations has concentrated on ex-
plaining stylized facts regarding the differential real effects of money- and
exchange-rate-based disinflations. Among others, Ball (1994) and Ascari and
Rankin (2002) consider explanations for the finding that money-based dis-
inflations typically cause slumps in output on impact. Exchange-rate-based
policies, on the other hand, are frequently characterized by initial booms
in real activity. Calvo and Vegh (1994) replicate this empirical finding by
assuming that a collapse of the disinflation policy is rationally anticipated.
Fender and Rankin (2007) explain the boom with an element of preannounce-
ment of the policy under a standard type of exchange rate peg.4 The long run
impact of disinflation policies in the framework of the New Keynesian model
is discussed in Blanchard and Gali (2007) and Ascari and Merkl (2007). The
present study is motivated by the idea that inflation targeting differs from
other disinflation policies in important respects. In particular, a strict inter-
pretation of an inflation target allows the policymaker to tolerate only minor
deviations from target. But adjusting the policy instrument such that the
inflation rate is reduced to a new target and defending this target rigorously
must preserve inflationary distortions such as wage and price differentials to
an exceptional degree.
In this chapter, I use a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with wage
staggering of the type suggested by Taylor (1979a) to consider a rather ex-
3The stabilization policy examined in Yun (2005) does not increase macroeconomic
volatility. The reason is that the author uses Calvo (1983) price contracts. I elaborate on
this below.
4Kolver-Hernandez (2007) achieves a similar result by introducing elements of state-
dependent pricing into the model economy.
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treme case of a disinflation exercise: an immediate and permanent reduction
in the rate of CPI inflation to a newly set target. I interpret this policy as
strict inflation targeting during a disinflation episode. The central bank sets
the path of money supply such that the newly set inflation target is attained
immediately and sustained throughout future periods. The particular nature
of the policy requires me to solve the model in a rather unconventional way.
I first impose the result of the disinflation policy, a reduction to a lower rate
of CPI inflation, and then solve for the policy itself, i.e. the path that money
supply has to follow in order to sustain the new inflation target throughout
the future.
I begin by considering a closed economy version of the model. As briefly
mentioned above, I find that the disinflation policy I consider not only cre-
ates a slump in output on impact, but can additionally generate oscillatory
behavior in both nominal and real variables along their post-disinflation ad-
justment paths. The reason is that the immediate reduction in price inflation
requires the real wage to fluctuate for some periods before it gradually con-
verges to its new steady state. The oscillations can be permanent when the
returns to labor in the production function are constant. From a modeling
perspective, the presence of oscillations along the adjustment path is a result
that would not obtain in a model with a Calvo (1983) type staggering struc-
ture. I show that this is because price setters in such a model would always
set prices equal to the prevailing price level. In the framework of model used
in this study, I distinguish two cases: one in which the economy is indeed
characterized by oscillatory behavior along its post-disinflation path and one
in which it reacts similarly to a conventional disinflation policy. Strikingly,
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the size of the initial slowdown in real activity is strongly positively related
to the presence of oscillations along the adjustment path.
The presence and the magnitude of oscillations along the economy’s ad-
justment path naturally depend on the degree to which wages need to fluc-
tuate in order to keep the inflation rate at the newly set target. Important
determinants are thus the desired size of the reduction in the inflation rate
as well as the returns to labor in the production function. Greater returns
to scale generate oscillations as they imply that wages are tied more closely
to the behavior of prices. In particular, I find that there are no oscillations
at all along the post-disinflation path of the economy if the returns to labor
are sufficiently low. At the other extreme, in the case of constant returns to
scale, the oscillations are large and permanent. The latter is thus the only
case in which the economy does not gradually converge to a new steady state.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the
structure of the model. Section 2.3 examines the implications of the disinfla-
tion policy and highlights the degree of returns to scale as a decisive factor in
determining the magnitude of the oscillations in the post-disinflation state.
Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The Model Economy
In this section, I employ a closed economy Dynamic General Equilibrium
Model with imperfect competition in the labor market and nominal wage
rigidities of the type proposed by Taylor (1979). The structure of the model
is kept simple which allows us to illustrate our main points in a clean way
11
and to derive crucial results analytically. I omit derivations where they are
standard in the literature.
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of households jǫ[0, 1] and firms.
The supply side of the economy produces a single consumption good using a
technology in which labor is the only variable factor of production
Yt = N
σ
t (2.1)
where Yt is output at time t, σ is the degree of returns to labor and
0 < σ ≤ 1. A typical firm demands a continuum of labor types jǫ[0, 1] to
minimize the cost of achieving a particular composite labor input Nt, given
by Nt = [
∫ 1
0
L
(ε−1)/ε
jt dj]
ε/(ε−1). Ljt is the quantity of labor that household
j supplies to the firm and ε > 1 is the elasticity of technical substitution
across labor types. Solving the cost minimization problem yields the standard
conditional demand for labor function
Ljt = Nt(
Wt
Wjt
)ε (2.2)
where Wt is the wage index given by Wt = [
∫ 1
0
W 1−εjt dj]
1/(1−ε). Goods
markets are perfectly competitive. The firm’s profit maximization problem
thus yields the supply function
Yt = Nt(
Wt
σPt
)σ/(σ−1) (2.3)
I now move to the demand side of the economy. Household j supplies labor
skill jǫ[0, 1] and sets its own wage Wjt. I assume that the economy consists
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of two sectors of households. Sector A comprises labor types [0, 0.5) and
sector B comprises labor types [0.5, 1]. Although households are monopolistic
suppliers of their individual type of labor input, they are price takers in all
other markets. I assume that they are completely symmetric in terms of their
preference structure which implies that consumption must be equal across
households in a given sector at any point in time. I also assume the existence
of complete domestic asset markets. This implies that households can insure
against any type of initial shock that might affect the two sectors differently
due to the staggering structure to be defined below. Hence, Cjt = Ckt must
hold for any two households j and k in sectors A and B. Finally, I define
aggregate nominal consumption as St = PtCt where Pt is the price of one
unit of the composite consumption good.
Wages are set by each individual household subject to a staggering struc-
ture of the type proposed by Taylor (1979). In particular, I assume that
households in sector A (B) set their wage in even (odd) periods and keep it
fixed for the subsequent period. The wage newly set in period t is denoted
by Xt independently of the sector in which it is set. Households are utility
maximizers. A representative household j in sector A derives utility from
consumption, liquidity holdings and leisure and maximizes her discounted
lifetime utility Uj by choosing a pattern for personal consumption Cjt, bond
holdings Bjt, wagesWjt and labor effort Njt subject to a series of budget con-
straints, the conditional demand for labor and the wage setting constraint:
Uj =
∞∑
t=0
βt[δlnCjt + (1− δ)ln(Mjt/Pt)− ηLζjt] (2.4)
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subject to
Mjt−1 + It−1Bjt−1 +WjtLjt +Πt +Gt = PtCjt +Mjt +Bjt (2.5)
Ljt = Nt(
Wt
Wjt
)ε (2.6)
Wjt = Wjt+1 = Xt, t = 0, 2, 4, ... (2.7)
where only the first two constraints must hold in even and odd periods
t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ... and where β < 1, ζ ≥ 1, It is the domestic gross interest rate,
Mt denotes money supply in period t, Gt is a lump-sum subsidy to households
and Πt denotes a share in firms’ profits that is equal across households.
5
The optimization problem for household k in sector B is exactly equivalent
except that the wage setting constraint holds in odd instead of even periods.
The first order conditions of this optimization problem are given by the
consumption Euler equation, the money demand optimality condition and
the optimal wage setting condition
Cjt+1 = β[It
Pt
Pt+1
]Cjt (2.8)
Mjt
Pt
= Cjt
1− δ
δ
It
It − 1 (2.9)
5A no-Ponzi-game condition ensures that individuals cannot borrow infinitely by re-
paying debt with further debt.
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Xt = [
ε
ε− 1
ηζ
δ
Lζjt + βL
ζ
jt+1
Ljt
PtCjt
+ β
Ljt+1
Pt+1Cjt+1
] (2.10)
The economy further comprises a government that controls money supply.
Its budget constraint is given by
Gt =Mt −Mt−1 (2.11)
The competitive equilibrium in the model economy is the sequence of
prices [Xjt, Pt]
∞
t=0 and allocations [Yt, Cjt, Njt, Ljt, Bjt,Mjt]
∞
t=0 such that firms
maximize profits, agents maximize utility and all markets clear.6 I aggregate
the equilibrium conditions across individuals and take a log-linear approxi-
mation around a reference steady state in which inflation is zero. Notice that
in what follows I will distinguish between the reference zero inflation steady
state (ZISS) around which the equilibrium conditions are linearized and a
constant inflation steady state (CISS) in which the economy finds itself one
period before the disinflation policy is applied. As the economy is closed,
bond holdings are zero in both states.7 The linearized equilibrium condi-
tions are presented in Appendix A.1.1.8 In the following, lower-case symbols
denote log deviations of variables from their reference steady state values,
i.e. vt = log
Vt
VR
.
6Due to the staggering structure in wages the labor market does not clear in the Wal-
rasian sense.
7While this must necessarily be the case in a closed economy setting, I will impose it
upon the open economy by assumption in the next section
8The interested reader may refer to Fender and Rankin (2008) for the linearization of
the wage setting condition.
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2.3 Strict Inflation Targeting as a Disinfla-
tion Policy
I now proceed to assess the macroeconomic effects of a disinflation policy
that uses strict inflation targeting to reduce the rate of CPI inflation from
a positive to a non-negative value. I define strict inflation targeting follow-
ing Svensson (2000). The definition implies that the policymaker only cares
about stabilizing inflation at a given target. I assume that she has perfect
control over the inflation rate and adjusts her policy instrument such that
inflation is kept at target at any point in time. The economy is initially in
a constant inflation steady state (CISS) in which real variables are constant
and all nominal variables grow at some constant inflation rate µI . The poli-
cymaker decides to reduce inflation in period t = 0 from its initial rate µI to
the lower but nonnegative value µD. This policy change is unexpected and
credible. The policymaker takes action by announcing µD as the new target
and adjusts the path of money supply such that the new target is attained
immediately and sustained throughout future periods.9
There is no doubt that this disinflation policy is more rigid than policies
applied in the real world. However, I present this extreme example as a
benchmark case that allows for an analytical characterization of possible ad-
verse effects of applying a too rigid inflation targeting policy for the purpose
of disinflation. The definition of the policy requires us to solve the model in a
rather unconventional way. I first impose the result of the disinflation policy,
9There is a unique path of money supply, the exchange rate and the nominal interest
rate that achieves this outcome. It is therefore not of importance, whether we think of
the central bank as using one or the other as its policy instrument.
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a reduction in the rate of inflation from µI to µD, and then solve for the path
that the money supply needs to follow in order to achieve and sustain the
newly set inflation target. Finally, I assess the macroeconomic effects of the
disinflation policy.
2.3.1 The Initial Constant Inflation Steady State
Before I can investigate the macroeconomic impact of the disinflation policy,
I need to solve for the equilibrium of the model in the initial CISS. I use the
fact that the new wage xt is homogeneous of degree one in nominal variables
and, when normalized by money supply such that vt = xt −mt, is constant
over time at
v = − 1
2γ
[− γ 1 + β
1− β +
1− β
1 + β
]
µI (2.12)
with γ = ζ
1+ε(ζ−1)
. The CISS value of nontradables output is then given
by
y =
σ(1− β)
2(1 + β)γ
µI (2.13)
We observe that nontradables output is affected positively by the inflation
rate in the CISS. The effect is due to wage setters discounting future utility.
I will further discuss this effect in the next chapter in the context of the full
nonlinear model. In the CISS, all nominal variables grow at the rate µI .
Defining m−1 as the level of money supply one period before the disinflation
policy is applied, I can write the wage index in the same period as
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w−1 = −1
2
[ −2β
1− β +
1− β
(1 + β)γ
]
µI +m−1 (2.14)
Equations (2.13) and (2.14) constitute the CISS solution of the model
one period before disinflation.
The next step in the analysis is to understand, how changes in the rate of
price inflation affect the rest of the economy and in particular the staggered
variable, wages. The supply function (A.5) allows me to write the price index
as a function of output and the wage index
pt =
1− σ
σ
yt + wt (2.15)
The equation illustrates that a given change in the price level is accommo-
dated partly by a reaction of wages and partly by firms adjusting production.
The wage level’s share in facilitating the price change depends positively on
the degree of returns to labor. The reason is that a larger σ implies a less
strongly upward sloping marginal cost curve and thus a weaker response of
prices to changes in the level of production in the economy. When σ = 1,
the marginal cost curve is horizontal, leaving no role for output in the deter-
mination of prices. This implies that the wage level must move one for one
with the price index. In the context of our disinflation policy the latter case
corresponds to a situation in which a reduction in the rate of price inflation
translates one for one into a reduction in the growth rate of the wage in-
dex. The subsequent section will show that this property allows for a purely
analytic characterization of the disinflation policy’s impact on the economy.
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2.3.2 The Special Case: Constant Returns to Scale
I begin by solving for the impact of the disinflation policy in the special
case of constant returns to scale. I do so because the distinctive implications
of this assumption allow for a good understanding of the channels through
which the policy affects the economy.
As a starting point, it is important to notice that there is a crucial im-
plication arising from the assumption of constant returns to scale in the
production function. In particular, equation (A.5) shows that this is the one
and only case for which it is not possible to solve for output when the paths
of both the wage index and the price level are known. The reason is that the
aggregate supply curve, i.e. the relationship between output and the price
level, is horizontal for a given wage. This implies that conventional solution
techniques cannot be applied to determine the full post-disinflation solution
of the model, a point that will perhaps become more obvious when I examine
the general case of σ < 1 in the next section.
There is, however, another anomaly about the case of constant returns to
scale. In the previous subsection I have shown that σ = 1 implies that the
wage index moves one for one with the price index and a policy of reducing
CPI inflation effectively becomes one of reducing the growth rate of the wage
index. Using this fact, it turns out to be possible to directly solve for the
post-disinflation path of the real side of the economy by distinguishing the
economy’s law of motion in even periods from the law of motion in odd
periods. To see this, remember that our disinflation policy reduces CPI
inflation from its initial rate µI to a lower but non-negative rate µD. Given
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that the wage index moves one for one with prices, it is easy to see what such
a policy implies for the behavior of sectoral wages. I take the wage index
and its one period lag. I evaluate the difference at t = 0. This yields
w0 − w−1 = 1
2
(x0 − x−1) + 1
2
(x−1 − x−2) (2.16)
I have assumed that the economy is in a CISS up until period t = 0. It
follows that the second term on the RHS is predetermined and equal to 1
2
µI .
Reducing inflation to µD in period t = 0 then implies that the LHS of (2.16)
is equal to µD. Hence,
x0 − x−1 = 2µD − µI (2.17)
Following the equivalent procedure for the subsequent periods, we have
xt − xt−1 = 2µD − µI (2.18)
for all t = 0, 2, 4, . . . ,∞, and
xt − xt−1 = µI (2.19)
for all t = 1, 3, 5, . . . ,∞. In other words, wages grow at the constant rate
2µD from one even period to the other and from one odd period to the other.
But, since µD < µI the new wage grows faster from even to odd periods than
from odd to even periods. Three cases are possible. First, if 2µD < µI , the
new wage set in even periods is lower than the wage set in the previous odd
period. Wages in sector A are thus smaller than wages in sector B throughout
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Figure 2.1: Post-Disinflation Path of the New Wage
the post-disinflation state. Second, if 2µD > µI , the new wage set in even
periods is higher than the wage set in the previous odd period. Third, if
2µD = µI , the new wage set in even periods is equal to the prevailing one
from the previous odd period.
Figure 2.1 illustrates these three cases. The special case of µD = 0 is
represented by Case 1b. It represents a complete disinflation, i.e. a reduction
in the rate of wage inflation from µI to zero. In particular, µD = 0 implies
that
x−2 = x0 = x2 = ... = w−1 − 1
2
µI (2.20)
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x−1 = x1 = x3 = ... = w−1 +
1
2
µI (2.21)
That is to say that the disinflation policy produces a wage gap between
the two sectors of households that is constant and permanent. The intuition
is the following: I imposed zero wage inflation from period zero onwards. The
wage set in period t = −2 is smaller than the one set in period t = −1. This
implies that the wage index requires downward pressure by the new wage set
in period zero to ensure zero wage inflation. Due to the fact that the wage
index is an equally weighted average of the two sectoral wages, the necessary
amount of downward pressure is achieved if the wage in period t = 0 is set
equal to wage set in period t = −2. The opposite reasoning applies in the
subsequent period.
Let us get back to the more general case of an inflation reduction from a
constant value µI to a lower positive value µD. Having determined the wage
setting behavior of households after the disinflation policy is introduced, I can
now derive the entire post disinflation state of the economy. We substitute
for both the wage index and employment in the wage setting condition (A.6)
and obtain
xt =
1
1 + β
[
st
2γ
1 + γ
+ xt−1
1− γ
1 + γ
]
+
β
1 + β
[
st+1
2γ
1 + γ
+ xt+1
1− γ
1 + γ
]
(2.22)
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We already know how wages behave in the post-disinflation state of the
economy. In principle, we can simply impose their paths on the law of motion
of the economy. However, it is important to notice that the dynamic path
of sectoral wages differs between even and odd periods. This implies that
we have to look at each period separately. Using the wage setting condition
(A.6) and substituting from equations (2.20) and (2.21), we have that
st +
1
β
st−1 =
1 + β
β
(w−1 +
1
2
µI + tµD)− 1− γ
2γ
(2µD − 1 + β
β
µI) (2.23)
st+
1
β
st−1 =
1 + β
β
(w−1− 1
2
µI+(t+1)µD)− 1− γ
2γ
(
1 + β
β
µI− 1
β
2µD) (2.24)
in odd and even periods respectively. These relationships hold from period
zero onwards. A similar relationship between s0 and s−1 would be convenient
as it would uniquely determine the post disinflation path of st. However,
the equivalent procedure would give us a relationship between s−1 and the
expectation of s0 as of period t = −1. And this expectation is false as soon
as the disinflation policy is introduced. The reason is that, in period t = −1,
the wage setter does, by assumption, not know that the disinflation policy
will be applied. Nominal consumption in the subsequent period then turns
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out to be different from her expectation as of period t = −1. But we can get
around this problem by appealing to stability reasoning. From (2.23) and
(2.24), we have that in odd and even periods respectively
st+2 − 1
β2
st = µD
β2 − 1
β2
t+
β2 − 1
β2
w−1 − µI(1 + β
β
)2
1
2γ
+ µD(3 +
2β − γ
β2γ
)
(2.25)
st+2− 1
β2
st = µD
β2 − 1
β2
t+
β2 − 1
β2
w−1 +µI(
1 + β
β
)2
1
2γ
+µD(3− γ + 1 + β
2
β2γ
)
(2.26)
Equations (2.25) and (2.26) are the basic laws of motion of the economy in
the post disinflation state. In order to arrive at a stationary solution, I deflate
both difference equations by the wage level wt. I create a new variable at
defined as the ratio at = st−wt. The resulting first order difference equations
in at take the form
at+2 =
1
β2
at + constant (2.27)
Since β < 1, the Eigenvalue of these equations is greater than one and
unstable. This implies that there is a unique non divergent solution for each
of these processes as Blanchard and Kahn (1980) show. This non divergent
solution obtains when at is equal across odd and across even periods. The
economy instantly jumps to its post disinflation state and remains there.
Using the goods supply and demand functions, I find
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yodd =
(1 + β)
2(1− β)γµI −
2β
(1− β2)γµD (2.28)
yeven = − (1 + β)
2(1− β)γµI +
(1 + β2)
(1− β2)γµD (2.29)
As is evident from equations (2.28) and (2.29), the disinflation policy re-
sults in output oscillations between even and odd periods. The amplitude
of these oscillations is constant. Moreover, we can observe that the extent
to which nominal and real variables fluctuate depends positively on the ini-
tial inflation rate and negatively on the post-disinflation rate. The reason
is that the inflation rate determines the degree of wage dispersion present
in the initial CISS. This suggests that a more gradual path of disinflation
may attenuate the increase in output volatility resulting from the disinfla-
tion policy. The intuition for these findings becomes clear when the post
disinflation path of money supply is derived. I have explained above that
the policy instrument is endogenous in our solution procedure although it is
exogenous in the interpretation of the policy experiment. Notice first that
nominal consumption can be expressed as
st = yt + wt (2.30)
Given the path of output documented in (2.28) and (2.29), and given that
the wage index grows at the rate µD from period to period, we observe that
post disinflation nominal consumption also grows at a lower rate in even
periods than it does in odd periods. The post-disinflation path of money
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supply is given as a function of the path of nominal consumption
mt =
β
1− β (
1
β
st − st+1) (2.31)
It is easy to see that money supply must follow a pattern that is qualita-
tively similar to the path of wages and output. The intuition is the following:
the disinflation policy effectively imposes a path for the new wage that re-
quires agents to set low wages in even periods and high wages in odd periods.
In order to motivate this wage setting behavior, money supply must be set
low in even and high in odd periods. This also explains the oscillatory be-
havior of output. Finally, it is straightforward to show that average output
in the post-disinflation state is lower than output in the initial CISS.10 This
is to say that the disinflation policy creates a slump in production.11
2.3.3 The General Case: Decreasing Returns to Scale
I now abstract from the assumption of constant returns to scale and return
to the more general case of σ < 1. The analysis in the previous section has
shown that the disinflation policy can result in oscillations in sectoral real
wages that are permanent and constant over time. In this section, I show that
this result is not robust to relaxing the assumption of σ = 1. In particular, I
find that the economy ultimately converges to a new steady state in this more
10But output is greater than or equal to that in the ZISS. The reason is that the
discounting effect of inflation on output is not only present in the initial CISS but also,
albeit attenuated, in the post-disinflation state.
11It is typically found that money based disinflations cause a slump in output on impact,
while exchange rate based disinflations can cause a boom. Explanations for these empirical
findings can be found in Calvo and Vegh (1994), Rebelo and Vegh (1995), Fender and
Rankin (2006) or Kolver Hernandez (2007).
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general case. The transition path may or may not be subject to oscillations,
depending on the particular value of σ.
I investigate the effects of the disinflation policy in a different way than
in the previous section. The reason is that it is now possible to derive the
entire post-disinflation path of the economy by determining the response of
the staggered variable, wages, to the reduction in price inflation. I again
consider a reduction in pt− pt−1 from µI to µD in period zero. In particular,
taking equation (2.22) and substituting for nominal consumption st using the
definition (A.2) and the supply function (A.5), I can express the new wage
in period t solely as a function of past and future wages as well as the price
index
xt =
1
1 + β
[
2γ
1 + γ
(
1
1− σpt −
1
2
σ
1− σ (xt + xt−1)) +
1− γ
1 + γ
xt−1]
+
β
1 + β
[
2γ
1 + γ
(
1
1− σpt+1 −
1
2
σ
1− σ (xt+1 + xt)) +
1− γ
1 + γ
xt+1] (2.32)
In the post-disinflation state pt and pt+1 = pt + µD are exogenous and
predetermined by definition of the disinflation policy. Therefore, the house-
holds wage setting condition can, from period t = 0 onwards, be expressed
as
xt+1− 1 + β
β
1− σ + γ
1− σ − γxt+
1
β
xt−1 = −1 + β
β
2γ
1− σ − γ (pt+
β
1 + β
µD) (2.33)
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This is the law of motion of the economy in the post-disinflation steady
state. Notice that pt is growing over time so that we need to stationarize the
equation before we can solve it. I do so by defining φt = xt − pt and obtain
φt+1 − 1 + β
β
1− σ + γ
1− σ − γφt +
1
β
φt−1 = µD(
1− β
β
− 2γ
1− σ − γ ) (2.34)
As I show in Appendix A.1.2, equation (2.34) is saddlepoint stable when
σ < 1, i.e. one of its eigenvalues lies within and the other outside the unit
circle. This result holds for any choice of parameter values within the defined
limits.12 I use the eigenvalue-eigenvector solution technique of Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) to solve for the post-disinflation path of φt. As (2.34) is
a scalar second order difference equation and its RHS is constant over time,
its rational expectations solution is given by
φt = λ1φt−1 − µD (1− β)/β − 2γ/(1− ασ − γ)
λ2 − 1 (2.35)
where λ1 denotes the eigenvalue that is smaller in absolute value and λ2
denotes the one that is bigger. Knowing both the path of the price index
and the normalized new wage φt, it is straightforward to derive the entire
post-disinflation path of the economy. In reference to the previous section,
notice that this would not have been possible in the special case of constant
returns to scale in the production function. The reason is that the aggregate
supply curve in this case is horizontal for a given wage level, implying that
12When σ = 1, one of the two eigenvalues is equal to -1, which is consistent with the
finding that there are permanent oscillations in the case of constant returns to scale.
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Figure 2.2: Closed Economy: Post-Disinflation Path with Oscillations
the post-disinflation path of the real economy could not have been derived
from the sole knowledge of the path of prices and wages.
Whether the path of the economy is subject to oscillations as in the case
of wage inflation targeting now crucially depends on the sign of the smaller
eigenvalue. Appendix A.1.2 shows that the smaller eigenvalue is of negative
sign, and thus induces oscillations, if and only if 1− σ − γ < 0 holds, where
γ = ζ
1+ε(ζ−1)
. This is to say that the post-disinflation path of the economy
exhibits oscillations for a sufficiently large σ and sufficiently small ζ and ε.
I study the impact of the disinflation policy in both situations using the
example of an initial inflation rate of two percent and a complete elimination
in price inflation after the policy is applied. I first investigate the case in
which 1 − σ − γ < 0 holds.13 Figure 2.2 illustrates the resulting path of
13I choose a rather extreme parametrization with σ = 0.9, ζ = 1.3 and ε = 4.
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the economy. As in the case of constant returns to scale, we observe strong
oscillations in both nominal and real variables after the disinflation policy
is applied. The new wage falls on impact, oscillates for a few periods, and
then gradually converges to its ZISS value. Money supply and output behave
similarly. Moreover, average output from period zero onwards is substantially
lower than prior to the application of the policy. The policy therefore not
only increases macroeconomic volatility but also creates a slump in output.
In the impact period of the policy, there is a drop of more than 2 percent in
real activity.
These results are somewhat similar to the previously discussed special
case of constant returns to scale in the production function. However, the
crucial difference is that the economy converges over time after some periods
of increased volatility. The reason is related to the assumption of decreasing
returns to labor. As discussed previously, firms now face upward sloping
marginal cost curves, which relieves wages of part of the burden of responding
to desired changes in the price level or its growth rate.14 And the weaker is
the response of wages in the impact period of the shock, the weaker will be the
response in the subsequent period. Hence, the magnitude of the fluctuations
in the economy decreases over time. The smaller is σ, the more rapidly this
process takes place. The attenuating effect is strengthened the greater is
the elasticity of substitution between labor types ε and the greater is the
elasticity of the disutility of labor ζ . 15
14The intuition is simple: in the presence of an upward sloping marginal cost curve, the
initial fall in output relieves wages from part of the burden of responding to the change in
prices.
15Regarding ε, the reason is that a higher substitutability of labor types implies that
a given firm will employ more labor of the low wage type in period t = 0. This reduces
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Figure 2.3: Closed Economy: Post-Disinflation Path without Oscillations
Let us now focus on the case of 1− σ− γ > 0 in which σ is small enough
and ε and ζ are large enough such that there are no oscillations in the post-
disinflation state. I choose σ = 0.1 and leave all remaining parameter values
the same as in the previous case. Figure 2.3 shows that there are now indeed
no oscillations in the post-disinflation path of the economy. All variables
monotonically converge to their ZISS levels. In fact, the post-disinflation
path of output reminds us of the one that is typically attained under a
conventional disinflation policy in a model with a staggering structure in
wages or prices.
To sum up, the analysis has shown that a strict inflation targeting policy
employed to reduce CPI inflation will result in a slump in output on impact
the wage index and implies that the new wage set in period t = 0 does not have to be as
low as would have been the case otherwise. A higher disutility per unit of work effort, on
the other hand, scales wages upward and thus also scales the wage gap between one sector
and the other.
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and may create oscillations of a substantial magnitude in both nominal and
real variables. The presence of oscillations in the post-disinflation path of the
economy crucially depends on the degree of returns to labor in the production
function. For a large enough σ the disinflation policy will result in oscillatory
behavior of both real and nominal variables. These oscillations die out more
slowly over time the larger is σ and are permanent in the limiting case of
σ = 1. Finally, notice that the slump in output following the disinflation
policy is tiny when there are no post-disinflation oscillations in the economy
and substantial if there are.
2.3.4 Digression: Calvo Staggering Structure
In this section I briefly show that the post-disinflation oscillations in response
to our disinflation policy would not obtain in a model with a staggering
structure as proposed by Calvo (1983). This is the reason why the policy
experiment of Yun (2005) does not lead to an equivalent conclusion.
Following Yun (2005) and much of the literature, let us consider the case
of price inflation targeting in an economy in which prices are subject to a
Calvo-type staggering structure. We can write the price index in the absence
of indexation as
P 1−εt = (1− α)P 1−εt,t + αP 1−εt−1 (2.36)
where Pt is the price index and Pt,t is the price that is chosen by the
fraction (1 − α) of firms that get to adjust their price in period t. Let us
assume a policy in which price inflation is reduced to zero once and for all in
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some period t = 0. Computing the ratio of Pt and Pt−1 and imposing
Pt
Pt−1
=
1, I find that Pt,t = Pt−1. Thus, newly set prices in the post-disinflation state
of the economy are always equal to the prevailing price level. The reason is
that firms choose prices in a forward looking manner and face the identical
problem in every period. Since prices gradually converge, there is no source
for oscillatory behavior in the economy. The increase in macroeconomic
volatility resulting from the disinflation policy applied in our model is thus
a result that does not obtain in Calvo-type staggering models.
2.4 Discussion
The present study is motivated by the idea that inflation targeting differs
from other disinflation policies in important respects. In particular, a strict
interpretation of an inflation target allows the policymaker to tolerate no de-
viations from target. But adjusting the policy instrument such that the infla-
tion target is attained and defending the new target rigorously may preserve
inflationary distortions such as wage and price differentials to an exceptional
degree. The implications of these distortions might be severe for both real
activity and volatility in the economy.
In order to formalize this idea, I have used a Dynamic General Equilib-
rium Model with wage staggering of the type suggested by Taylor (1979a) to
consider a rather extreme case of a disinflation policy: an immediate and per-
manent reduction in the rate of CPI inflation to a newly set target. I found
that the disinflation policy not only creates a slump in output on impact,
but can additionally generate oscillatory behavior in both nominal and real
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variables along their post-disinflation adjustment path. These oscillations
can be permanent when the returns to labor in the production function are
constant. In this case only, the economy does not gradually converge to a
new steady state. Moreover, I showed that the size of the initial slowdown
in real activity and the magnitude of the oscillations are positively related.
From a modeling perspective, the analysis has shown that the presence
of oscillations along the adjustment path would not occur in a model with a
Calvo (1983) type staggering structure as in Yun (2005). In the framework
of the particular model I employed, I found that the presence of oscillations
along the post-disinflation path of the economy as well as their magnitude
strongly depend on the desired size of the reduction in the inflation rate
as well as the returns to labor in the production function. In particular,
I illustrated that there are no oscillations at all along the post-disinflation
path of the economy if the returns to labor are sufficiently low. At the other
extreme, in the case of constant returns to scale, the oscillations are large
and permanent. The reason is that, in the latter case, CPI inflation targeting
becomes equivalent to a policy of wage inflation targeting.
The present study is in line with the analysis of Yun (2005) in that it
identifies the slow convergence of prices as the major source of inefficiency
resulting from an unexpected, immediate and permanent reduction in the
inflation rate. Moreover, the analysis has shown that the negative conse-
quences of strict inflation targeting identified by Svensson (2000) may be
exacerbated when the policy is used as a disinflation regime. I interpret this
as an explanation for the finding of Roger and Stone (2005) that target misses
are particularly common for disinflating inflation targeters despite the fact
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that monetary authorities in these economies should be particularly eager to
avoid credibility losses.16 In sum, there are good reasons to be cautious when
adopting inflation targeting as a disinflation regime. This may be particu-
larly true for emerging market economies which have a limited experience
with an independent monetary authority.
16The authors provide evidence that suggests that central banks rather shift up the
planned trajectory for the inflation rate than tightening policy in order not to deviate
from it. This behavior complies with the concept of opportunistic disinflation proposed
by Clifton (1999).
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Chapter 3
Strict Inflation Targeting as a
Means of Achieving
Disinflation: Extensions
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I investigate how the conclusions from the previous chapter
change in an open economy setting. In addition to the returns to scale in
the production function, the degree of openness of the economy is identified
as a decisive factor in determining the presence and the magnitude of the
oscillations in the post-disinflation state of the economy. I show that the
degree of openness matters because the exchange rate acts as a stabilizer
along the post-disinflation path of the economy by effectively relieving wages
of part of the burden of reducing the inflation rate. The more open is the
economy, the greater is the share of the burden it can successfully manage.
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Furthermore, I investigate the impact of the disinflation policy on the
economy in the full nonlinear model (as opposed to using a loglinear version
of it as in the previous and the first part of the current chapter). Although
the results are qualitatively very similar to the loglinear economy, a set of
additional conclusions emerges in the special case of a closed economy with
constant returns to scale in the production function. It turns out that the pol-
icymaker faces a surprisingly strict feasibility constraint that does not allow
for the policy to be carried out in virtually any case of empirical relevance.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I extend
the model economy employed in the previous chapter to an open economy
framework. Section 3.3 identifies the degree of openness as a decisive factor in
determining the impact of the disinflation policy on macroeconomic volatility.
Section 3.4 investigates the disinflation policy in the framework of the full
nonlinear model. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Opening up the Model Economy
I now assume that the economy is open in the sense that its agents trade
goods and assets with a foreign country. The economy’s basic structure is
the same as in the previous section. In opening up the economy I follow the
formulation of Fender and Rankin (2008).
I assume that there are now two output sectors, one producing tradable
goods and one producing non-tradable goods. Output in the tradables sector
YTt is exogenous and normalized to one. The production function for non-
tradable goods YNt is equivalent to equation (2.1) in the closed economy
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specification. Markets for both types of goods are perfectly competitive.
The foreign currency price of tradables is normalized to unity. Together with
the assumption that the law of one price holds, this implies that PTt = Et,
where Et is the nominal exchange rate, i.e. the domestic price of foreign
currency. As regards financial markets, Bt is now an international bond
traded between home and foreign agents. The currency of its denomination
is immaterial since we assume that there are no initial outstanding bonds and
there is no uncertainty after the disinflation policy is applied. A no-arbitrage
condition implies interest rate parity
It = I
∗
t
Et+1
Et
(3.1)
where I∗t is the foreign gross interest rate. The optimization problems
of the individual agents are equivalent to the closed economy case except
that households now consume both non-tradable and tradable goods. Their
preference structure is revealed by the composite consumption index
Cjt = C
α
NjtC
1−α
Tjt (3.2)
where 0 < α < 1 and CNjt and CTjt denote household j’s consump-
tion of nontradables and tradables respectively. Utility from consumption
is maximized subject to a given nominal spending constraint Sjt defined by
Sjt = PNtCNjt + PTtCTjt, such that
CNjt = αSt/PNt (3.3)
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CTjt = (1− α)St/PTt (3.4)
where α is the degree of home bias in consumption. I denote 1 − α the
degree of openness of the economy. The consumer price index (CPI) is then
a weighted average of the price of tradables and non-tradables. In particular,
Pt =
P αNtP
1−α
Tt
αα(1− α)1−α (3.5)
The trade balance Tt can be expressed as Tt = 1 − CTt. In principle,
the trade balance may be different from zero, indicating a trade surplus or
deficit. Over time deficits must be balanced by surpluses and initial net
foreign assets. A modified no-Ponzi game condition therefore reads
−I−1B−1 =
∞∑
t=0
[I0I1...It−1]
−1PTtTt (3.6)
However, Fender and Rankin (2008) show that the assumptions of zero
initial net foreign assets and the exogeneity of output in the tradables sector
together imply that the trade balance is zero at any point in time. This
result significantly simplifies the analysis as it allows to abstract from any
dynamics introduced by the accumulation of net foreign assets. As in the pre-
vious chapter, we differentiate a reference zero inflation steady state (ZISS)
around which the equilibrium conditions are linearized from a constant infla-
tion steady state (CISS) in which the economy finds itself one period before
the disinflation policy is applied. The log-linear definitions and equilibrium
conditions of the open economy model can be found in Appendix A.2.1,
where lower-case symbols denote log deviations of variables from their refer-
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ence steady state values.
Notice that in what follows I will distinguish between the reference zero
inflation steady state (ZISS) around which the equilibrium conditions are
linearized and a constant inflation steady state (CISS) in which the econ-
omy finds itself one period before the disinflation policy is applied. As the
economy is closed, bond holdings are zero in both states.1 The linearized
equilibrium conditions are presented in Appendix A.1.1.2 In the following,
lower-case symbols denote log deviations of variables from their reference
steady state values, i.e. vt = log
Vt
VR
.
3.3 The Role of the Degree of Openness of
the Economy
In opening up the model economy I left its basic structure unchanged. This
implies that the initial constant inflation steady state (CISS) is the same
as in the previous section. I can thus directly proceed to derive the post-
disinflation path of the open economy. The disinflation policy is defined
in the exact same way as before and is applied to reduce the rate of price
inflation from its initial rate µI to the new target µD in period t = 0. I begin
the analysis by noticing that price inflation in period t can be expressed as
pt − pt−1 = (1− ασ)(et − et−1) + ασ(wt − wt−1) (3.7)
1While this must necessarily be the case in a closed economy setting, I will impose it
upon the open economy by assumption in the next section
2The interested reader may refer to Fender and Rankin (2008) for the linearization of
the wage setting condition.
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This implies that a reduction in CPI inflation can be the result of a re-
duction in wage inflation, an exchange rate appreciation or both.3 It suggests
that the post-disinflation path of wages may be subject to oscillations of a
smaller magnitude than in the closed economy model if the exchange rate
adjusts to alleviate them from part of the burden of reducing the inflation
rate. In order to investigate this issue, I proceed as in the previous chapter
and express the wage setting condition as
xt =
1
1 + β
[
2γ
1 + γ
(
1
1− ασpt −
1
2
ασ
1− ασ (xt + xt−1)) +
1− γ
1 + γ
xt−1]
+
β
1 + β
[
2γ
1 + γ
(
1
1− ασpt+1 −
1
2
ασ
1− ασ (xt+1 + xt)) +
1− γ
1 + γ
xt+1] (3.8)
Notice that setting α = 1, we are back at equation (2.32), the post-
disinflation law of motion in the closed economy setting. The subsequent
steps are thus equivalent to the analysis in the previous section. I again
define φt = xt − pt. The law of motion of the open economy in the post-
disinflation state is then given by
φt+1 − 1 + β
β
1− ασ + γ
1− ασ − γφt +
1
β
φt−1 = µD(
1− β
β
− 2γ
1− ασ − γ ) (3.9)
The stability proof in Appendix A.1.2 shows that (3.9) is saddlepoint
stable as one of its eigenvalues lies within and the other outside the unit circle.
3The reason is that the foreign price of tradables is assumed to be constant.
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This result holds for any choice of parameter values within the defined limits.
I again use the eigenvalue-eigenvector solution technique of Blanchard and
Kahn (1980) to solve the model. As (3.9) is a scalar second order difference
equation and its RHS is constant over time, its rational expectations solution
is given by
φt = λ1φt−1 − µD (1− β)/β − 2γ/(1− ασ − γ)
λ2 − 1 (3.10)
where λ1 denotes the eigenvalue that is smaller in absolute value and λ2
denotes the one that is bigger. Appendix A.1.2 shows that the condition for
the presence of oscillations in the post-disinflation state of the economy is
now given by 1 − ασ − γ < 0. This implies that an economy that is more
closed is more likely to be subject to oscillatory behavior after the disinflation
policy is applied. The reason is simply that the exchange rate takes a more
significant share in the burden of reducing the rate of CPI inflation, the larger
is the share of tradable goods in the consumption bundle and the price index.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate these results. I have chosen the same pa-
rameterizations as in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 except that α now takes the value
0.9 in Figure 3.1 and the value 0.1 in Figure 3.2. A first look at the graphs
shows that the exchange rate behaves in a qualitatively equivalent fashion
as the new wage. In Figure 3.1 it initially appreciates and then follows an
oscillatory path until it converges to its ZISS level. In Figure 3.2, the conver-
gence process is monotonic. The exchange rate appreciates on impact and
then gradually depreciates towards its ZISS value. Finally, notice that the
oscillations in Figure 3.1 are of a slightly smaller magnitude than in Figure
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Figure 3.1: Open Economy: Post-Disinflation Path with Oscillations
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Figure 3.2: Open Economy: Post-Disinflation Path without Oscillations
2.2. This is in line with the intuition that the exchange rate contributes to
a smoother post-disinflation path of the economy.
In sum, the exchange rate alleviates wages from part of the burden of
reducing the inflation rate when the economy is open. The more open is the
economy, the larger is the role played by the exchange rate and the smaller is
the magnitude of the oscillations in the post-disinflation state of the economy.
Even in the case of constant returns to scale in the production function, the
economy always converges to a new steady state and oscillations are never
permanent.
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3.4 The Nonlinear Open Economy
In this subsection, I investigate the impact of the disinflation policy on the
open economy when the model is not linearized. I do so in order to illustrate
that the log-linear model hides interesting findings by eliminating the model’s
non-linearities. In particular, I show that a disinflation from a constant
inflation rate to zero cannot be implemented for any realistic parametrization
of the model when the returns to scale in the production function are constant
and the economy is closed. The reason is that the actions of the policymaker
are in this case constrained by a liquidity trap. The case of a partial reduction
in inflation is then even more problematic. If inflation is to be reduced to
a positive new target, there is no perfect foresight solution to the model at
all. However, subsequently I show that these constraints are exclusive to
the special case of of a closed economy with constant returns to scale in the
production function of its firms.
3.4.1 The Initial Constant Inflation Steady State
As in the previous section, I assume that the economy is initially in a CISS
in which real variables are constant and all nominal variables grow at the
constant inflation rate µI =
Mt
Mt−1
.4 I again first determine the CISS solution
of the model. In order to derive an expression for nontradables output in the
CISS, I proceed as before and find that
4Note that the definition of µI has changed. The definition of µD changes accordingly.
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YN = A[(
(1
2
+ 1
2
µε−1I )
−ζ + βµζI(
1
2
+ 1
2
µ1−εI )
−ζ
(1
2
+ 1
2
µε−1I )
−1 + β(1
2
+ 1
2
µ1−εI )
−1
)
1
ζ (
1
2
+
1
2
µε−1I )
1
1−ε ]−σ (3.11)
where A = ( 1
σα
)−σ( ε
ε−1
ηζ
δ
(σα)ζ−1)−
σ
ζ > 0. The rate of money growth
enters the expression for nontradables output in a more complex fashion
than in the linearized version of the model. I now identify three channels
through which the rate of money growth µI affects nontradables output in
the CISS. These channels will turn out to be important for the adverse effect
of the disinflation policy on average output.5
(1) Discounting Channel : Under wage staggering, the wage that house-
holds set in period t has to lie between the ideal wage for period t and the
projected ideal wage for period t+1. Under positive inflation, the ideal wage
for period t must be lower than the one for period t+1. And as individuals
discount future utility according to the discounting parameter β < 1, the
wage set in period t will be set closer to the ideal current wage than to the
projected ideal wage for the subsequent period. This, in turn, allows firms to
employ more labor at the same cost and increases output. The magnitude of
the effect increases the greater is the dispersion between the two ideal wages,
i.e. the greater is µI . In sum, µI has a positive effect on equilibrium output
due to its depressing effect on real wages through the discounting parameter
β.6
(2) Productivity Channel : In the presence of inflation, the new wage in
5Note that in the linearized version of the model, there is only one, namely the ’dis-
counting channel’.
6The smaller is β, the lower will households set their wages.
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period t is smaller than the optimal wage in period t+1. Wage staggering
then implies that in an arbitrary period t, wages differ between the sector that
has just adjusted its wage and the sector whose wage is prevailing from the
previous period. This implies that inflation creates wage dispersion between
households with the two sectors alternating in setting the higher wage.7 To
be able to infer what wage dispersion implies for equilibrium output, notice
that labor skills are imperfect substitutes in the production function. This
implies that, ceteris paribus, using equal amounts of each labor types yields
a higher average productivity of labor than using unequal amounts. In the
presence of wage dispersion, profit maximizing firms substitute labor from the
low wage sector for labor from the high wage sector. This choice is optimal
under wage dispersion but is inefficient in comparison with conditions under
which households in different sectors set the same wages and supply the
same amounts of labor and thus attain a higher level of average productivity
per unit of labor.8 In sum, inflation creates wage dispersion which leads to
labor substitution and a reduction in productivity. The higher is ε, the less
severe is this effect. However, the less severe the effect is, the more do firms
engage into labor substitution and the lower is the level of output attained
in equilibrium.
(3) Disutility Channel : I have elaborated on the fact that wage dispersion
induces firms to substitute labor from the low wage sector for labor from the
high wage sector. As long as ζ > 1, the resulting intertemporal fluctuation
7The exact same degree of wage dispersion that is present in the CISS will be preserved
in the post-disinflation state due to the particular nature of the disinflation policy.
8These conditions are for instance satisfied in the ZISS around which I have linearized
the equilibrium conditions in the previous section.
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Figure 3.3: The Effect of the Inflation Rate on Output
in the demand for a given household’s labor supply increases the disutility
the household derives from providing it. This increase in disutility induces
households to demand compensation payments in the form of wage increases.
The higher the degree of wage dispersion, the greater the increase in the wage
level and hence the greater the reduction in output. In sum, µI has a negative
effect on equilibrium output in the CISS as it increases the overall disutility
of work effort. This effect is stronger the greater is ζ .
Figure 3.3 illustrates the effect of µI on CISS output. The impact of a
marginal increase in inflation varies across different levels of the inflation rate.
An increase in the inflation rate affects output positively if the inflation rate
is rather low. The reason is that, at low rates of inflation, the ’discounting
channel’ dominates. The greater is µI , the stronger is the degree of wage
dispersion and the more do the ’productivity channel’ and the ’disutility
channel’ gain in relative importance. For sufficiently large values of µI , the
net effect of a marginal increase in µI on output is negative. This implies
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that the distortion resulting from an additional percentage point of inflation
worsens with the size of the rate of inflation. The smaller the magnitude of β,
ζ and ε, the stronger is the discounting channel relative to the productivity
channel and the disutility channel.9
I move on to derive the CISS solution for the wage index one period before
disinflation. Applying the same procedure as in the previous section, I have
that
W−1 = M−1V [
1
2
+
1
2
µε−1I ]
1
1−ε (3.12)
where V is given by
V =
1
Z
[
ε
ε− 1
ηζ
δ
(σα)ζ−1
(1
2
+ 1
2
µε−1I )
−ζ + βµζI(
1
2
+ 1
2
µ1−εI )
−ζ
(1
2
+ 1
2
µε−1I )
−1 + β(1
2
+ 1
2
µ1−εI )
−1
]
1
ζ (3.13)
where Zt =
Mt
St
and where, assuming that there is no foreign inflation, the
money demand function and the interest rate parity condition imply that
Z =
1− δ
δ
µI
µI − β (3.14)
Equations (3.11) and (3.12) determine the state of the economy one period
before disinflation.10
9Ascari (1998) and Graham and Snower (2004) derive the effect of money growth on
output in similar frameworks and reach the same qualitative conclusion.
10The disinflation policy is unexpected such that the expectation of S0
S
−1
as of period
t = −1 must be µI .
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3.4.2 The Special Case: Closed Economy with Con-
stant Returns to Scale
I initially focus on the special case of a closed economy and constant returns
to scale in the production function. The supply equation (2.3) shows that, as
in the linearized version of the model, these assumptions imply that a policy
of CPI inflation targeting is equivalent to one of wage inflation targeting. I
concentrate on the particular case of µD = 1 to begin with. In solving for
the post-disinflation path of the economy, I follow the same procedure as in
the case of the linearized model.
It is straightforward to determine what the disinflation policy implies for
wages set from period t = 0 onwards. I use the wage index and impose
that the rate of inflation is equal to µI until period t = −1 and to µD = 1
thereafter. I find that in all odd periods starting with period one,
Xt = X−1 (3.15)
and in all even periods starting with period zero,
Xt = X−2 =
X−1
µI
(3.16)
It is straightforward to show that the wage setting condition (2.10) can,
in a complete markets equilibrium, be expressed as
Xt = [
ε
ε− 1
ηζ
δ
W εζt N
ζ
t + βW
εζ
t+1N
ζ
t+1
W εt Nt/St + βW
ε
t+1Nt+1/St+1
]
1
1+ε(ζ−1) (3.17)
I substitute for the wage index and eliminate employment. This yields
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Xt = [
ε
ε− 1
ηζ
δ
(
1
2
X1−εt +
1
2
X1−εt−1 )
1−ζ S
ζ
t + βS
ζ
t+1
1 + β
]
1
1+ε(ζ−1) (3.18)
This relationship holds for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. Evaluating (3.18) at
each particular time period and using (3.15) and (3.16), I find that
St+2 = [[S
γ
t − (M−1V )ζ
1 + β
ε
ε−1
ηζ
δ
(1
2
+ 1
2
B1−ε)1−ζ
(1− βB1+ε(ζ−1))]/β2] 1ζ (3.19)
St+2 = [[S
γ
t − (M−1V )ζ
1 + β
ε
ε−1
ηζ
δ
(1
2
+ 1
2
B1−ε)1−ζ
(B1+ε(ζ−1) − β)]/β2] 1ζ (3.20)
in odd and even periods respectively, where B = (1
2
+ 1
2
µε−1I )
1
1−ε /(1
2
+
1
2
µ1−εI )
1
1−ε .
Equations (3.19) and (3.20) represent the fundamental laws of motion
of the economy in the post-disinflation state. In order to learn about the
stability properties of the two equations, I differentiate both and evaluate
them at their respective steady states. The resulting expressions turn out
not to be analytically tractable. I am thus left with the option to establish
stability results for given parameter values. I compute the slope of each of
the two equations at their respective steady states for various combinations
of parameter values within the defined limits. I find a robust result across
all parameterizations, namely that both equations exhibit a slope greater
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than one at their respective steady states and are thus locally unstable. The
unique non divergent solution of (3.19) and (3.20) must then be given by
their respective steady states. I proceed to rule out unstable solutions as in
the previous section. In the post-disinflation state, nominal consumption is
thus given by
St = [(M−1V )
ζ 1 + β
ε
ε−1
ηζ
δ
(1
2
+ 1
2
B1−ε)1−ζ
(1− βB1+ε(ζ−1))/(1− β2)]1/ζ (3.21)
St = [(M−1V )
ζ 1 + β
ε
ε−1
ηζ
δ
(1
2
+ 1
2
B1−ε)1−ζ
(B1+ε(ζ−1) − β)/(1− β2)]1/ζ (3.22)
in odd and even periods respectively. The results show that, as in the
linearized version of the model, nominal consumption fluctuates between even
and odd periods throughout future periods in the special case of µD = 1.
The same is true for money supply which is given as a function of nominal
consumption by
Mt =
1− δ
δ
St
1− βSt/St+1 (3.23)
However, taking a closer look at (3.22), we observe that a steady state
solution for nominal consumption does not exist in even periods for suffi-
ciently large values of µI . We know that the initial rate of money growth µI
is greater than one. Thus, B < 1. In fact, B decreases with µI . For suffi-
ciently large values of µI , the term B
1+ε(ζ−1) − β is negative. This implies
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that the steady state solution for nominal consumption in even periods does
not exist. The reason is the following: nominal consumption is high in odd
periods in which wage setters set high wages. It is low in even periods in
which wage setters set low wages. A large µI implies a high degree of wage
dispersion and thus strong oscillations in macro variables. For sufficiently
large values of µI , the wage set in even periods becomes arbitrarily small
and so does nominal consumption. Eventually, there is no positive level of
nominal consumption in even periods that is consistent with the wage setting
behavior of households and the disinflation policy becomes infeasible. The
maximum size of the initial inflation rate µI for which the disinflation policy
is still feasible in terms of this constraint depends on the choice of parame-
ter values. Unsurprisingly, it hinges crucially on the parameters β, ε and ζ .
The reason is that these parameters determine the wage setting behavior of
households and thereby the amplitude of the oscillations in macro variables.
The greater is the magnitude of each of these parameters, the stronger incen-
tives must be set to induce the required wage setting behavior on the part of
the households.
The constraint B1+ε(ζ−1) − β ≥ 0 does not, however, turn out to be
binding in this model. The reason is that there is a second constraint for
the policy to be feasible which takes the form of a liquidity trap. The set of
combinations of parameter values that do not violate the second constraint is
a strict subset of those that do not violate the first. This implies that there
are cases in which the economy hits the liquidity trap although a solution
for even periods’ nominal consumption exists. In order to fully understand
why the economy hits a liquidity trap in this framework, notice that the
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consumption Euler equation (2.8) is given by
It =
1
β
St+1
St
(3.24)
The optimal intertemporal choice of consumption requires the nominal
interest rate to be low in odd periods in order to induce a fall in nominal
consumption in the subsequent even period. Similarly, a rise in nominal con-
sumption in odd periods requires a high nominal interest rate in the previous
even period. The money demand function in equation (2.9) shows that the
interest rate increase in even periods causes a fall in even periods’ money de-
mand, while the decrease in odd periods causes a rise in odd periods’ money
demand. The Euler equation and the money demand function taken together
imply the following: the greater are the oscillations in nominal consumption
that the disinflation policy produces in the post disinflation state, i.e. the
smaller is St+1
St
in odd periods, the smaller is the nominal interest rate in
even periods. As St+1
St
approaches β, the nominal interest rate approaches its
lower bound It = 1 and money demand approaches infinity. For
St+1
St
< β,
the nominal interest rate becomes (notionally) smaller than one and the de-
mand for money flicks from infinity to negative infinity. Mathematically, the
reason is that the demand for money is a hyperbola as equation (2.9) shows.
Intuitively, the key insight is that the strict disinflation policy hits the lower
bound of the nominal interest rate. For a sufficiently strong reduction in
inflation, there is no odd periods’ nominal interest rate It > 1 that could
induce an upward jump in money demand of the magnitude that is required
for the policy to work. The monetary authority is thus constrained by a
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Table 3.1: Maximum Value of µI Allowing the Policymaker to Avoid the
Liquidity Trap
β ε ζ µI
0.90 1.4 1.2 1.0052
0.95 3.5 1.4 1.0007
0.95 4.5 1.9 1.0004
0.97 6.0 2.5 1.0001
liquidity trap. In Table 3.1, I list the maximum feasible initial inflation rates
that do not violate this feasibility constraint for given parameterizations. It
is immediately obvious that the constraint is too strict for the policy to be
of any practical relevance in this case.
The above results imply that for sufficiently high initial inflation rates
it may not be possible for the monetary authority to set the future path of
its policy instrument such that the inflation rate is immediately reduced to
zero and the zero inflation rate is sustained throughout future periods. The
magnitude of the feasible reductions in the inflation rate is surprisingly small.
If one considers the last two cases in Table 3.1 to be realistic calibrations, the
analysis implies that the maximum feasible rate of wage inflation which can
be immediately and permanently reduced to zero amounts to less than 0.05
percent. The disinflation policy admittedly is very strict. But the results
suggest that a complete inflation reduction is infeasible for any practical
purposes. An analysis of the effects of the use of strict inflation targeting to
reduce the rate of inflation from a positive to a lower positive value therefore
suggests itself.
In the framework of the linearized model, I found that the nature of the
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disinflation policy’s impact on the economy in the case of a partial reduc-
tion of inflation is equivalent to the particular case of eliminating inflation
alltogether. In the nonlinear model, however, it turns out that there is no
equilibrium of the model that could support such a policy. In particular, the
inflation rate cannot be kept at the new target after disinflation throughout
all future periods. Due to the nonlinearity in the wage index formula, the
new wage is subject to fluctuations between even and odd periods which grow
over time. The new wage set in one of the two sectors grows, while the other
falls and eventually hits its zero lower bound. Hence, an equilibrium does
not exist. Surprisingly, this is not the case if the inflation rate µI is reduced
to a new but negative inflation target 0 < µD < 1. Intuitive explanations
as well as mathematical proofs for these findings are presented in Appendix
A.1.
I now return to the particular case where µD = 1 and proceed to derive
the full post-disinflation solution of the model for the case of a reduction of
the inflation rate from a positive value to zero. Using nontradables supply
and demand, I can express output in the post-disinflation state as
YNt = [
St
W−1
]σ (3.25)
Hence,
YN = [(
1
2
+
1
2
µε−1I )
1
1−ε ]−σ[
1 + β
1− β2
1− βB1+ε(ζ−1)
ε
ε−1
ηζ
δ
(σα)ζ−1(1
2
+ 1
2
B1−ε)1−ζ
]
σ
ζ (3.26)
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Table 3.2: Nontradables Output for Different Calibrations
Parameters Cal A Cal B Cal C Cal D
β 0.9 0.95 0.95 0.97
ε 1.4 3.5 4.5 6
ζ 1.2 1.4 1.9 2.5
µI∗ 1.0052 1.0007 1.0004 1.0001
Nontradables Output Cal A Cal B Cal C Cal D
CISS 0.806029 1.35665 1.12799 1.01772
ZISS 0.805927 1.35664 1.12798 1.01772
Post Disinflation odd 0.843760 1.38503 1.14881 1.02962
Post Disinflation even 0.767502 1.32791 1.10671 1.00556
Post Disinflation avg 0.805631 1.35647 1.12776 1.01759
* µI = 1 in ZISS
For all Calibrations: η = 0.1 and δ = 0.7
YN = [(
1
2
+
1
2
µε−1I )
1
1−ε ]−σ[
1 + β
1− β2
B1+ε(ζ−1) − β
ε
ε−1
ηζ
δ
(σα)ζ−1(1
2
+ 1
2
B1−ε)1−ζ
]
σ
ζ (3.27)
in odd and even periods respectively.
Table 3.2 shows that post-disinflation nontradables output oscillates be-
tween low and high values in a similar fashion as observed in the previous
section for the linearized version of the model. Notice that these oscillations
are of a surprisingly large magnitude. In case A, in which the rate of wage
inflation is reduced by only about 0.5 percent, the magnitude of the oscil-
lations in output is approximately 5 percent. This is empirically absolutely
implausible. Average output is moreover smaller in the post-disinflation state
57
compared to both the initial CISS as well as the reference ZISS. The reason
is that the positive discounting effect of inflation on output is not present
in the POS while the disinflation policy preserves the exact degree of wage
dispersion present in the CISS and thus the adverse effects resulting from it.
The presence of wage dispersion in the post-disinflation state also implies
that ZISS output is, in contrast to the results in the previous section, higher
than average output in the post-disinflation state of the model economy.
Finally, notice that ZISS output is almost equal to CISS output for each of
the calibrations presented in Table 2. One reason is that the disinflation is
of a very small magnitude. Another is that there is no discounting effect but
also no wage dispersion in the ZISS. It appears that the positive discounting
effect of inflation on output and the adverse effects of wage dispersion almost
exactly offset each other in the CISS for the parameter choices presented in
Table 2.
In sum, the disinflation policy is infeasible for any practical purposes in
a closed economy with constant returns to labor in firms’ production func-
tions. For feasible calibrations, it results in a reduction of average output
and substantially increases output volatility. The reduction in average out-
put grows, in relative terms, with the magnitude of the initial inflation rate
µI .
11 In Appendix A.2.3 I show that the disinflation policy, mainly due to
the resulting reduction in average output, also reduces welfare if one excludes
11Notice that Output in the CISS, ceteris paribus, falls with β, ε and ζ. However, it
may increase or decrease with µI depending on the reference value of µI . Moreover, there
is also an interaction effect as the adverse effects of ε and ζ as well as the positive effect
of β on output decrease in magnitude the smaller is µI . This explains, why it is possible
for CISS output to increase from case 1 to case 2 but to decrease from case 2 to case 3
and from case 3 to case 4.
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money balances from the utility function.
3.4.3 The General Case: Open Economy and Decreas-
ing Returns to Scale
The purpose of the present section is to show that both a complete and a
partial disinflation of an empirically relevant size are possible in the nonlinear
model if one abstracts from the special case of a closed economy and constant
returns to scale. The post-disinflation path of the economy moreover looks
strikingly similar to the equivalent case in the log-linear model.
As before I solve for the post-disinflation path of the economy by focusing
on its law of motion, i.e. the wage setting condition, which can be expressed
as
Xt = [
ε
ε− 1
ηζ
δ
W εζt Y
ζ/σ
Nt + βW
εζ
t+1Y
ζ/σ
Nt+1
W εt Y
1/σ
Nt /St + βW
ε
t+1Y
1/σ
Nt+1/St+1
]
1
1+ε(ζ−1) (3.28)
As in the case of the linearized model, we need to normalize all nominal
variables by the price level before we can solve the model. For each nominal
variable Qt, I define Q˜t =
Qt
Pt
. Using this definition as well as the fact that
Pt+1 = PtµD in the post-disinflation state, it is straightforward to show that
the following system of equations determines the post-disinflation path of the
economy:
X˜t = [
ε
ε− 1
ηζ
δ
W˜ εζt Y
ζ/σ
Nt + β(W˜t+1µD)
εζY
ζ/σ
Nt+1
W˜ εt Y
1/σ
Nt /S˜t + β(W˜t+1µD)
εY
1/σ
Nt+1/(S˜t+1µD)
]
1
1+ε(ζ−1) (3.29)
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αα = P˜ αNtS˜
1−α
t (3.30)
W˜t = [0.5X˜
1−ε
t + 0.5(
X˜t−1
µD
)1−ε]
1
1−ε (3.31)
YNt = (
σαS˜t
W˜t
)σ (3.32)
P˜Nt = (αS˜t)
1−σ(W˜t/σ)
σ (3.33)
We need to resort to numerical methods to solve this system of equations.
A set of initial conditions can be derived based on equations (3.11) and (3.12).
The latter define the state of the economy one period before disinflation. As
a solution procedure, I use the Newton-type algorithm first proposed by
Laffargue (1990).12
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 consider a disinflation from two percent down to price
stability. The solid lines represent the post-disinflation path of the economy
in the log-linear version of the model using the same parameterizations as in
Figures 2.2 and 2.3.13 The dashed lines represent the corresponding path of
the economy in the full nonlinear model. It is immediately obvious that a
disinflation of a realistic size is indeed possible in the nonlinear version of the
model. Moreover, not only is the post-disinflation path of the model economy
qualitatively equivalent to the case of the log-linear version of the model, it is
12The algorithm is employed in Dynare for the solution of deterministic models.
13I converted the values from log deviations back to level terms.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of the Linear and the Nonlinear Model I
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of the Linear and the Nonlinear Model II
62
−2 0 2 4 6
1.62
1.64
1.66
1.68
1.7
output
−2 0 2 4 6
0.73
0.735
0.74
0.745
0.75
new wage
−2 0 2 4 6
1.56
1.57
1.58
1.59
1.6
1.61
exchange rate
−2 0 2 4 6
0
10
20
30
40
50
money supply
Figure 3.6: Nonlinear Model: Partial Disinflation with Oscillations
even quantitatively very similar. While the magnitude of the fluctuations in
nominal variables is greater in the nonlinear model, the movements in output
are almost precisely of the same magnitude. This implies that we can draw
the same conclusions from these results as I did in the previous section for
the log-linear version of the model.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 present the results from reducing the rate of price
inflation from 5 percent to 3 percent in the nonlinear model. The nominal
variables are shown as normalized by the price index. It is immediately
obvious that, contrary to the special case of a closed economy and constant
returns to scale, not only disinflations of an empirically relevant size but
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Figure 3.7: Nonlinear Model: Partial Disinflation without Oscillations
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also partial disinflations are possible in the nonlinear model. As in the log-
linear version of the model, the qualitative conclusions arising from partial
disinflations are the same as in the case of a complete disinflation to price
stability.
3.5 Discussion
This chapter investigated how our previous conclusions about the impact of
the disinflation policy change when the model economy is extended to an
open economy setting. In addition to the returns to scale in the production
function, the degree of openness of the economy was identified as a decisive
factor in determining the presence and the magnitude of the oscillations
in the post-disinflation state of the economy. I showed that the degree of
openness matters because the exchange rate acts as a stabilizer along the
post-disinflation path of the economy by effectively relieving wages of part
of the burden of reducing the inflation rate. The more open is the economy,
the greater is the share of the burden it can successfully manage.
Furthermore, I investigated the impact of the disinflation policy on the
economy in the framework of the full nonlinear model. Although the results
are in general qualitatively very similar to the case of the loglinear version
of the model, a set of additional conclusions emerges in the special case of a
closed economy with constant returns to scale in firms’ production functions.
It turns out that the policymaker faces a surprisingly strict feasibility con-
straint that does not allow for the policy to be carried out in virtually any
case of empirical relevance.
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Chapter 4
Bank of England Interest Rate
Announcements and the
Foreign Exchange Market
4.1 Introduction
The Bank of England (BoE) was granted operational independence to set its
key policy interest rate by the incoming UK Labour government in May 1997,
with the goal of creating policy consistent with stable inflation and economic
growth.12 In practice, interest rate decisions are made by the Bank’s Mone-
tary Policy Committee (MPC), which meets for two days each month-as well
as an additional pre-meeting briefing day-and issues a statement regarding
interest rate decisions at noon on the second meeting day. This framework
1This chapter is co-authored with Michael Melvin, Michael Sager and Mark P. Taylor.
2Prior to August 2006, policy decisions were framed in terms of the repurchase, or repo,
rate. We use the names Bank rate and repo rate interchangeably.
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allows a natural laboratory setting for examining the impact of monetary
policy decisions around a known time and date. Since market participants
know that interest rate announcements arrive at noon on the second meeting
day, there may be positioning prior to the announcement and news effects
after the announcement that result in systematic patterns in exchange rate
behavior on MPC meeting days that differ from other days. A stated aim of
the new policy regime was that monetary policy should be more transparent
than hitherto (King, 2000). The availability of the record of MPC decisions
therefore affords us a rare opportunity to examine how the decisions of the
key policy-setting committee are impounded into financial prices. In this
paper, we concentrate on an examination of the pattern of exchange rate
volatility surrounding the MPC’s interest-rate decisions as well as the role
played by the surprise content in the announcements.
Since activities directly related to each MPC meeting are spread over
three different days (see Section 4.3, below), our analysis will include an
examination of the pre-meeting briefing day, the first day of the meeting,
and the second day of the meeting when the policy decision is made and
publicised (as well as days unrelated to the meetings, to serve as controls).
Both daily and high-frequency, intraday data are employed in the analy-
sis. The daily data provide a bird’s eye view of market behavior around
MPC meetings, using a generalised autoregressive heteroscedastic (GARCH)
framework. Given the findings of this low-frequency analysis, a microscope
is then taken to the data to examine exchange rate dynamics on days related
to MPC meetings. The intraday econometric framework is provided by a
Markov switching model where exchange rate returns switch between a high-
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volatility, informed-trading state, and a low-volatility, uninformed or liquid-
ity trading state. A key difference from the usual Markov switching model
employed in financial analysis is our incorporation of endogenous shifts in
the transition probabilities, where these shifts are modeled as a function of
variables related to the MPC meeting and policy outcomes.
We choose to employ a Markov switching framework in order to allow for
an alternative characterization of macroeconomic news effects on the foreign
exchange market. The underlying hypothesis is that macroeconomic news
do not simply affect the market as shocks to otherwise continuous processes.
On the contrary, news effects may change the entire data generating process
for a financial variable. One reason is that ”hot-potato” trades are likely to
dominate the market to an unusual degree as dealers adjust their inventory
and oﬄoad onto other dealers, effectively generating a multiplier effect on
trades (Lyons, 1994). It is difficult to believe that this adjustment period is
characterized by the same data generating process that governed the market
prior to the news impact. An econometric specification allowing for regime
switches therefore appears appropriate. Indeed, one particular benefit of
applying such a model is that it facilitates a plausible interpretation of ob-
served nonlinearities. Moreover, and in contrast to the deterministic models
typically employed in similar analyses, the framework allows for a proba-
bilistic and thus very flexible characterization of the data. In particular, by
modeling switching probabilities endogenously, we allow the probability of
regime switching to vary at various points during MPC meeting days, rather
than modelling the switch deterministically. Given the notoriously capricious
nature of financial markets, our approach therefore provides an interesting
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alternative perspective on news effects on financial markets.
The next section provides a brief review of the literature on the financial
effects of macroeconomic news announcements. In Section 4.3 we provide
some background institutional details on the MPC and the UK monetary
policy-setting process. Section 4.4 contains a discussion of our econometric
methodology and the various hypotheses to be tested. Section 4.5 describes
our data sets and contains our main empirical findings. Finally, Section 4.2
summarises our conclusions and discusses directions for future research.
4.2 Exchange Rate and Asset Price Effects
of Monetary Policy Announcements: A
Brief Review of the Literature
Early intraday studies of macroeconomic news effects on exchange rates, such
as Hakkio and Pearce (1985) and Ito and Roley (1987), tend to provide mixed
results in terms of the significance of news announcements on exchange rate
movements. One possible reason for this finding was the coarseness of the
sampling intervals, with observations of exchange rates taken at opening,
noon and closing. Clearly, if news effects work themselves out within periods
less than several hours, then observing the market at three equally spaced
points over the trading day will miss much of the action. The increased
availability of high frequency intraday foreign exchange rate data during the
1990s considerably advanced research in this area.
Intraday exchange rate volatility effects of news announcements were first
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documented by Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995, 1996).3 Ederington and Lee
(1993) use 5-minute tick data from November 1988 to November 1991 for
mark-dollar, as well as various interest rate futures, and report conclusions
consistent with our findings below. They estimate a series of regressions of
the deviation of the absolute value of exchange or interest rate returns in a
given five minute period on day j from the average return during that pe-
riod across the whole sample as a function of a series of dummy variables
that designate the publication schedule of various US macroeconomic data
series. Ederington and Lee (1993) conclude in favour of a significant change
in intraday exchange and interest rate volatility upon publication of various
macroeconomic series, including the monthly employment report, producer
price inflation and trade data, with the standard deviation of five minute
returns immediately after publication at least five times higher on announce-
ment days than on non-announcement, or control, days. Ederington and Lee
(1993) also find that although the greatest volatility impact occurs within one
minute of publication, the standard deviation of returns remains significantly
above normal for up to forty five minutes after publication for a number of
macroeconomic series.
In an extension to their original paper, Ederington and Lee (1995) per-
form a similar analysis using 10-second data, and conclude that much of
the price reaction to macroeconomic news is actually completed after only
40 seconds. They also find evidence of a pre-announcement volatility ef-
fect immediately ahead of key macroeconomic data releases, consistent with
3Taylor (1987, 1989) provides early, high-frequency studies of the foreign exchange
market and finds some evidence of the impact of news on deviations from covered interest
rate parity.
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our findings below. Similarly, Ederington and Lee (1996) report significant
volatility effects from macroeconomic data releases in the interest rate op-
tions market, although they find against any such effect in mark-dollar option
volatility.
A number of papers have since reported findings similar to Ederington
and Lee (1993), for both macroeconomic data releases and monetary pol-
icy announcements and statements. These include Andersen and Bollerslev
(1998), in the context of a wider study of the determinants of mark-dollar
volatility, and Goodhart, Hall, Henry and Pesaran (1993). Goodhart et. al.
apply a GARCH-M methodology to sterling-dollar tick data over the period
April to July 1989 to analyze the volatility impact of an announced BoE
interest change and publication of US trade data, both of which occurred
in May 1989. Their findings are generally consistent with ours reported
below, in that they find significant evidence of a non-permanent volatility
impact due to the monetary policy announcement and US trade data publi-
cation. They find this volatility effect to be more persistent than either our
results or those of Ederington and Lee (1993), and suggest that it remains
in the data during the subsequent 4-5 days. Almeida, Goodhart and Payne
(1998) perform a similar high frequency analysis of the volatility impact of
US and German macroeconomic data releases using five minute tick data for
mark-dollar over the sample period January 1992 to December 1994. They,
too, find evidence of non-permanent volatility effects. Their conclusion that
these effects generally dissipate within fifteen minutes of publication for US
data releases, and approximately three hours for German releases, are more
consistent with our findings below. Although fewer German data releases
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examined by Almeida et. al. have a significant impact upon the volatility
of exchange rate returns than US series, the number of significant German
releases increases when the authors account for the proximity of the next
Bundesbank policy meeting; the closer to this meeting, the more likely the
Bundesbank will act upon any surprises contained in data releases.
Faust, Rogers, Swanson andWright (2003) use intraday, daily and monthly
data from 1994 to 2001 to estimate structural vector autoregressions (SVARs)
incorporating current and future US and foreign short-term interest rates and
exchange rate series in order to assess the contemporaneous effect of a US
monetary policy shock on other variables in the SVAR.4 Although the re-
sults for future interest rates are mixed, the impact of the monetary shock
on both exchange rates using high frequency data is positive (meaning that a
surprise rate increase depreciates the value of the dollar) and statistically sig-
nificant. In a similar vein, Harvey and Huang (2002) examine the impact of
Federal Reserve open market operations on a range of interest and exchange
rates using GMM estimation and intraday data - specifically, two-minute and
hourly returns - over the period 1982 to 1988. In this case, though, while
the authors find in favour of a significant increase in intraday interest rate
futures volatility associated with so-called Fed Time, they conclude against
any significant, generalised increase in exchange rate return volatility.5
In a complementary study, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003)
focus on detecting shifts in the conditional mean rather than the volatility
4Interest rates are measured using futures contracts for Eurodollar, Libor and Fi-
bor/Euribor. Exchange rates included are sterling and mark/euro, both expressed in
terms of the US dollar.
5They also find evidence that interest rate volatility is actually greater when the Fed
does not conduct operations during the allotted time than when it does.
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of exchange rates. Using five-minute tick data for the Swiss franc, mark,
sterling and yen, all expressed in terms of the US dollar. Andersen et. al.
examine the impact of Federal Reserve policy announcements, as well as a
variety of macroeconomic data series from the US and Germany, over the
sample period January 1992 to December 1998. The authors find in favor
of a significant, asymmetric jump effect associated with shocks due to policy
announcements by the US Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and
a number of US data releases immediately following publication of many
data series; negative US data surprises often exhibited a larger impact upon
exchange rates than positive surprises. By contrast, and yet consistent with
the findings of Almeida et. al. (1998), only relatively few German data
releases exert a statistically significant effect upon exchange rate levels.
A number of studies complementary to our research have analysed the
volatility impact of monetary policy announcements, as well as statements
and speeches by central bank officials, using daily data. These include
Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005), Reeves and Sawicki (2005), Kohn and
Sack (2003), Ahn and Melvin (2007) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007).
Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) analyze the effect of Fed Funds
rate changes and the accompanying FOMC policy statements on bond yields
and stock prices using factor analysis. They find that two latent factors are
necessary in order to capture the asset price effects of monetary policy, with
the former associated with the interest rate change and the latter associated
with the FOMC statements. The strong policy implication of this research
is, therefore, that both monetary policy actions and statements may have
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important effects on asset prices.6
Reeves and Sawicki (2005) analyze the impact on three-month forward
interest rates and long gilt futures of the publication of MPC minutes7, the
quarterly BoE Inflation Report, as well as MPC member speeches and regu-
lar testimonies to parliamentary committees. Using both daily and intra-day
observations over the period June 1997 to December 2005, Reeves and Saw-
icki conclude in favour of a significant interest rate volatility effect due to
the publication of MPC minutes and the Inflation Report (although in this
case only using intra-day data). Kohn and Sack (2003) perform a similar
analysis on the volatility impact of policy statements by the FOMC, as well
as congressional testimony and speeches by former Chairman Greenspan for
the trade-weighted dollar, a range of interest rates and S+P500 returns using
daily data over the sample period January 1989 to April 2003. They find that
FOMC statements generate a significant change in the volatility of interest
rates, but no significant change in the volatility profile of either the dollar or
S+P500 returns. This finding is consistent with the evidence that we present
below using daily data.
Ahn and Melvin (2007) conduct an intradaily examination of exchange
rate regime switching for Federal Reserve FOMC meeting days and find sur-
prising evidence of switches to a high-volatility informed trading state during
the time of the meeting rather than at meeting end when decisions are an-
nounced. An extensive search of public news suggests that this informed
6Grkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) find, in fact, that policy statements have a much
greater impact on longer-term Treasury bond yields.
7Since October 1998, MPC minutes are published thirteen days after the associated
policy announcement that is the focus of our study.
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trading state cannot be explained as the response to public information.
This is consistent with a market where informed traders are taking positions
in advance of the meeting end based upon their expectations of the outcome.
Finally, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) undertake an EGARCH study of
Federal Reserve, BoE and ECB monetary policy announcements and broader
statements regarding economic outlook using daily data over sample periods
that begin in 1997 for the BoE, and 1999 for both the Federal Reserve and
ECB; all sample periods run until 2004. Although evidence for exchange
rates is mixed, Ehrmann and Fratzscher do conclude that policy announce-
ments by all three central banks exert a significant impact upon the volatility
of interest rates. In addition, the impact of BoE policy announcements is
significantly larger than either the Federal Reserve or ECB. This second find-
ing is consistent with the authors’ hypothesis that the BoE combination of
collegial communication strategy and individualistic voting strategy leads
to more regular and significant policy announcement shocks than for either
the Fed or ECB. The volatility impact of broader statements on economic
outlook is only significant in the case of the Federal Reserve.
4.3 The Monetary Policy Committee
In May 1997 Gordon Brown, then UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, an-
nounced that the BoE would be given operational responsibility for setting
interest rates via the newly created MPC.8 The MPC was to focus on an
inflation target of 2.5 percent on a two-year horizon for the retail price index
8For institutional background on the MPC and the monetary policy process, see Bean
(1999). Note that inflation targeting had been adopted in the UK since 1992.
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excluding mortgage interest payments.9 Conditional on maintenance of the
inflation target, the MPC could also address fluctuations in economic growth
and employment.
The MPC is comprised of nine members. Five are drawn from the BoE:
the Governor, the two Deputy Governors, and two Executive Directors. The
other four members are drawn from outside the Bank and are appointed by
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. At the time this paper was written, the
four external members included two academic economists and two business
economists. The Governor serves as the Committee chair.
The Committee meets monthly, normally on the Wednesday and Thurs-
day following the first Monday of each month. The meeting dates for each
year are published well in advance of the meetings.10 On the Friday morning
prior to each meeting, the Committee meets for a briefing to prepare for the
meeting. Summaries of important news and trends are provided by senior
BoE staff. On the Monday and Tuesday prior to the meeting, the BoE staff
prepares any additional background information and analysis required by the
Committee. On these days MPC members receive written answers to any
questions that arose at the Friday briefing along with any new data releases
or important news.
The monthly MPC meeting typically begins at 3.00 pm on Wednesday
afternoon with a review of the state of the UK and world economy. The BoE
Chief Economist starts the meeting with a short summary of any major events
since the Friday briefing. On Thursday morning, the MPC reconvenes and
9This policy goal was subsequently changed to 2.0 percent in December 2003, and is
now defined in terms of the harmonized consumer price index.
10These are published at www.bankofengland.co.uk.
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the Governor begins with a summary of the major issues. Members are then
invited to state their views of the appropriate policy to follow. The Deputy
Governor responsible for monetary policy will usually speak first with the
Governor speaking last. Ultimately, the Governor offers a motion that he
suspects will result in a majority vote and then calls for a vote. Members
vote with a one-member, one-vote rule. Those in the minority are asked to
state their preferred level of interest rates. Lastly, the press statement is
developed. If the decision is to change interest rates or follow a policy that
was not expected by the market, the press statement will include the reasons
for the action taken. In other cases, simply the decision is reported. This
decision is announced at noon, London time. Following the announcement,
policy is implemented with open-market operations beginning at 12:15 pm.
4.4 Methodology
The focus of this paper is on inference regarding movements in the dollar-
sterling exchange rate during MPC meetings. Given that the foreign ex-
change market knows when the MPC meets and when its decisions are an-
nounced, we want to examine evidence regarding any market positioning
before and during the meeting and as to whether these effects are driven by
the news content of the respective policy announcement.
A logical first step is to examine whether meeting days are different from
other days as well as from one another in terms of systematic patterns in
dollar-sterling exchange rate movements. As discussed above, given the
multi-day structure of MPC deliberations, one may hypothesise that the
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foreign exchange market forms an opinion about the likely meeting outcome
prior to the public announcement at noon on the second day of the meeting.
This does not have to rest upon information leaks from the Committee. It
may be that traders close down trade positions in advance of the interest
rate decisions in order to limit their risk exposure precisely because they are
unsure about the upcoming announcement. Furthermore, such behavior may
be driven by astute MPC-watchers’ informed opinions of the likely Commit-
tee vote. An analogy in the Federal Reserve case is the often-cited story of
how Fed-watchers at one time gauged the likely FOMC decision by the size
of the briefcase that former Chairman Alan Greenspan carried to work. The
idea was that a thick briefcase signaled a likely interest rate shift while a thin
briefcase signaled a high probability of no change in policy. No doubt, there
are many such stories one could gather from MPC watchers as well.
We explore the evidence in the data regarding briefing days, first meet-
ing days, and second meeting days by initially analyzing daily returns for
USD/GBP. We estimate simple linear models of daily exchange rate returns
incorporating dummy variables for days of MPC briefings, first, and second
meeting days as well as a variable indicating the size of the interest rate
change:
∆et = a+ b0Briefing + b1Day1t + b2Day2t + b3∆it + εt (4.1)
where ∆et is the change in the logarithm of the exchange rate on day
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t, and Briefing, Day1, and Day2 are dummy variables equal to 1 on the
respective MPC meeting day and equal to zero otherwise. These dummy
variables are subsequently incorporated into the conditional variance equa-
tion of a GARCH model. Following Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) and
Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998), we allow the announcement effects to
have a temporary impact on the conditional variance only, on the basis that
announcement effects are likely to die out in less than a full day:11
∆et = µ+ c1∆et−1 + ... + cn∆et−n +
√
stεt (4.2)
εt|Ωt−1 ∽ N(0, ht) (4.3)
st = (1 + δ0Briefing + δ1Day1 + δ2Day2) (4.4)
ht = ω + αε
2
t−1 + βht−1 (4.5)
where Ωt−1 denotes the information set at time t-1. The conditional
variance on any given day t is therefore given by stht and, e.g., by (1 +
δ2)ht on second meeting days. This implies that δ2 captures the percentage
increase in the conditional variance on second meeting days. Estimation of
the model is carried out using quasi-maximum likelihood. The results of
11We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this specification.
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this daily analysis can help inform us as to whether exchange rate returns
and their volatility differ around the time of MPC meetings, or in between
the various days of these meetings, and according to whether the respective
policy announcements on second MPC meeting days came as a surprise to
the market.
We then take a microscope to the data for second meeting days to examine
the intraday behavior of returns on days when a policy decision is announced.
Before turning to the questions to be examined, the econometric framework
employed in our intraday analysis is introduced.
It is usual to think of high-frequency exchange rate data on any given day
as bounded within a fairly narrow band and exhibiting first-order autocorre-
lation. By contrast, on MPC meeting days we may expect important news
to be received by the market. We find it convincing to think of these news
effects as changing, temporarily, the entire data generating process of the ex-
change rate - and other financial variables - rather than simply introducing
a one-time shock to an otherwise continuous process. Intuitively, so-called
”hot-potato” trades are likely to dominate the market to an unusual degree
in the immediate aftermath of the news as dealers adjust their inventory
and oﬄoad onto other dealers, effectively generating a multiplier effect on
trades (Lyons, 1994). It is difficult to believe that this adjustment period is
characterised by the same data generating process that governed the mar-
ket prior to the news announcement. An econometric specification allowing
for regime switches therefore appears appropriate. We chose to adopt the
Markov switching framework associated with Hamilton (1990, 1994), allow-
ing the switching probabilities to be endogenously determined (Diebold, Lee
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and Weinbach, 1994).
An important advantage of this framework is that it facilitates a plausible
interpretation of observed nonlinearities and allows for probabilistic rather
than deterministic switching between regimes.12
A Markov-switching first-order autoregressive model for exchange rate
returns is postulated as follows:
∆et = µ(St) + ρ(St)[∆et−1 − µ(St−1)] + εt (4.6)
where εt ∽ N [0, σ
2(St)] and where ∆et is the change in the logarithm
of the exchange rate at time t. Note that the mean of the exchange rate
returns process µ, the autocorrelation coefficient ρ, and the variance of the
innovation, σ2 are allowed to take on one of two values depending on the
realization of an unobserved state variable Stǫ[1, 2]. In our application, we
assume a two-state Markov process. One of the states (say, state 2) may
be thought of as reflecting the usual pattern of exchange rate returns with
negative autocorrelation and a relatively small variance. This tranquil state
is the normal state that would be associated with liquidity trading when no
important information arrives in the market. The other state (say, state 1)
may be thought of as the informed-trading state when volatility is high and
12Along with our hypothesis that intraday news does not generate a one-time shock
to the distribution of variables, as discussed above, the opportunity to interpret nonlin-
earities is a principal motivation for employing the Markov switching framework in our
intraday analysis rather than simply continuing with the GARCH analysis used at the
daily frequency.
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realized returns much larger than normal (Easley and O’Hara, 1992; Lyons,
2001).
Thus far, our proposed methodology is similar to that employed, inter
alia, in Engel and Hamilton (1990). However, we diverge from the traditional
Markov approach by modelling the probability of switching from one regime
to another endogenously. Denoting the transition probability of switching
from regime j to regime i at time t as P ijt for i, jǫ[1, 2], we can write the
postulated functions for the transition probabilities, conditional upon infor-
mation at time t, It, and the previous state, as
P iit = Pr[St = i|St−1 = i, It] = Φ[αii + β
′
iiXt] (4.7)
where Φ denotes the cumulative normal density function (in order to
ensure that the probabilities lie in the unit interval) and where XtǫIt is
a vector of variables known at time t which may influence the transition
probability according to the vector of loadings βii. Given P
11
t , we implicitly
have P 21t = 1− P 11t . Similarly, given an estimate of P 22t , we implicitly have
P 12t = 1− P 22t .
The Markov-switching framework is applied to high-frequency data to ad-
dress several questions of interest in the intraday setting. First, can we iden-
tify endogenous regime switching? Are the transition probabilities driven by
the news component in the policy announcements? To test if the MPC policy
announcement released at noon on the second meeting day is price-relevant
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public news, we incorporate various dummy variables in the explanatory vari-
able vector Xt. These dummies were set equal to one for a certain afternoon
period, say noon to 13:00, and to zero otherwise.
A second question of interest is whether evidence exists of positioning
during the second meeting day prior to the policy announcement at noon?
To address this question, we incorporate dummy variables equal to one for
various time intervals prior to noon and zero otherwise. We explore alterna-
tive definitions over different morning time intervals as a sensitivity analysis.
4.5 Data and Empirical Findings
Our data sample spans over a decade, running from the inception of the
Monetary Policy Committee in June 1997 through to October 2007, and in-
corporates 126 MPC meetings. Tables A.2 to A.4 in the Appendix list the
MPC meeting days in our sample and the associated interest rate decision
for each meeting. We classify an MPC decision as a surprise to the mar-
ket if it differs from the median expectation taken from a survey of market
economists by Bloomberg.13 The standard deviation of analysts’ expecta-
tions is reported as a measure of forecast dispersion. The tables also provide
a range of alternative surprise measures - based on 3 months short term in-
terbank rates (IB) as well as 3 months sterling interest rate futures contracts
13This survey is carried out on the Friday before each MPC meeting (i.e. on the same
day as the pre-briefing of the MPC by staff members of the BoE) and asks respondents
for the magnitude-if any-of the interest rate change that they expect to result from the
upcoming meeting. In its current guise, the survey collates the expectations of up to 60
financial economists. Although the sample of economists is not necessarily the same from
one month to the next, a core subset ensures continuity and the survey is in any case is
designed to capture market expectations.
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on the London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) - to be
used for robustness checks.14
Tables A.2 to A.4 suggest that the Bank of England has succeeded in
achieving its goal of improving monetary policy transparency. All surprise
measures show a clear downward trend in the frequency of policy surprises.
Interest rates were raised at 19 meetings and lowered at 17 meetings. Of the
36 meetings at which the Bank rate was changed - 19 increases, 17 cuts -
this policy action was expected by the market on 18 occasions, as measured
by the Bloomberg survey. Of the remaining 18 instances, the market was
either surprised that the MPC changed the policy rate or was surprised by
the extent of the change. There were no instances where the market expected
a change in the policy rate in the opposite direction to the change actually
announced. Including the May 2000 meeting, at which the market expected
a rate change but the MPC kept its repo rate constant, this adds up to a
total number of 19 policy surprises according to the Bloomberg survey.15 We
therefore divide the meeting day sample into the 107 days when the change
- including a change of zero basis points - in the policy rate was exactly as
predicted - we term these ’No Unexpected Change Days’ - and the 19 days
when the rate changed by an amount different to market expectation - which
we term ’Unexpected Change Days’.
14The period t policy announcement is classified as a surprise to the market if the
difference between the period t+1 (IB or Liffe) rate and the period t-1 rate is greater than
10 (15) basis points.
15According to ’IB10’ (’IB15’, ’LIFFE10’, ’LIFFE15’), 21 (13, 19, 10) policy surprises
can be identified during the sample period.
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4.5.1 Daily Data and Results
Daily observations of USD/GBP were obtained from the Federal Reserve
Board. These are buying rates at noon New York time (17:00 London time).
The daily data are sampled for the period May 1, 1997 to October 31, 2007.
Using daily data, we estimated the model represented by equation (4.1)
above by OLS. The evidence indicates that the explanatory variables Brief-
ing, Day1, Day2, and have no power in explaining exchange returns. This
is true whether the meeting-related variables encompassed all meeting days
or just those on which the Bank rate was changed unexpectedly. But the
regression results do indicate the presence of significant GARCH effects. We
then estimated the GARCH specification for daily exchange rate returns out-
lined above in which the dummy variables related to MPC meetings enter the
conditional variance equation multiplicatively. Estimation is carried out by
quasi-maximum-likelihood estimation using a Gaussian likelihood function
and robust standard errors. The results indicate no explanatory power for
variables related to all meetings. However, letting the meeting day dummies
take the value one on meetings with surprising interest rate changes only,
our preferred specification generates the values reported in Table 4.1. In this
specification, the dummy for meeting day 2, Day2 is statistically significant
at the 1 percent level. The coefficient indicates that the conditional variance
increases by about 25 percent on second meeting days. On briefing days, on
the other hand, the conditional variance is about 11 percent lower than on
non-meeting days.
Results regarding the Day2 dummy were equivalent using all of our var-
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Table 4.1: GARCH Model of Daily Exchange Rate Returns
ious alternative surprise measures based on 3-months short term interbank
rates or 3-months sterling interest rate futures contracts (Tables A.5, A.6,
A.7, A.8 in the Appendix), demonstrating the robustness of the results. So,
although USD/GBP exchange rate returns appear to be unrelated to meet-
ing day variables, exchange rate volatility is typically greater on days when
policy surprises are announced.
4.5.2 Intraday Data and Results
The daily analysis indicates that second MPC meeting days are different
from other days in volatility terms. We now take a microscopic look at these
days in order to investigate systematic exchange rate movements and their
determinants within a narrow window around the interest rate announce-
ments. In this high-frequency setting, all references to MPC meeting days
refer to second meeting days when the policy announcement is made. Tick
data for USD/GBP were obtained from a major international bank for each
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of our 126 MPC meeting days and a set of 126 control days, defined as the
same day of the week as the MPC exactly one week after the MPC meeting.
Either no data or insufficient data could be made available to us for 14 out
of the total of 252 days.16
We sample the last quotation of each 5-minute interval over the hours
7:00-17:00 London time to create a series of exchange rate returns, defined
as the change in the logarithm of the 5-minute observations multiplied by
10,000.17 The data for each day are stacked in serial order to create a data
set with 28,556 observations. For further reference, it is important to notice
that the 12:05 observation on any given day is the last quotation from within
the interval 12:00-12:05.
The Markov model represented by equation (4.6) above was used to es-
timate the effect of MPC announcements on the transition probabilities.
Estimation of the model was carried out using a modified version of the EM
algorithm due to Diebold, Lee and Weinbach (1994). The two states are
identified by significant shifts in the mean µ, the autocorrelation coefficicient
ρ and the variance σ2.18 Recall that state 1 is the high-variance state asso-
ciated with information-based trading and state 2 is the low-variance state
associated with the normal market conditions of liquidity trading. The re-
16We also do not include the extraordinary and unscheduled meeting of September 18,
2001, and the respective control day.
17Danielsson and Payne (2002) compare one week of indicative quote data with firm
quotes from an electronic FX brokerage and find that the properties of returns for each
series become quite similar at a 5-minute sampling frequency. At higher frequencies, the
indicative quotes tend to lag firm quotes. We choose the 5-minute sampling strategy to
ensure that our exchange rate returns are representative of market conditions. The raw
data were referenced to Greenwich Mean Time, so time references were appropriately
adjusted to account for British Summer Time.
18Only in the case of the constant transition probability model are the means not sig-
nificantly different from zero.
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Table 4.2: Constant Transition Probability Model
sults in Table 4.3 show that the estimated state 1 variance is generally found
to be about 3.5 times that of state 2. Statistically significant negative first-
order autocorrelation was also found in all models. Negative autocorrelation
is a common finding in high frequency exchange rate returns.
In Table 4.2 we report estimates of the constant transition probability
model and then in Table 4.3 we report the preferred model. The payoff
from estimating the endogenous transition probabilities is demonstrated by
the significant likelihood ratio statistic associated with comparing the con-
stant transition probability model as the restricted estimate and the time-
varying transition probability model as the unrestricted estimate.19 In terms
of the transition probabilities, P 11 is the probability of remaining in the high-
volatility state and P 22 is the probability of remaining in the low-volatility
state. Normally, we would expect P 22 > P 11 and this is what the data reveal.
Estimating a Markov-switching model with fixed transition probabilities re-
19From the log-likelihood values reported in Table 4.2 and 4.3, this statistic is -2(-
73022+71082)=3880 (p-value = 0.00). Notice that the means are not significantly different
from zero in the specification with constant transition probabilities.
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Table 4.3: Preferred Time-Varying Transition Probability Model
sulted in the following estimates: P 11=(1.68)=0.95 and P 22=(1.74)=0.96.
The unconditional probability of being in state 2 associated with these tran-
sition probabilities is given as (1−P
11)
(1−P 11)+(1−P 22)
= 0.556, so the unconditional
probability of being in state 1 is 0.444.
Moving on to the time-varying probabilities model, it is first of all interest-
ing to find that the mean return is significantly positive in the high-volatility
state and significantly negative in the low-volatility state. This result might
appear puzzling as it suggests that return volatility is high when the pound
appreciates against the dollar and low when it depreciates. It is interesting to
investigate, whether this result is driven by the interest rate announcement
or whether it is simply an artefact of the data in the sample period consid-
ered. In order to further investigate this, we included additional intercept
terms into the mean equation of our preferred specification as follows:
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∆et = µ(St)+µpos(St)I(∆i > 0)+µneg(St)I(∆i < 0)+ρ(St)[∆et−1−µ(St−1)]+εt
(4.8)
where µpos and µneg are additional constant terms, I(∆i > 0) is an in-
dicator function that takes the value 1 on interest rate surprise days be-
tween 12:05-13:00 if the announced interest rate is higher than expected, and
I(∆i < 0) is an indicator function that takes the value 1 on interest rate sur-
prise days between 12:05-13:00 if the announced interest rate is lower than
expected. We chose this definition for the indicator function as the analy-
sis will proceed to show that the impact of interest rate announcements on
the market is by far the greatest between 12:05-13:00 on announcement days
when the announcement comes as a surprise to the market. As Table 4.4
reveals, the coefficients on µpos are significantly positive in both states and
the coefficients on µneg are significantly negative in both states, with none
of the previous results changed in a substantive way. These results indicate
that, as expected, a higher UK policy rate than expected yields a positive
mean return to holding sterling during the main impact period of the an-
nouncement, implying that the pound appreciates. A lower policy rate than
expected yields a negative mean return during the main impact period of the
announcement, implying that the pound depreciates. The finding that the
mean return is, on average, generally positive in the high-volatility state and
negative in the low-volatility state is therefore unrelated to the effect of the
policy announcements. It rather appears to be a general artefact of the data
within the sample period considered in this study: during periods unrelated
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Table 4.4: Markov Switching Model Including Additional Constant Terms
to surprising policy announcements, there is on average more volatility during
times of appreciation than depreciation of the pound against the dollar.
Transition probabilities are modeled as varying with dummy variables
that switch to 1 at certain times of day and are equal to 0 otherwise. Prelim-
inary estimates suggested that the preferred model has P 11 as a function of
a constant and a dummy that is equal to one from 12:05-13:00 only on MPC
meeting days when interest rates changed unexpectedly, a dummy equal to
one from 12:05-13:00 on all MPC days, a dummy equal to one on all days
between 12:05 and 13:45 and a dummy equal to one between 11:30 and 11:55
on all MPC days.20 P 22 is a function of a constant, a dummy equal to one
on all days between 12:05 and 13:45, and a dummy equal to one on all MPC
meeting days from 11:15-11:55.21 Estimates are reported in Table 4.3, and
20Notice that the observation for 12:05 on any given day is the last quotation within
the interval 12:00-12:05-i.e. the first observation in our data set after the interest-rate
announcement.
21As discussed above, interest rates were deemed to have been changed unexpectedly by
the MPC when the rate change, including a zero change, was different from the median
expectation according to the Bloomberg survey of market participants - Tables A.2 to A.4.
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indicate that each of the determinants of P 11 and P 22 differ significantly from
zero with p-values of 0.01 or lower.
The results indicate that the probability of remaining in the informed
trading state P 11 is significantly higher from 12:05-13:00 following news that
the MPC has unexpectedly changed its Bank interest rate. Based upon our
preferred model specification, the estimated value of P 11 changes from 0.74
before 11:30 to 0.85 between 11:30-11:55 and to 0.98 during the hour imme-
diately following the unexpected change in the Bank rate.22 The probability
of remaining in the tranquil state, P 22, falls significantly between 11:15-11:55
on MPC announcement days and between 12:05-13:45 on all days. But al-
though statistically significant, one may argue that the implied change in P 22
is not economically significant. Tables A.9, A.10, A.11 and A.12 in the Ap-
pendix report results from estimating the same specification but replacing the
Bloomberg survey surprise measure with the alternative measures detailed
above. The similarity of results is striking and suggests that our findings are
robust. Accordingly, for the remainder of our analysis we concentrate on the
Bloomberg survey surprise measure.
Following on from our baseline estimates, Table 4.5 assesses the sensi-
tivity of transition probability estimates over alternative specifications using
afternoon dummy variables. In each case, the baseline model is augmented
by an additional explanatory variable. These additional dummy variables
are defined according to the same time divisions as previously, but over more
types of day-second MPC days with and without interest rate changes, and all
22The preferred model specification is determined for surprises defined according to the
Bloomberg Survey of market Economists.
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Table 4.5: Additional Variables Added to the Preferred Model Specification
days-than those incorporated in the preferred specification.23 For instance,
the dummy ’Additional 1’ takes the value one from 12:05-13:00 on all days.
Adding this dummy to the specification for P 11 and testing its significance
yields a coefficient of -0.12 and a p-value of 0.26. Table 4.5 indicates that
none of the added variables is statistically significant.
One potential difficulty in this form of analysis is to ensure that estimated
intraday state probabilities truly reflect the impact of MPC policy announce-
ments, rather than the effect of other news or shocks. One obvious omitted
variable candidate in this respect is the announcement calendar of other
central banks. In particular, there are twenty-eight meetings in our sample
where MPC announcement days coincided with policy announcements by the
Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB). Announcements
by the ECB occur at 12:45 GMT, which coincides with the reported signif-
icant increase in the probability of remaining in the informed trading state
P 11 following announcements of MPC policy decisions. To test whether sig-
23Recall that this focused only on 2nd MPC days with surprise announcements.
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nificant volatility shifts in USD/GBP returns in part reflect a response to
the publication of ECB interest rate decisions, we therefore included a set
of dummy variables to proxy for these announcements. These dummies take
the value one for time periods starting at 12:45 GMT on (a) all days on which
MPC and ECB policy announcements coincided, (b) those coincident days
on which the ECB announced an interest rate change, or (c) only those coin-
cident days which involved an ECB policy surprise.24 As Table 4.6 reports,
only the dummy representing the time period 12:45-17:00 on all coinciding
days was significant, when included in the specification for P 11, with a p-
value of 0.02 and a coefficient of -0.21.25 Overall, though, our results are not
altered in any substantive way by the inclusion of any of these ECB dummy
variables.
We can conclude that the evidence in presents a robust result: we have
presented significant evidence of a systematic regime switch to a high-volatility
informed trading state on MPC days when the BoE Bank rate is changed
unexpectedly. This effect is highly significant for about an hour following the
interest rate announcement. After this time, the probability of remaining in
the informed trading state falls significantly. This result for MPC days with
unexpected interest rate changes is clearly distinguished from other days and
is not simply a ”time of day” effect that exists in the market every day. In
response to the questions posed above, Can we identify endogenous regime
24We define ECB surprise announcement days according to changes in the short term
interbank rate (EURIBOR) using the same approach as for the BoE in Tables A.2 to A.4.
25A priori, one would expect the coefficient on this dummy variable to have a positive
sign, indicating that ECB policy announcements increase the probability of higher return
volatility in USD/GBP market. Accordingly, the observed negative estimated sign may
indicate that this dummy is capturing something other than the volatility impact of ECB
policy announcements.
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Table 4.6: Controlling for ECB Monetary Policy Announcements
switching? Are the transition probabilities driven by the news component in
the policy announcements, we can answer with a strong affirmation.
We now turn to the final question to be addressed using intraday data:
Is there evidence of positioning during MPC meetings prior to the policy
announcement at noon on the second meeting day? The news anticipation
effect is captured by the coefficients on the dummy variable for 11:30-11:55 on
all MPC days in the P 11 equation and the dummy variable for 11:15-11:55 on
all MPC days in in the P 22 equation.26 As reported in Table 4.3, both dummy
variables are indeed significant. The coefficients imply that from 11:30-11:55
there is an increase in the probability of remaining in the informed trading
state-that is, state 1- and that from 11:15-11:55 there is a decrease in the
probability of remaining in state 2, the liquidity trading state. The previous
results summarized in Table 4.3 established that the noon announcement of
26Allowing the news anticipation effect to be captured by dummies with different starting
points in the two equations improves the fit of the model.
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unexpected interest rate changes were, indeed, price-relevant news as there
is a switch to the high-volatility informed trading state immediately after
the announcement. The current question requires that the pre-noon period
receive a microscopic examination.
Parts A, B, and C of Table 4.7 incorporate alternative morning dummy
variables into the preferred model as a further robustness check. This pro-
ceeds much like the analysis associated with the post-noon announcement
effect. Starting with the baseline preferred model, we specify alternative
dummy variables for the pre-noon period for our three different types of
days: all days, all MPC meeting days, and MPC meeting days when an un-
expected interest rate change was announced, and examine the sensitivity of
the estimates to the additional variables. Part A includes dummy variables
for all days over alternative times of the morning. For instance, the first row
of part A includes a dummy equal to 1 from 11:45-11:55 in the P 11 equa-
tion. The p-value indicates that this additional variable has no significant
explanatory power. Our preferred model results are not altered by the inclu-
sion of the variable. Similarly, the other variables added to the P 11 and P 22
equations have no significant explanatory power.
Part B of Table 4.7 incorporates additional morning dummy variables
for all MPC days into the preferred model, and part C incorporates addi-
tional morning dummy variables on Unexpected Change Days. None of the
dummies in part B are significant. By contrast, in part C dummies for the
periods 11:45-11:55, 11:30-11:55 and 11:00-11:55 enter the P 11 equation with
significant p-values, and positive coefficients. In addition, the dummy for
9:00-11:55 in the P 22 equation is borderline significant as well. This suggests
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Table 4.7: Markov-Switching Model of MPC News Anticipation Effects
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that the probability of being in the high volatility state increases by to the
interest rate announcement on days with unexpected interest rate changes as
compared to days when the announcement is anticipated. This result could
be interpreted as indicative of information leakages prior to the announce-
ment. The results from our baseline specification are again not changed in a
substantive way by the inclusion of these variables.
Taken as a whole, there is evidence of regime switching in terms of ex-
change rate volatility in the morning prior to the end of the MPC meetings.
The evidence is strongest for the P 11 equation for the 11:30-11:55 time pe-
riod. During this interval, there is a statistically significant jump in the
probability of remaining in the high-volatility state, from 0.74 to 0.85. Of
course, since the meetings always end prior to the noon announcement and
the MPC’s policy decision is known by insiders, the regime switching could
be a result of signals read by market participants. This is not to claim that
there are deliberate information leaks emanating from the committee. It
may be something much more subtle (recall the Greenspan briefcase story
presented earlier). Furthermore, it may be that traders are simply closing
down trade positions in order to limit their risk exposure precisely because
they are unsure about the upcoming announcement. The evidence presented
here indicates no particularly large probability shifts prior to the conclusion
of MPC meetings. This is certainly true if one considers the probabilities
of regime switching in the morning compared with the afternoon. The news
impact of policy announcements appears to be much larger than any antici-
pation effect.
The implications of the intraday estimation results for the transition prob-
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abilities are summarized in Figure A.3 in the Appendix. The figure plots the
smoothed unconditional probability of being in state 1, for the three types
of days in our sample as generated by the preferred model reported in Table
4.3. This probability is averaged across all observations for each type of day
for each 5-minute interval. One can observe dramatic differences across types
of days and time of day.
It is clear that non-MPC meeting days are characterized by low-volatility,
liquidity trading as the probability of remaining in the informed trading state
is quite low all throughout the day; fluctuating between 0.25 and 0.45. On
MPC meeting days when no unexpected interest rate change occurs, there is
an increase in the average unconditional probability of being in state 1 that
begins modestly around 11:30 and continues until 12:05 when it jumps to
about 0.53. After this peak, the probability quickly falls to about 0.40 by
about 12:30 and then by 13:00 is quite similar to the afternoon pattern on
non-MPC days.
On MPC meeting days when an unexpected interest rate change occurs,
however, there is a dramatic jump at noon when the policy announcement is
released, from about 0.55 to more than 0.90. The probability of being in the
informed trading state subsequently remains above 0.70 until about 13:00
after which it continues to fall so that by about 13:30 it appears to follow a
pattern much like other days. In Figure A.4 in the Appendix we have plotted
the same information as in Figure A.3 but using alternative measures of
policy surprises, as detailed above. The overall pattern is strikingly similar,
suggesting that the results are robust to the exact characterization of policy
surprises.
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An interesting feature of Figure A.3 is that the probability of moving into
the high-volatility state rises even on days when the interest rate decision
was correctly anticipated. This is perhaps worthy of further investigation,
since one might expect anticipated announcements to be discounted into the
exchange rate prior to the announcement. One possible explanation of this
finding may be related top the fact that we have used the median expectation
from the Bloomberg survey and ignored any dispersion in expectations among
survey participants: there will in general still be some people surveyed who
are surprised by the announcement even when it coincides with the median
view. If these people then initiate trades in response, this may then generate
a series of ”hot-potato” trades, although the multiplier effect on trades would
be expected to be smaller than if the majority of the market were surprised.
In order to investigate the validity of this argument, we use the measure
of forecast dispersion introduced in Tables A.2 to A.4 to distinguish days
when analysts were unanimous in regarding their expectation of the policy
announcement from MPC days when they were not. We construct a dummy
that takes a value one from 12:05-13:00 on MPC days without policy sur-
prises when the standard deviation of analysts’ expectations is zero. We then
construct a second dummy variable that takes the value one from 12:05-13:00
on MPC days without policy surprises on which the standard deviation is
greater than zero. We include both of these variables in the P 11 equation
of our preferred specification and exclude ’Dummy 2’, representing the time
span 12:05-13:00 on all MPC days. The data set is reduced to 24,683 ob-
servations due to a lack of data on analysts’ expectations prior to October
1998.
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Table 4.8: Markov-Switching Model Taking Account of Forecast Dispersion
Table 4.8 shows that only the variable indicating non-surprise MPC days
with dispersion in expectations exhibits a significant influence on P 11, with
a p-value of 0.001 and a coefficient of 0.4. This suggests that the rise in
P 11 at noon on MPC days without policy surprises is only significant when
at least one individual deviated from the median market expectation. This
finding gives support to the argument above that the increase in P 11 at noon
on MPC days without surprises is due to the use of the median individual
analyst’s expectation as a proxy for the entire market’s expectation. In
other words, even if the median expectation does not differ from the actual
announcement, there are still market participants who are surprised by the
announcement. This emphasizes the importance of investor heterogeneity in
the foreign exchange market (Sager and Taylor, 2006).
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Overall, the evidence in Figure A.3 indicates that MPC days are, indeed,
different from other days. The noon policy announcement appears to be
price-relevant news, in particular when the announcement comes as a surprise
to the market. There is some modest evidence of positioning in advance of the
announcement on all MPC days, but for days when interest rates are changed
unexpectedly, it appears that the market response comes immediately at
noon with the news. It also appears that the market takes around an hour
to digest the news component of an unanticipated announcement in terms of
the average P 11 dropping significantly back to around its previous level.
It should also be noted that our findings-in particular the evidence of
a strong exchange rate reaction to the news announcement (which is much
more marked on days when the interest rate announcement differs from the
median market expectation) with little strong evidence of positioning during
the morning period of the meeting-are qualitatively similar to those reported
by Sager and Taylor (2004) in their high-frequency study of the exchange
rate effects of interest-rate announcements by the Governing Council of the
ECB, suggesting that the results are robust.27
It is also interesting to contrast our results with those of Evans and Lyons
(2007). We conclude in favour of a significant but relatively short-lived im-
pact upon the volatility of exchange rate returns for both unexpected and
expected rate changes. By contrast, Evans and Lyons’ analysis of proprietary
27Likewise, Clare and Courtenay (2001) examine the response of interest and exchange
rates to UK monetary policy announcements and macroeconomic data releases using 1-
minute tick data in a sample that spans the introduction of operational independence
at the BoE. They, too, find in favour of a significant volatility effect due to both types
of new information, and for both interest and exchange rates, and also conclude that the
implications of policy innovations are more quickly incorporated into interest and exchange
rates in the post-independence era than previously was the case.
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order flow data concludes in favor of a very persistent relationship between or-
der flow and exchange rate returns, with the former exhibiting out-of-sample
predictive power for returns as much as one quarter ahead, but no significant
impact in the short-term. This contrast reflects differences in the behaviour
of market participants in the various segments of the foreign exchange mar-
ket. In this paper, we have isolated the impact of knee-jerk trading on the
volatility of returns around the time of MPC interest rate announcements, as
inter-dealer positioning adjusts to reflect the arrival of this new information.
This is an important and quick process, as befits a liquid and relatively effi-
cient market as foreign exchange. But it is only part of the story. Evans and
Lyons (2007) focus explicitly away from inter-dealers and on the customer
segment of the market that accounts for more than 50 percent of market
turnover.28 As Sager and Taylor (2006) discuss, other than smaller hedge
funds the majority of foreign exchange market customers typically does not
a similar exhibit knee-jerk reaction to news as the inter-dealer market. Al-
though this behavior contradicts the Rational Expectations Hypothesis, it is
rational - in the sense of being profit-maximizing - and reflects both the size
of assets under management, and associated transaction costs of trading, and
that a large proportion of the trading activity of this market segment is not
driven by news innovations, but benchmark adjustments (Lyons, 2001).
28This segment includes asset management firms, such as mutual fund managers, as
well as hedge funds, corporates and central banks. For information on the share in foreign
exchange market turnover of the various market segments, see BIS (2007).
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4.6 Discussion
Following the granting of independence on the setting of interest rates to the
Bank of England in 1997, the Monetary Policy Committee was created as
its interest-rate setting committee, charged with fostering monetary policy
consistent with stable inflation and economic growth. A stated aim of the
new policy regime was that monetary policy should be more transparent than
hitherto. The availability of MPC decisions affords us a rare opportunity to
examine how the decisions of the key policy-setting committee are impounded
into the foreign exchange market.
Since the MPC meets at regularly scheduled, pre-announced times and the
policy decision is always announced at noon, the meetings provide a natural
laboratory for examining exchange rate dynamics on days when monetary
policy is formulated and announced. Our particular interest is with respect
to the news content of the policy announcement and also whether there is
any evidence of positioning in the foreign exchange market during the MPC
meeting prior to the announcement.
We employed daily data on USD/GBP to analyze any differences that
may exist in the behavior of exchange rate returns on the three kinds of days
associated with MPC meetings: the pre-meeting briefing day; the first day of
the meeting; and the second day of the meeting when the policy announce-
ment is made. We estimated models of daily exchange rate returns to infer
if information on MPC meeting days contains any explanatory power. Our
estimation results suggest that daily exchange rate returns are well character-
ized by mean-zero changes and meeting day information has no explanatory
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power for returns. But modeling the conditional volatility of the daily re-
turns revealed evidence of significantly greater volatility on second meeting
days when interest rates are changed unexpectedly.
Given this result, we turned to a microscopic view of second meeting days
using intraday exchange rate returns and an endogenous-probability Markov-
switching framework. Our estimated model assumed that there exist two
states: state 1, the high-volatility state associated with informed trading,
and state 2, the low-volatility state associated with liquidity trading. We
diverged from the usual non-linear regime-switching framework to model en-
dogenous transition probabilities as a function of information regarding the
meeting days. The transition probabilities were found to switch systemati-
cally and significantly on meeting days. The probability of remaining in the
high volatility state was estimated to increase from 0.74 before 11:30 to 0.98
from 12:05-13:00 on MPC meeting days when interest rates are changed by
an amount different from that expected by the market (or are not changed
when the market expects a change).
The second day of MPC meetings, the day on which interest rate decisions
are announced, is therefore best characterized as having a-statistically and
economically-significant exchange rate reaction to the news announcement
at noon with some evidence of positioning during the morning period of the
meeting. These announcement effects last for around an hour to ninety min-
utes and are much more marked on days when the interest rate announcement
differs from the ex ante median market expectation.
An interesting extension of these results would be to empirically test
the ability of market participants to profitably exploit these announcement
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effects-that is, to validate the economic significance of our findings-through a
profit-loss analysis of trading strategies that, say, introduce short-lived option
structures in USD/GBP on the second day of MPC meetings around the time
of the policy announcement. This is a task we leave to future research.
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Chapter 5
Monetary Shocks and Portfolio
Choice
5.1 Introduction
The current financial crisis has for several years been preceded by substan-
tial global imbalances in trade and capital flows.1 In particular the United
States were not only at the center of the financial crisis, but also among the
economies relying most heavily on capital inflows to finance a growing trade
deficit. A number of observers have argued that accommodative monetary
policy over the past decade has been a key culprit behind these imbalances
by inducing the build-up of excess liquidity, a rise in financial leverage and
a boom in asset prices. This, in turn, may have contributed to a surge in
private consumption, in part due to wealth effects, and ultimately a rising
US current account deficit (e.g. Taylor 2009).
1This chapter is co-authored with Marcel Fratzscher and Roland Straub
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During the same period, capital flows to the United States have exhibited
peculiar dynamics regarding their composition, with the US current account
deficit financed increasingly via inflows into bonds as opposed to equities.
Figure 1 illustrates this point, underlining that in particular since 2001, in
an environment of accommodative monetary policy, net inflows into US debt
securities have surged to close to 6% of US GDP or about USD 800 billion
per year, while net inflows into equities, FDI and other investment have been
modest and even negative at times.
The role of monetary policy thus warrants closer scrutiny in order to
understand how it may have contributed to the dynamics of capital flows,
both in terms of their size and their composition. This is a first objective
of the paper. More specifically, the paper focuses on the effect of monetary
policy shocks in the United States on the US trade balance and different
types of capital flows.
Moreover, the focus on the effect of monetary policy shocks on the direc-
tion and composition of capital flows allows us to contribute to the debate
on the determinants of portfolio choice, and how asset price movements are
related to portfolio decisions of investors across countries as well as across
financial asset classes. This is the second objective of the paper. An im-
portant strand of this literature analyses portfolio rebalancing versus return
chasing as motives for investment decisions, in an environment of incomplete
financial markets and imperfect substitutability of financial assets (e.g. Bohn
and Tesar 1996, Hau and Rey 2006 and 2008, Albuquerque 2007, Devereux
and Sutherland 2006, Tille and van Wincoop 2007). A related literature fo-
cuses on understanding asset price comovements, in particular the peculiar
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stock-bond return correlation, which are hard to explain via the use of em-
pirical models to date (e.g. Shiller and Beltratti 1992, Baele, Bekaert and
Inghelbrecht 2008).
The paper employs a standard structural VAR specification to identify
monetary policy shocks, relying on sign restrictions imposed on the im-
pulse response functions of a few macroeconomic variables, following closely
Canova and De Nicolo (2002), Uhlig (2005) and Fratzscher and Straub (2008).
We specify our Bayesian VAR using US variables relative to those of other
G7 members in the baseline specification, and relative to an extended sample
of rest of the world countries in the robustness specification.
The empirical analysis yields two key findings. First, US monetary policy
shocks exert a statistically and economically meaningful effect on US capital
flows and the trade balance. An exogenous easing of US monetary policy
by 100 basis points (b.p.) induces net capital inflows and a worsening of
the US trade balance of around 1% of GDP after 8 quarters. The variance
decomposition indicates that US monetary policy shocks over the period 1974
to 2007 explain about 20-25% of the variation in both the US trade balance
and capital flows at that horizon. As to the channels, it appears that wealth
effects play a central role. Equity returns rise on impact by about 6% in
response to a 100 b.p. policy easing,2 while interest rates fall. Both of
these responses in turn induce an increase in private consumption for about
8 quarters, and thus a deterioration in the trade balance.
The second main finding regards the effect of monetary policy shocks on
2This estimate is essentially the same as that found in the literature (Rigobon and Sack
2002, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2004, Bernanke and Kuttner 2005) which mostly use an
event-study methodology focusing on the daily response to FOMC policy surprises.
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the composition of US capital flows. The intriguing finding is that an ex-
ogenous US monetary policy easing causes net inflows into debt securities,
foreign direct investment (FDI) and other investment, while inducing net
outflows of portfolio equities. Monetary policy shocks thus entail a condi-
tional negative correlation between flows of portfolio equity and debt. By
contrast, monetary policy shocks induce a positive conditional correlation in
equity returns and bond returns, as is well known in the literature. Moreover,
they cause a negative conditional correlation between equity flows and equity
returns, but a positive conditional correlation between bond flows and bond
returns. The findings are robust to a battery of extensions and sensitivity
checks, such as using the approach suggested by Fry and Pagan (2007) to
extract the median impulse responses from a single model.
How should one understand and rationalize these empirical findings?
From an observational perspective, the findings seem to fit well with the
stylized facts of Figure 1 stressing the shift in the composition of capital
inflows from equities to bonds amid an environment of low interest rates in
recent years.
Furthermore, our empirical analysis allows us to contribute to the lit-
eratures on the determinants of portfolio choice as well as on asset price
comovements. As to the literature on portfolio choice, one strand of the de-
bate has emphasized the role of a return chasing motive behind international
capital flows, in which investment decisions are primarily driven by expected
returns. Bohn and Tesar (1996) analyses return chasing and portfolio re-
balancing in a simple ICAPM framework, yielding a decomposition of net
purchases into transactions necessary to maintain a balanced portfolio and
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net purchases that are triggered by time varying investment opportunities.
Their results suggest that US transactions in foreign equities are primarily
driven by the latter return chasing motive. In another classic paper, Brennan
and Cao (1997) study the effect of information asymmetries between domes-
tic and foreign investors on international portfolio flows, finding evidence in
favor of a positive correlation between equity flows and returns, though only
for US investments abroad.3 Finally, an important recent strand of this lit-
erature rationalists the return chasing motive for capital flows (Albuquerque
2007), and presents evidence that such return chasing is taking place at a
global scale due to asymmetries in information and differences in investor
performance (Albuquerque et al. 2008).
Another strand of the literature has provided evidence in favor of a promi-
nent role for the portfolio rebalancing motive as a driver of capital flows
(Branson and Henderson, 1985). The more recent literature stresses the in-
completeness of financial markets and the role of various forms of risk that
make domestic and foreign assets imperfect substitutes, and in which thus
portfolio rebalancing is a key driver of international capital flows. Hau and
Rey (2006) argue that the (unconditional) negative correlation between eq-
uity returns and exchange rate returns may be rationalized through a port-
folio rebalancing motive in which exchange rate risk induces investors to
reallocate capital out of countries with rising exchange rates.
In Hau and Rey (2008), the authors find evidence in favor of portfolio
rebalancing in a sample of 6500 international equity funds for the US, UK,
3However, they do not find such a positive correlation for foreign investment into US
assets. They explain this finding by the notion that foreigners are less informed and thus
revise their predictions more strongly when they receive a given signal.
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Canada and the EU. Calvet et al. (2009) find similar micro evidence for
portfolio rebalancing in the behavior of Swedish households. Froot and Ra-
madorai (2002) use proprietory data on daily institutional investor currency
flows and find that these flows are highly correlated with contemporaneous
and lagged exchange rate changes. At a macro level, there is a growing lit-
erature emphasizing the role of country risk and market frictions for why
capital is not flowing to countries with high asset returns (e.g. Kraay et
al. 2005, Gourinchas and Rey 2006, Gourinchas and Jeanne 2006, Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti 2006, Daude and Fratzscher 2007, Alfaro et al. 2008).4
The evidence of the present paper is consistent with a portfolio rebalanc-
ing motive for equity portfolio flows - as implied in the negative conditional
correlation between equity returns and equity flows - and a motive akin to
return chasing behind investment decisions for bonds - as indicated by the
positive conditional correlation between bond returns and bond flows.
As regards the return correlations, the literature on asset price comove-
ments stresses that there tend to be strong time variations in the comove-
ments of returns across different asset classes, such as between equity re-
turns and bond returns. These strong time variations constitute a puzzle, as
neither present value models (Shiller and Beltratti 1992), nor consumption-
based asset pricing models (Bekaert, Engstrom and Grenadier 2005), nor
dynamic factor models with a broad set of economic state variables (Baele,
Bekaert and Inghelbrecht 2008) are able to explain them well. Andersen et
4An important related literature is emerging using DSGE models with endogenous
portfolio choice (Coeurdacier 2005, Devereux and Sutherland 2006, Tille and van Wincoop
2007, Pavlova and Rigobon 2008), which stresses the imperfect tradability of risk, which
contributes to the home bias in the international investment patterns.
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al. (2007) show that the bond-stock return correlation is positive during
periods of expansion but negative and large during economic contractions.
They conjecture that this strong time variation and switch in sign in the cor-
relation may be explained by the time-variation in the relative importance
of cash flow effects and discount rate effects: during expansions, discount ef-
fects dominate thus inducing a positive correlation between stock and bond
returns; while cash flow effects are dominant in contractions so that returns
on bonds - with fixed nominal cash flows - have the opposite sign compared
to returns on equities - which have stochastic dividends.
The present paper stresses that this positive correlation between stock
returns and bond returns is present precisely when discounting effects (mon-
etary policy shocks) dominate. Of course, it also implies that this correlation
may be different when other shocks dominate. As such, the present paper
focuses on understanding the effect of one specific shock for portfolio choice
and asset prices, while we leave it for future research to condition the analysis
on other types of economic shocks. Moreover, the paper’s findings emphasis
the importance of jointly analyzing quantities and prices, i.e. portfolio flows
in conjunction with asset price movements, and also across asset classes for
understanding the portfolio choices of investors.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we examine the determinants
of net capital flows in a simple intertemporal capital-asset pricing model as
discussed in Bohn and Tesar (1995). Section 3 presents the empirical model
and outlines methodology used to identify monetary policy shocks in detail.
Section 4 presents the empirical findings for the benchmark specification and
discusses the interpretation and the implications of the results. Robustness
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and sensitivity tests are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
5.2 Decomposing Net Capital Flows
We begin by examining the determinants of net capital flows in an intertem-
poral capital-asset-pricing model as discussed in Bohn and Tesar (1995). We
use the model to fix language and notation. Although originally constructed
for equity investment, the intutition of the model can be applied to most
other forms of investment in a similar fashion. The model yields a natu-
ral decomposition of net purchases of assets into (i) transactions that are
necessary to maintain a balanced portfolio of securities (portfolio-rebalancing
effect) and (ii) net purchases that are triggered by time-varying investment
opportunities (return-chasing effect). As a result, depending on which of
the two effects dominate in the investor’s portfolio allocation, the correlation
between investment returns and net capital flows may take either sign.
We begin by considering the problem an investor faces who can purchase
both domestic and foreign equity. Let NPkt be the period t net purchases
of stocks in country k and let W be the value of the investor’s portfolio. By
definition, the following relationship determines how net purchases of asset
k are related to portfolio shares (αkt) and total wealth (Wt):
NPkt = αktWt − (1 + gkt)(αkt−1Wt−1) (5.1)
where gkt is the capital gain on security k. Since wealth at time t is a
function of the return on the total portfolio between periods t− 1 and t, net
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purchases can be approximated as:
NPkt = (αkt − αkt−1)Wt−1 + (dpt + gpt − gkt)(αkt−1Wt−1) (5.2)
where dpt and g
p
t are the dividends and capital gains on the investor’s total
portfolio. The right hand side of equation (5.2) comprises two terms, each
representing possible motives for the investor to purchase or sell security k.
The first component indicates that a change in the investor’s desired portfolio
weight on security k between period t− 1 and t may trigger the purchase or
sale. The second component suggests that the investor will purchase security
k when her wealth increases due to dividend payments on her total portfolio
of assets. However, she will sell security k when returns on asset k exceed
returns on the rest of the portfolio such that the portfolio is not in balance
anymore.
In particular, Cox et al. (1985) show that investors facing the standard
trade-off between mean return and variability behave subject to the following
optimality condition linking the portfolio weight on security k to the return
process:
αkt = σekΣ
−1
t Et(µ) + ηkt (5.3)
where σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, E(µt) is the vector
of expected excess returns on all securities, ek is a 0-1 vector that selects
element k, Σt is the covariance matrix of returns and ηkt is the component
of the portfolio used to hedge the investor against all other types of risks
that are not related to her equity investment strategy. For tractability, it is
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assumed that time variation in the model occurs in the first moments of the
driving processes for returns and the state variables only. The reason is that
this ensures that the hedge terms are constant. Substituting into (5.2) yields
a condition that determines the investor’s portfolio adjustment strategy:
NPkt = (d
p
t + g
p
t − gkt)(αkt−1Wt−1) + σekΣ−1t [Et(µ)− Et−1(µ)]Wt−1 (5.4)
The first component on the right hand side of equation 5.4 captures what
we denote the portfolio-rebalancing effect, namely net purchases of asset k
that are required to maintain constant portfolio weights. The second term
captures the extent to which investors adjust portfolio weights as the portfolio
is reoptimized over time. Given a fixed level of risk aversion and a constant
variance-covariance matrix of returns, an investor adjusts portfolio weights
only if his expectations of excess returns are revised over time. We therefore
refer to this as the return-chasing effect.
The two effects imply different correlation structures between the (ex-
pected) return on capital and capital flows. If the portfolio rebalancing effect
dominates, an increase in the relative return on assets in country k should
lead to a net capital outflow as indicated by the negative coefficient on the
local capital gain gkt. On the other hand, if the return chasing effect domi-
nates then changes in the investor’s expectation of excess returns in country
k should dominate portfolio flows. The latter implies a positive correlation
between expected excess returns and net capital flows.
We emphasise that the purpose of this section is purely motivational in
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order to illustrate the implications of changes in returns for portfolio flows,
and vice versa. Our empirical exercise in the next sections will investigate
which effect dominates empirically when analysing net portfolio flows of debt
and equity following a monetary policy shock in the United States.
5.3 The Empirical Model
In this section, we present our empirical model and explain the implemen-
tation of our pure-sign restrictions approach. In Appendix A.13, we define
further the variables that we use in the analysis and declare the respective
data sources.
5.3.1 Model Specification
We estimate a structural VAR model of the form
yt = c+
p∑
i=1
Aiyt−i +B
−1εt (5.5)
where B is an (n× n) matrix of contemporaneous coefficients, Ai is an
(n× n) matrix of autoregressive coefficients, εt is an (n× 1) vector of struc-
tural disturbances and yt an (n× 1) vector of endogenous variables, and p
is the number of lags in the VAR. The model we use is of dimension n = 8,
where yt is defined as
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yt = [ct − c∗t , it − i∗t , cpit − cpi∗t , eqt − eq∗t , nbt, reert, tbt, capt] (5.6)
The variable capt represents the different capital flow variables that are
included in the model one at a time. These are the aggregate Financial Ac-
count, and its four individual components Foreign Direct Investment, Port-
folio Equity, Portfolio Debt and Other Investment. All of these are net flows,
i.e. changes in assets minus liabilities, and are by definition relative variables
where a positive value denotes a net inflow of the respective type of capital
from the rest of the world into the United States.5 The remaining variables
are the trade balance as a ratio of GDP, tbt, which is the main counterpart
of the financial account in the balance of payments identity.6 We include
this variable not only because at any point in time trade deficits must be
balanced by financial account surpluses, but also because potentially net fi-
nancing needs for trade deficits may be an important driving factor of capital
flows.7
The variable nbt is the ratio of non-borrowed to total reserves which we
include solely for the purpose of identifying monetary policy shocks. We
follow Strongin (1995), Faust and Rogers (2003) and Uhlig (2005), among
others, who argue that the reserve ratio is the monetary aggregate that can
be most closely associated with changes in the monetary policy stance of the
5A problem associated with the capital flow variables is that they tend to be very
volatile at times. We therfore use five-quarter moving averages of them for our estimation.
6More precisely, given the accounting identity of the balance of payments, the financial
account tracks the trade balance quite closely (with the opposite sign) with differences
arising due to the income and transfer accounts under the current account, the capital
account, changes in reserves and statistical discrepancies.
7The qualitative results of this study are robust to the inclusion of the current account
balance in place of the trade balance in the model.
118
United States. The variable reert is the log of the real effective exchange
rate. The remaining variables ct− c∗t , it− i∗t , cpit− cpi∗t and eqt− eq∗t respec-
tively represent the percentage differences between US and rest of the world
variables for consumption (ct−c∗t , in USD), short term interest rates (it−i∗t ),
CPI inflation (cpit − cpi∗t ) and equity returns (eqt − eq∗t , in USD).
In the benchmark specification, ”Rest of the World” is defined as a GDP
weighted average of the non-US G7 countries. The exception is the equity
return differential eqt − eq∗t for which countries are given weights according
to their share in the aggregate non-US G7 equity market capitalization. It is
important to note that the given definition of the equity return differential
eqt − eq∗t in USD terms implies that it effectively represents the deviation
from equity parity as defined in Hau and Rey (2006). According to their
definition, equity parity holds whenever the equity return differential in local
currency terms is exactly offset by the nominal exchange rate return.
We use quarterly data that spans the sample period between 1974 and
2007. The year 1974 is used as a starting point of the analysis as it marks
the beginning of the floating exchange rate period after the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system. The choice of the time period and the associated
data availability considerations naturally limit the choice of candidate coun-
tries to be included in our definition of the ”Rest of the World”. We will,
however, test the robustness of our results to the extension of the definition
by including a range of additional countries. The economies included in the
two ”Rest of the World” samples are listed in the Appendix.
5.3.2 Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks
We are interested in the effect of a monetary policy shock on the different
types of net capital flows between the United States and the rest of the
world. We identify monetary policy shocks using the pure-sign restrictions
approach pioneered by Faust (1998), Canova and de Nicolo´ (2002) and Uhlig
(2005). The technique allows us to identify structural error terms from a
reduced form version of the VAR model presented in equation (5.5) by using
a minimum of intuitively appealing sign restrictions on the impulse response
functions of some of the endogenous variables included in the vector yt. The
identification restrictions we use are well grounded in economic theory and
are by now widely used in the academic literature to identify monetary policy
shocks.
We present the restrictions we use to identify an expansionary monetary
policy shock in Table 5.1. An upward arrow indicates that the respective
variable is required to increase for four quarters following the shock. In
particular, we assume that an expansionary monetary policy shock reduces
short term interest rates and has a positive effect on consumption, inflation
and the ratio of non-borrowed to total reserves. In terms of the relative
variables in our model, this implies that a monetary policy shock reduces
it − i∗t and increases ct − c∗t , cpit − cpi∗t and nbt. In Table 5.1, the upward
arrow on ct−c∗t is shown in parentheses as we will leave out this restriction at
a later point in the analysis as a robustness check. Table 5.1 also presents the
restrictions of two additional types of shocks: an aggregate demand shock
and an aggregate supply shock. The reason is that it has been shown that
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Table 5.1: Sign Restrictions
Structural Shock it − i∗t cpit − cpi∗t nbt ct − c∗t
Monetary Policy ↑ ↑ ↑ (↑)
Aggregate Demand ↑ ↑ ↑
Aggregate Supply ↓ ↑
increasing the number of identified shocks can help to uncover the correct
sign of the impulse response functions (Paustian 2007). We therefore identify
these two additional structural shocks as a robustness check but do not report
results on the impulse responses to these shocks in what follows. Moreover,
the table illustrates that the identifying restriction for monetary policy shocks
make this type of shock distinct from supply and demand shocks.
We now move to the implementation of the pure-sign restrictions ap-
proach. Thereby, we follow Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002), Uhlig (2005)
and Peersman and Straub (2008) in recovering the structural error terms
from the estimated reduced form model via the use of sign restrictions on
the impulse response functions of some of the endogenous variables. Let us
first define vt = B
−1εt as the reduced form residuals of the VAR. Standard
OLS estimation of the reduced form VAR yields thereby an estimate of the
variance-covariance matrix Σ = E (vtv
′
t). In order to identify the structural
error terms underlying these disturbances such that impulse response func-
tions can be constructed, we need to find a way to choose among the infinite
number of possible decompositions of Σ. Two candidate decompositions are
the Cholesky Factor and the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition. The lat-
ter is given by Σ = CC ′ = PDP ′ where P is a matrix of eigenvectors andD is
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a diagonal matrix with the corresponding eigenvalues on the main diagonal.
Although this decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix is intuitively
not very appealing as it is economically not meaningful, the crucial advan-
tage is its uniqueness and the fact that it generates orthonormal shocks. It
therefore allows us to generate any possible decomposition of Σ by finding
an orthonormal matrix Q such that QQ′ = In and writing the newly found
candidate decomposition as Σ = CQQ′C ′ = ĈĈ ′.
The only task left is thus to find an algorithm that allows to efficiently
search through the infinite space of orthonormal matrices Q and to con-
struct candidate decompositions accordingly. Such an algorithm can be
achieved by constructing a desired number of orthonormal matrices Q as
Q =
∏
m,nQm,n(θ) where Qm,n(θ) are rotation matrices of the form:
Qm,n(θ) =


1 · · · 0 · · · 0 · · · 0
· · · . . . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 · · · cos (θ) ... − sin (θ) · · · 0
...
...
... 1
...
...
...
0 · · · sin (θ) · · · cos (θ) · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · . . . · · ·
0 · · · 0 · · · 0 · · · 1


(5.7)
and where m and n are the rows that are being rotated by the angle θ.
The number of rotation matrices is naturally large in a model of dimension
n = 8. In fact, there are n(n − 1)/2 = 28 bivariate rotations for a given
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angle θ. The algorithm we use entails to randomly draw a rotation angle
θ (j) and to construct the matrix Q as the product of the resulting rotation
matrices Qm,n(θ). In principle, any rotation can be constructed by varying
the parameter θ (j) in the range [0, π]. This algorithm allows for an efficient
exploration of the infinite space of possible realizations of the matrix Q. A
given draw Qj allows us to construct a candidate contemporaneous impact
multiplier matrix Ĉj and the corresponding set of impulse response functions
Rj,t+k = A(L)
−1Ĉjvt (5.8)
For estimation and inference, we use a Bayesian approach. Our prior
and posterior for the coefficient matrix A (L) and the variance covariance
matrix Σ come from the Normal-Wishart family. We use the same weak
parameterization for the prior as in Uhlig (2005). In order to draw ”candi-
date truths” Ĉj, we jointly draw from the Normal-Wishart posterior for the
variance covariance matrix Σj and the coefficient matrix Aj(L) as well as
from the uniform distribution of the rotation angles θ (j). Impulse response
functions are then constructed using the above procedure. A sign restriction
on the impulse response of variable p to shock q after k periods following the
shock is of the form:
Rpqk (j) ≷ 0 (5.9)
We impose our set of sign restrictions for four periods after the shock occurs.
If the impulse response functions obey the postulated sign restrictions, we
keep the draw. If they do not, we discard it. We continue this procedure until
we have found 1000 admissible draws. When identifying multiple shocks, we
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identify them simultaneously. This means that, in order for a given draw to
be accepted, it must obey the restrictions applicable to each of the identified
shocks simultaneously.
At any point in the response horizon the distribution of impulse responses
across accepted draws is subject to two different sources of variation. One
is the uncertainty around the estimates of A(L) and Σ which we take into
account by means of using a Bayesian approach. The other source of variation
is the uncertainty introduced by drawing a value for the candidate rotation
angle θ (j). This effectively generates variation ”across models” and brings
about the question of how to summarize the distribution of impulse response
functions across accepted draws at each point along the response horizon.
Following most of the sign restrictions literature, we simply report the median
of each distribution along with upper and and lower quantiles in order to give
an idea of the range of permissible impulse responses. Fry and Pagan (2007)
criticize this practice on the grounds of the fact that the resulting benchmark
impulse response function does not necessarily emerge from a single model.
In fact, it would only be the case if Rpqk (j) was monotonous in the rotation
angle θ(j) at each k. But since there is no guarantee for monotonicity, the
different points in the benchmark impulse response function will generally
come from different models, i.e. different values of θ(j). The issue is the
same across all variables and all shocks. As a consequence, the identified
shocks are no longer orthogonal to each other and we present a set of impulse
responses which are not simultaneously generated by the same model.
In order to remedy these shortcomings, Fry and Pagan (2007) suggest
to choose the rotation angle θ (j)∗ as a benchmark for which the impulse
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responses are as close as possible to the median response across all shocks
and variables. In their approach, the impulse responses are thus produced
by a single model and a set of orthogonal shocks, while at the same time
somewhat preserving the consensus view that the median is a good way of
summarizing the results. As a criterion for choosing the rotation angle θ (j)∗,
for which the impulse response functions Rpqk (j) are closest to med (R
pq
k ), the
authors suggest to use the sum of the squared deviations, normalized by the
standard deviation across the response horizon and across all variables and
shocks.
min
θ(j)
n∑
p=1
n∑
q=1
h∑
k=1
(
Rpqk (j)−med (Rpqk )
std (Rpqk )
)2
(5.10)
where h is the horizon considered in the impulse response function and
std (Rpqk ) is the standard deviation of R
pq
k across all accepted draws. While
employing the standard approach of reporting the median response in our
benchmark case, we use the approach of Fry and Pagan (2007) as a robustness
check for our results. Similarly, we compute the variance decomposition as
the median of the variance decompositions produced by all accepted draws,
but report the variance decomposition resulting from θ (j)∗ as a robustness
check.
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5.4 Estimation Results
We now turn to the empirical findings. We estimate the Bayesian VAR
described in Section 2. Throughout the analysis, we identify monetary shocks
using the sign restrictions presented in Table 1. It is important to emphasize
that we do not place any restrictions on the capital flow variables (capt) in
the definition of the vector of endogenous variables yt. We therefore allow
the data to speak for itself in terms of the responses of our variables of
interest. In addition, the real exchange rate (reert), the trade balance (tbt)
and the relative equity returns (eqt − eq∗t ) are left unrestricted in each of
the specifications we employ. This is important because we draw inference
upon the correlations between the impulse responses of these and the capital
flow variables. We first present impulse response functions of the endogenous
variables in the model and later their variance decomposition.
5.4.1 The Response and Composition of Capital Flows
In this subsection, we present the results from estimating the Bayesian VAR
presented in equation (5.5). The vector of endogenous variables is defined
as in (5.6). The model thus includes seven control variables plus one of
the capital flow variables at a time. We estimate the model for each of
the four different types of capital flows as well as the financial account as an
aggregate. In our benchmark specification, the capital flows are nominal flows
denominated in billions of US dollars. Moreover, the capital flow variables
are defined such that a positive value signals a net capital inflow into the
United States. The fact that these variables can thus take both positive and
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negative values is the reason why we use the variables in levels instead of
log terms. It is clear that the use of nominal flow variables is subject to
the critique that eventual impulse responses to the monetary shock can be
distorted by the response of relative price levels and/or the exchange rate to
the same shock. We will address this caveat in the robustness section.
Figure 5.1 shows the impulse response of all eight variables in the VAR
to a one-standard deviation expansionary monetary shock when the financial
account, i.e. the net aggregate of all types of capital flows is included in the
model. In this benchmark specification, the monetary easing implies a 16
basis points (b.p.) reduction in nominal short term interest rates relative to
the rest of the world. The solid line in each of the subplots illustrates the
median response of the respective variable to the shock. It is presented for a
horizon of 20 quarters. Following most of the sign restrictions literature, we
also report 16th and 84th quantiles of the response functions (Uhlig, 2005).8
The impulse responses depicted in Figure 5.1 suggest that the reserve
ratio nbt, relative consumption ct − c∗t and the percentage difference in CPI
inflation cpit−cpi∗t react positively to the monetary shock as imposed via the
identification restrictions. However, in particular in the case of ct − c∗t the
response is short-lived. The interest rate differential it − i∗t falls for few ad-
ditional periods before its response reverts to zero. The ex ante unrestricted
equity return differential eqt − eq∗t increases for about ten quarters following
the shock. In terms of magnitude, on impact a monetary policy easing shock
8In the VAR literature using Cholesky or Blanchard-Quah type decompositions, two
standard deviation error bands are typically reported. This is equivalent to using 2.3% and
97.7% quantiles. However, in the sign restrictions literature inference is typically based
on a limited number of draws which increases the uncertainty around the quantiles.
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Figure 5.1: Benchmark Specification
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by 100 b.p. raises relative equity returns by about 6%. The distribution of
the impulse responses is strongly positive for about five quarters. Moreover,
on impact the one standard deviation expansionary monetary shock leads to
a deviation from equity parity of more than 1.5 percent.
After an initial appreciation, the real exchange rate reert begins to depre-
ciate in response to the expansionary monetary shock, and then stabilises and
appreciates again after about 8 quarters.9 This pattern is somewhat different,
though not inconsistent with the evidence on ”delayed overshooting” in the
literature, as e.g. shown in Scholl and Uhlig (2008). While its dynamics are
in line with the standard UIP reasoning underlying the overshooting model,
the magnitudes of the initial appreciation and the rather weak depreciation
thereafter are unexpected. An explanation for these findings might be the
fact that we use real effective exchange rates (given the purpose of our anal-
ysis) rather than bilateral nominal exchange rates as is standard in the work
on testing Dornbusch’s overshooting hypothesis. Moreover, another reason
may have to do with the fact that we restrict the consumption differential
to rise on impact of the monetary shock. This is a restriction not employed
in Scholl and Uhlig (2008). Intuitively speaking, a rise in consumption will
put appreciating pressure on the real exchange rate. A robustness exercise
presented in Figure A.8 shows that the real exchange rate indeed depreciates
for most of the response horizon if we relax this restriction, while the main
results for capital flows remain unchanged. Note however that the initial
9The link between monetary poliocy shocks and exchange rates is covered extensively
by the literature on testing Dornbusch’s overshooting hypothsis - see Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995), Kim and Roubini (2001), Faust and Rogers (2002) and Scholl and Uhlig
(2008).
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appreciation of the exchange rate following a monetary easing, which goes
against the standard UIP reasoning, is found also in Scholl and Uhlig (2008)
and Grilli and Roubini (1995).
The next subplot of Figure 5.1 shows that the trade balance tbt wors-
ens significantly and persistently throughout the entire response horizon. In
terms of magnitude, a monetary policy easing shock by 100 b.p. worsens the
US trade balance by about 1% of US GDP after 8 quarters. This finding is
in line with Kim (2001), Bems, Dedola and Smets (2007) and Barnett and
Straub (2008) who also find evidence in favour of a significant current account
worsening following an expansionary monetary shock. The reason is likely to
be an ”income absorption effect”, i.e. an increase in domestic import demand
following the fall in the interest rate differential. We therefore provide evi-
dence against the presence of a significant expenditure switching effect, the
importance of which is highly disputed in the open economy macroeconomics
literature.10 Given the balance of payments identity, we would expect the
net aggregate of all capital flows to react in the opposite way of the trade
balance. And indeed we find that the response of the financial account is
almost the exact mirror image of the trade balance response. This strong
and persistent inflow of capital into the United States in response to the ex-
pansionary monetary shock may be an additional explanation for the above
discussed response of the real exchange rate.
As a next step, we decompose the financial account into its different com-
ponents in order to better understand the transmission mechanism and the
heterogeneity across different types of capital. As discussed above, differ-
10For early references see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Betts and Devereux (1996).
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ent types of capital flows have their own characteristics and determinants.
While trade credits, loans and currency flows are likely to be at least partly
driven by financing motives for trade flows, FDI, equity and debt flows may
be driven more by return considerations. We hope to uncover some of these
motives by examining the correlation between the impulse responses of our
control variables and the responses of each of the different types of capital
flows. As outlined in the previous section, the literature on cross-border cap-
ital flows has attempted to answer the question of whether return-chasing
or portfolio rebalancing motives are dominant in driving cross-border equity
flows by establishing correlations between net equity flows and equity returns
at particular points in time. The present study has the advantage of allow-
ing for an additional time dimension through the impulse response functions
we generate. This allows us to deduce investors’ decisions by tracing the
response of both capital flows and the relevant macro variables to structural
economic shocks along the response horizon.
Figure 5.2 shows the impulse response functions of foreign direct invest-
ment (fdi), equity investment flows (equity), debt investment flows (debt)
and other investment flows (oi) to an expansionary monetary policy shock.
The responses of the control variables are omitted since they do not differ
in any noteworthy way from what is shown in Figure 5.1. The solid lines
in Figure 5.2 again represent the median impulse response of the respective
variable to the monetary shock. As discussed above, Fry and Pagan (2007)
challenge the usefulness of the median as a summary measure of the impulse
response distributions at each point along the response horizon. In order to
show that our results are robust to this criticism, we report the median im-
Figure 5.2: Benchmark Specification: Different Types of Capital Flows
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pulse responses together with the impulse responses generated by minimizing
the Fry and Pagan (2007) criterion. In Figure A.6, the dashed lines repre-
sent the set of response functions produced by the rotation angle θ∗, while
the solid lines show the median response. It is obvious that the two sets
of response functions look very much alike. In fact, the qualitative results
presented below hold irrespectively of the summary measure considered. In
order to save space, we therefore concentrate in what follows on the more
commonly used median response as a benchmark case.
A first glance at the results of Figure 5.2 reveals that the different types
of capital flows react very heterogeneously to monetary policy shocks. The
main striking finding is the opposite response of equity flows to that of debt
flows, as well as FDI and other investment flows. In order to interpret this
finding, it is instructive to recall the response of key control variables in the
model. In particular, we witnessed a positive deviation from equity parity for
about one to one and a half years following a monetary policy shock. Thus,
taking into account the entire response horizon, we confirm the predictions of
Hau and Rey (2006) and others (conditional on the monetary shock), namely
that a positive deviation from equity parity is associated with portfolio equity
outflows. However, the opposite is the case for bonds: the decline in US short-
term interest rates - and thus the rise in bond returns - induces net inflows
into US bonds, thus implying a positive correlation between bond returns
and bond flows that is consistent with a return-chasing motive of investors.
A crucial advantage of our approach is that we can trace the dynamic
response pattern of the various variables over time, and in particular we can
trace both equity returns and the evolution of net equity flows over time
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in response. In fact, our results suggest that equity outflows materialise
later than the rise in relative equity returns in response to a monetary policy
shock. Thus these outflows occur some time after returns have already begun
deviating from parity. This suggests a more differentiated answer to the
question of whether return chasing or portfolio rebalancing motives dominate
investors’ decisions. In particular, as regards the return chasing motive,
it is important to examine the risk-adjusted performance of an investment
strategy of betting on violations of the equity parity condition. In fact, our
results suggest that an investor who is overexposed to the US stock market
will refrain from rebalancing his portfolio if the expected returns from buying
additional US equity are large enough relative to the risk associated with the
investment.
In order to illustrate this point, we take the perspective of a Bayesian
investor who considers to bet on violations from (conditional) equity parity
at each point during the response horizon. Note that the impulse response
of the equity return differential k periods after the shock is the period k
excess return due to the monetary policy shock of the following investment
strategy: in period k − 1 after the shock, the investor sells one (foreign
currency) unit of foreign equity, exchanges the payoff into US dollars and
reinvests it into US equity. Following Scholl and Uhlig (2008), we calculate
the implied return-to-risk (Sharpe) ratio of this (conditional) investment as
eqt−eq∗t
sd(eqt−eq∗t )
for every point in the response horizon. In particular, we define it
as the ratio of the posterior mean excess return and the posterior standard
deviation of the distribution of impulse response functions in period k. This
measure gives us an idea of the reward and the risk a potential investor faces
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when betting on a deviation from equity parity at different points along the
response horizon.11 It is important to note that the investor bets on violations
from equity parity conditional on the monetary shock. In other words, as
Scholl and Uhlig (2008) argue, the implied Sharpe Ratio we construct for
the hedging strategy presented takes the perspective of a Bayesian investor,
who remains uncertain about the precise impact of the monetary shock, but
can insure against any other types of shocks that might occur during the
investment horizon.
As Figure A.7 illustrates, the Sharpe Ratio increases strongly on impact
of the shock and then falls persistently. It reaches a value of about 0.75 at
the point at which substantial amount of net equity investment flows out
of the US. The reward-to-variability ratio of betting on positive deviations
from equity parity thus needs to fall by a substantial amount before investors
start rebalancing their portfolio and selling US equity. In sum, the portfolio
rebalancing motive does trigger an outflow of equity from the country in
which relative equity returns rise. However, the outflow only occurs when
the profitability of chasing higher expected returns diminishes to a sufficient
extent.
Figure 5.2 also shows the response of foreign direct investment to the
monetary easing. Although most of the relevant literature has focused on
equity flows when discussing the implications of the portfolio balance model
11Scholl and Uhlig (2008) compute Sharpe ratios for a Bayesian investor betting on
deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in response to a monetary policy shock.
In contrast to the present paper, the authors focus on the return-to-risk ratio of bets of
differing length that all begin in the impact period of the shock. For the purpose of this
study, however, it is more interesting to examine simple one-period bets that begin at
different points in the response horizon.
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for cross-border capital flows, similar arguments can be made for FDI. The
figure shows that there is a net inflow of FDI immediately following the
shock. The inflow is quite persistent and remains substantially positive for
about two years. This result is quite intriguing given the fact that equity
flows respond in the opposite way. As discussed previously, the inflow of FDI
coincides with simultaneous increases in the equity return differential eqt−eq∗t
and the consumption differential ct − c∗t . This implies that, contrary to
equity flows but similar to bond flows, foreign direct investment appears to be
driven by expected returns rather than portfolio rebalancing considerations.
A reason for this finding might be the fact that short term risk and portfolio
balance considerations play less of a role for FDI flows than for equity flows
as the former are typically more long term oriented. In any case, the result
emphasizes the particular nature of FDI flows compared to less concentrated
forms of equity investment.
The third subplot in Figure 5.2 presents the impulse response of debt
flows to the monetary shock. The responses of the interest rate differential,
the inflation differential and the real effective exchange rate at least allow for
a suggestive interpretation of the response of debt instruments to a deviation
from interest rate parity. In particular, it appears that investment in debt in-
creases quite persistently in the US relative to the rest of the world when US
interest rates fall, thus inducing a deviation from interest rate parity. Hence,
contrary to portfolio equities, the monetary policy shock induces a positive
conditional correlation for bonds between returns and flows - as returns rise
when interest rates fall - suggesting that return chasing motives play a dom-
inant role for debt flows. A stronger argument in this respect could be made
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if bilateral nominal exchange rates were included in the model such that de-
viations from interest rate parity could be observed and a similar analysis
as in the case of equity investment could be conducted. However, due to
the rest of the world definition behind the construction on the real exchange
rate, this is not possible such that the evidence must remain suggestive.
The last plot in Figure 5.2 shows the response of other investment to the
monetary easing, showing that other investment flows into the United States
increase strongly and significantly during the first part of the response hori-
zon and become insignificant thereafter. In order to understand the reasons
behind this finding, it is perhaps useful to remember that major categories
of these flows are trade credits, loans and currency flows. These types of
capital are typically used to directly finance import expenditure. Hence, one
might categorize these flows as borrower rather than investor driven. It is
then reasonable to expect that inflows of this type of capital should occur
prior to the import expenditure actually being made. And this is precisely
what we observe.
In summary, the evidence of this section has shown that monetary policy
easing shocks cause net inflows in debt securities, foreign direct investment
(FDI) and other investment, while inducing net outflows in portfolio equities
from the United States. Monetary policy shocks thus entail a conditional
negative correlation between flows in portfolio equity and debt. A key for
understanding this conditional correlation is the effect of monetary policy
shocks on asset price returns, which induces a positive correlation between
equity returns and bond returns. Overall, our evidence suggests that, condi-
tional on monetary policy shocks, a portfolio rebalancing motive dominates
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for investment decisions in equity securities but a return chasing motive is
the main driver for investments in bonds.
5.4.2 Variance Decomposition
As a complement to the analysis in the previous subsection, we decomposed
the variance of the endogenous variables in our model in order to determine
the variance share explained by the monetary shock. Notice that the findings
presented here are based on the benchmark specification but are not sensitive
to identifying additional (aggregate supply and demand) shocks.12 Table 5.1
contains the median results for the capital flow variables of interest and the
trade balance. A first glance at the numbers suggests that monetary policy
shocks are important drivers of all these variables. The share of the variation
explained by the monetary shock ranges from 4 to 23 percent across horizons
of one to four years. Another compelling finding is that the monetary policy
shock explains around 20 percent of the variance of both the trade balance
and the financial account at various horizons while the explanatory power for
the disaggregated capital flows is much more limited in size. This finding may
seem contradictory at first but is in line with the fact that the variance of the
financial account variable is the sum of both the variances and the covariances
of the individual capital flow variables. It appears that the monetary shock
explains the covariances very well, while this is less the case for the individual
variances of the flows. Intuitively, it is reasonable that the monetary shock
must have strong explanatory power for the financial account as an aggregate
if it does so for its counterpart in the balance of payments identity.
12The resulting variance shares for these additional shocks are available upon request.
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Table 5.2: Variance Decomposition
Horizon Financial Account FDI Equity Debt Other TB
1 Year 12.6 7.3 4.1 3.5 14.0 16.7
2 Years 20.7 8.5 7.4 5.7 22.9 22.9
3 Years 22.2 8.7 8.6 7.5 20.5 22.4
4 Years 22.3 9.0 8.3 8.8 19.2 21.5
Table 5.3: Variance Decomposition: Fry and Pagan (2007)
Horizon Financial Account FDI Equity Debt Other TB
1 Year 10.2 17.2 2.6 6.6 9.4 14.6
2 Years 19.4 12.8 2.8 6.2 21.7 17.0
3 Years 20.7 10.6 4.0 8.9 19.8 20.2
4 Years 24.7 9.0 4.1 12.1 18.0 22.4
Most of the individual types of capital flows, on the other hand, are
purely incentive driven. Their variances can thus be rather decoupled from
the financing needs for trade expenditure as long as their covariances are
such that the balance of payments accounting identity is achieved. In other
words, the investor does not consider the financing needs of the country he
or she invests in. It is only in the aggregate that investors’ decisions need to
be such that capital flows balance the net flow of goods and services. This
argument is perhaps emphasized by the fact that other flows are the only
individual type of capital that is driven by monetary shocks to a similar
extent as the trade balance. As we outlined above, these types of capital
are typically less incentive driven and likely to be very closely aligned with
changes in the trade balance.
In Table 5.3, we present the results from an equivalent variance decom-
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position based on the set of impulse responses that minimize the Fry and
Pagan (2007) criterion. The numbers show that the qualitative arguments
we made above are not sensitive to a different summary measure of the dis-
tribution of impulse response functions. At the same time, however, it is
interesting to note that the precise numbers for each individual variable dif-
fer quite strongly in some cases. This suggests that caution is in order when
interpreting variance decompositions solely based on one summary measure
of the distribution of impulse response functions.
5.4.3 Robustness Analysis
We conduct a battery of robustness checks to ensure that the main findings
in the previous sections are not sensitive to the specification of the empirical
model. In this subsection, we present the results obtained from these tests.
In the previous section, we employed a restriction in the identification
scheme of a monetary policy shock, which differs from the analysis of Uh-
lig(2005). In particular, we assume that an expansionary monetary shock
must have a positive effect on consumption. The reasoning behind this as-
sumption is rather obvious and it is well-established in the literature. We
believe that it helps to identify monetary shocks with greater precision. How-
ever, one might argue that the restriction implies an unnecessary reduction
of the degrees of freedom in the empirical model. As a first robustness check,
we therefore identify the monetary policy shock solely on the basis of the re-
maining three restrictions, i.e. the restrictions on the response of the interest
rate differential, the inflation differential and the reserve ratio. The resulting
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responses of the endogenous variables in the model can be found in Figure
A.8 for the case in which the financial account is added to the basic specifica-
tion. The impulse response functions presented show that the consumption
differential still reacts positively to the expansionary shock in the impact pe-
riod. Following a brief initial appreciation, the real exchange rate depreciates
strongly in response to the monetary shock and shows evidence of delayed
overshooting. The impulse responses of the remaining control variables and
the financial account do not change in any important way compared to the
benchmark case. Figure A.9 shows that the same is true for the responses of
the other capital flow variables.
It has frequently been argued that the number of shocks identified in a
VAR is positively related to the probability of identifying each individual
shock correctly (Paustian, 2007). As a second robustness check, we therefore
identify two additional structural shocks simultaneously with the monetary
shock. We have chosen simple aggregate supply and demand shocks because
the underlying identifying restriction are rather uncontroversial. In partic-
ular, Table 5.1 shows that we require the aggregate supply shock to reduce
inflation and to have a positive effect on consumption whereas an aggregate
demand shock must increase the interest rates, inflation and consumption.
Formally, we extend the method outlined in Section 5.3 by requiring that a
candidate draw of the decomposition of the variance covariance matrix must,
in order to be accepted, uncover one shock that obeys the restrictions of the
monetary shock, one that obeys the restrictions of the aggregate supply shock
and one that obeys the restrictions of the aggregate demand shock. The re-
sulting impulse response functions for the capital flow variables are shown
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in Figure A.10. It is immediately obvious that the response functions do
not differ in any important way from their equivalents in the benchmark
specification.13 If anything, the responses are more precise than before.
In this study we are interested in the channels through which the ad-
justment of the financial account takes place following the occurrence of a
structural shock. The comovement of capital flows with the equity return
differential eqt − eq∗t naturally plays an important role in this context. We
have so far used the equity return differential in US dollars in our model. The
reason is that changes in relative equity returns should only play a role for
the re-allocation of capital across borders is they are not offset by exchange
rate movements. However, in order to ensure that the reaction of eqt−eq∗t to
the expansionary monetary shock is not entirely due to exchange rate fluctu-
ations and indeed reflects asymmetric equity price changes, it is instructive
to include the equity differential in local currencies as a robustness check. As
Figures A.11 and A.12 show, the impulse response functions for the differ-
ent types of capital flows and the equity return differential look qualitatively
very similar to the benchmark results and deliver the same set of qualitative
conclusions. The only striking difference is that the equity return differential
increases for about eight instead of five quarters after the shock impacts the
economy. In line with the above reasoning, this result perhaps strengthens
the view that portfolio rebalancing motives are an important driving factor
in the cross-border allocation of equity investment.
In the above analysis, we have used unadjusted capital flow variables. The
13In order to save space, we have not reported the responses of the control variables
themselves. But their impulse responses do not change either. The results are available
upon request.
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results are therefore subject to the criticism that the response of the variables
to the monetary shock might be driven by movements in relative price levels
or the exchange rate. We tackle this criticism by including our capital flow
variables as ratios to GDP as a robustness check. The resulting impulse re-
sponse functions for each of the capital flow variables are contained in Figure
A.13. We can see that, compared to the benchmark specification, the adjust-
ment by GDP lowers the impulse responses of all variables during the first
quarters after the shock. The reason is simply that consumption and GDP
increase in response to the shock for a few periods. Hence, positive responses
become weaker whereas negative responses become more pronounced. How-
ever, the fact that all of the response functions retain their qualitative shape
suggests that the impulse responses of the unadjusted capital flow variables
in our benchmark specification are not simply the result of changes in relative
price levels or the exchange rate.
Up until now, we have included one capital flow variable in the model at
a time. However, it is clear that there might be important interdependency
between the different types of capital flows that we miss if the remaining
variables are omitted. As a robustness check, we therefore augment the VAR
by dimension three such that the four different types of capital flows can be
included at the same time. In spite of the fact that we are now working with
a VAR of dimension eleven, the resulting impulse response plots shown in
Figure A.14 look almost exactly the same as in our benchmark specification.14
There appears to be no loss in the precision of the estimates, which might be
due to the fact that the interlinkages between the capital flow variables are
14The response of the reserve ratio is omitted for presentation purposes.
143
indeed important and improve the fit of the model.
We also checked for the robustness of our results to an alternative defini-
tion of the ”Rest of the World”. We now define the ”Rest of the World” as
the G7 countries plus a range of additional economies, the selection of which
was made solely subject to data availability.15 Figure A.15 shows that the
results are robust to this redefinition.
Finally, we considered one potential criticism to our results with regard to
the dynamics of net debt flows. In particular, the interest rate we have con-
sidered so far has been the short-term money market rate, while the return
on international debt flows is rather better represented by the evolution of
long-term interest rates. Therefore, in this exercise we replace the differential
of short-term money market interest rate by the 10-year bond yield differen-
tial between the United States and other G7 economies. As shown in Figure
A.16, our main results that (i) debt flows and debt returns are positively
correlated and (ii) debt and equity flows are negatively correlated still hold,
confirming the dominance of the return chasing motive behind international
debt flows following a monetary policy shock.
5.5 Discussion
The evidence of the paper has shown that monetary policy shocks exert a
substantial effect on the dynamics and composition of US capital flows. In
the aggregate, a monetary policy easing shock of 100 basis points leads to
net capital inflows and a trade balance deficit of about 1% of US GDP after 8
15The ”Rest of the World” now includes the G7 (minus the US) as well as Australia,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain Sweden, and Switzerland.
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quarters. The key finding of the paper is that monetary policy shocks induce
a negative conditional correlation between flows into equities and bonds,
while causing a positive conditional correlation between equity returns and
bond returns.
Moreover, for equities there is a negative conditional correlation between
flows and returns, i.e. a rise in equity returns in response to monetary policy
shocks is eventually associated with an outflow in equity portfolio investment
from the country. The opposite is the case for bonds, for which there is a
positive conditional correlation between returns and flows.
Yet it is not only the direction of capital flows and returns that exhibit an
intriguing pattern, but also the dynamics of flows and returns. While returns
- interest rate differentials and relative equity returns - react instantaneously
to monetary policy shocks, capital flows react much more gradually over
time, with their peak response occurring only after about eight quarters or
more. The strength of the methodology of the paper is hence that it allows
tracing not only the overall reaction of capital flows and returns, but also to
understand how the dynamics of these responses differ.
A central objective of the paper has been to contribute to the literature
on the determinants of portfolio choice, and how asset price movements are
related to such portfolio decisions. The evidence of the paper is consistent
with a portfolio rebalancing motive for equity securities, and a motive akin
to return chasing for bonds.
An intriguing issue is that flows and returns in equities and in bonds re-
spond in the opposite way to such monetary policy shocks. The literature
on asset price comovements has found it hard to explain the asset price co-
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movements empirically, in particular the strong time variations in stock-bond
return correlations. The findings of the paper suggest that such a positive
correlation between stock returns and bond returns is present precisely when
discount rate effects dominate. Of course, it also implies that the correla-
tion may be very different when other shocks dominate. The present paper
thus focuses on one specific shock for portfolio choice and asset prices, while
we leave it for future research to condition the analysis on other types of
economic shocks.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
A growing number of both theoretical and applied economists have devoted
their time to the study of the conduct of monetary policy in recent years.
This thesis has contributed to different fields of this literature.
Chapter 2 is motivated by the idea that inflation targeting differs from
other disinflation policies in important respects. In particular, a strict inter-
pretation of an inflation target allows the policymaker to tolerate only minor
deviations from target. But adjusting the policy instrument such that the
inflation rate is reduced to a new target and defending this target rigorously
must preserve inflationary distortions such as wage and price differentials to
an exceptional degree. The chapter employed a dynamic general equilibrium
with Taylor wage contracts to show that the use of strict inflation targeting
as a disinflation policy may result in a slump in output and a considerable
increase in macroeconomic volatility. Important determinants of the magni-
tude of the macroeconomic oscillations in the post-disinflation state turned
out to be the size of the reduction in the inflation rate and the degree of re-
147
turns to labour. In Chapter 3, the analysis was extended to an open-economy
setting demonstrating that the exchange rate can act as a stabilizer by effec-
tively relieving wages of part of the burden of reducing the inflation rate. The
more the economy is open, the smaller the magnitude of the macroeconomic
oscillations will be after the disinflation policy is applied.
Chapter 4 of this thesis employed a Markov switching framework to al-
low for an alternative characterization of macroeconomic news effects on
the foreign exchange market. The choice of the model was motivated by
the presumption that monetary policy announcements do not simply affect
the foreign exchange market as shocks to an otherwise continuous process.
On the contrary, news effects may change the entire data generating pro-
cess underlying a market’s dynamics. An econometric specification allowing
for regime switches therefore appears appropriate. Indeed, one particular
benefit of applying such a model is that it facilitates a plausible interpre-
tation of observed nonlinearities. We found strong evidence for nonlinear
regime switching between a high-volatility ”informed trading” state and a
low-volatility ”liquidity trading” state driven by monetary policy announce-
ments that come as a surprise to the market. We also uncovered significant
market positioning prior to the announcement, indicating that market par-
ticipants limit their risk exposure just before policy decisions are made.
Chapter 5 investigated the impact of monetary shocks on the direction
and the composition of international capital flows. The chapter employed
a standard structural VAR specification to identify monetary policy shocks
by means of the pure sign restrictions approach used in Canova and De
Nicolo (2002) and Uhlig (2005). The empirical analysis yielded two key find-
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ings. First, US monetary policy shocks exert a statistically and economically
meaningful effect on US capital flows and the trade balance. An exogenous
easing of US monetary policy by 100 basis points induces net capital in-
flows and a worsening of the US trade balance of around 1% of GDP after
8 quarters. The second main result focuses on the effect of monetary policy
shocks on the composition of US capital flows. Intriguingly, it is found that
an exogenous US monetary policy easing causes net inflows in debt securi-
ties, foreign direct investment (FDI) and other investment, while inducing
net outflows in portfolio equities from the United States. Monetary policy
shocks thus entail a conditional negative correlation between flows in portfo-
lio equity and debt. A key for understanding this conditional correlation is
the effect of monetary policy shocks on asset prices. While a monetary policy
easing implies a decrease in short-term (and long-term) interest rates, it also
causes the above mentioned increase in relative equity returns. Overall, our
evidence suggests that monetary policy shocks induce negative conditional
correlations between flows in bonds and equity securities. Moreover, they
cause a negative conditional correlation between equity flows and equity re-
turns, and and a positive conditional correlation between bond flows and
bond returns.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1.1 Log-linear Definitions and Equations
In the following equations lower-case symbols denote log deviations of
variables from their reference steady state values, i.e. vt = log
Vt
VR
:
µt+1 = mt+1 −mt (A.1)
st = pt + ct (A.2)
mt − pt = ct − β
1− β it (A.3)
st+1 − st = it (A.4)
yt =
σ
1− σ (pt − wt) (A.5)
xt =
1
1 + ε(ζ − 1)[
1
1 + β
[st + ε(ζ − 1)wt + (ζ − 1)nt]
+
β
1 + β
[st+1 + ε(ζ − 1)wt+1 + (ζ − 1)nt+1]] (A.6)
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wt =
1
2
xt +
1
2
xt−1 (A.7)
nt =
1
σ
yt (A.8)
A.1.2 The Perfect Foresight Solution
In the following, I show in a first step that there is a unique perfect foresight
solution for the law of motion of the economy in the post-disinflation state
when either σ < 1 or α < 1. In a second step, I show that the sign of the
smaller eigenvalue depends on the degree of returns to labor σ and the degree
of openness of the economy 1− α as well as the parameters ζ and ε. In the
special case of α = 1 and σ = 1 a saddlepath equilibrium does not exist.
The proofs are outlined for the open-economy setting but hold equivalently
in the closed economy setting if α is set to unity.
Stability
As long as α < 1 or σ < 1, the system of equations determining the law of
motion of the economy in the post-disinflation steady state has exactly one
stable eigenvalue such that there is a unique perfect foresight solution. To
see this, notice that the law of motion of the economy is given by
φt+1 − 1 + β
β
1− ασ + γ
1− ασ − γφt +
1
β
φt−1 = µD(
1− β
β
− 2γ
1− ασ − γ ) (A.9)
167
The characteristic equation of this 2nd order difference equation is given
by
ω2 + bω + c = 0 (A.10)
where b = −1+β
β
1−ασ+γ
1−ασ−γ
and c = 1
β
. Notice that in the special case of
α = 1 and σ = 1, the two eigenvalues of this difference equation are readily
derived as λ1 = −1 and λ2 = − 1β , implying that one eigenvalue lies on the
unit circle and the economy will never converge. In order to prove stability
for all other cases, I apply standard results from the continuous time case.
In particular, I define the variable z such that z = ω−1
ω+1
and ω = 1+z
1−z
.1 I
therefore transform the equation to
(1− b+ c)z2 + 2(1− c)z + (1 + b+ c) = 0 (A.11)
Applying standard results for a continuous time characteristic equation,
the following condition must hold for the characteristic equation to have
exactly one stable eigenvalue.
1 + b+ c
1− b+ c < 0 (A.12)
After some manipulations we have
1A stable eigenvalue in the continuous time case has a negative real part. It can be
shown that ω lies in the unit circle if and only if z has a negative real part.
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1 + b+ c
1− b+ c = −
γ
1− ασ (A.13)
And since α, σ < 1, it is clear that this expression is strictly negative.
We can conclude that for any parameterization within the restrictions given,
there will be exactly one stable eigenvalue. This implies that there is a unique
perfect foresight solution to the model and the economy ultimately converges
to a new steady state. In the special case of α = 1 and σ = 1 a saddlepath
equilibrium does not exist.
The Sign of the Smaller Eigenvalue
I call p(ω) the 2nd order characteristic polynomial function in ω, i.e. the LHS
of the characteristic equation. I have shown that there is one and only one
stable eigenvalue when α < 1 or σ < 1. This implies that the characteristic
function cuts the horizontal axis precisely once within the range (−1, 1).
Now, suppose that the stable eigenvalue is of a positive sign. This implies
that p(0) and p(1) must be of opposite sign. Therefore, for the unique stable
eigenvalue to be of a positive sign, the following condition must hold:
c
1 + b+ c
< 0 (A.14)
After some manipulations
1− 1− ασ + γ
1− ασ − γ < 0 (A.15)
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Noticing that multiplying by the denominator of the fraction might in-
volve multiplying by a negative number, I find that the condition is fulfilled
if and only if 1 − ασ − γ > 0, where γ = ζ
1+ε(ζ−1)
. This implies that the
unique and stable eigenvalue will be negative for sufficiently high α and σ
and sufficiently small ζ and ε.
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A.2 Appendix for Chapter 3
A.2.1 Log-linear Definitions and Equations
In the following equations lower-case symbols denote log deviations of
variables from their reference steady state values, i.e. vt = log
Vt
VR
:
µt+1 = mt+1 −mu (A.16)
st = pt + ct (A.17)
mt − pt = ct − β
1− β it (A.18)
st+1 − st = it (A.19)
et+1 − et = it (A.20)
yNt =
σ
1− σ (pNt − wt) (A.21)
yTt = 0 (A.22)
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cNt = st − pNt (A.23)
cTt = st − et (A.24)
pt = αpNt + (1− α)et (A.25)
1
α
yt = yNt (A.26)
τt = −cTt (A.27)
xt =
1
1 + ε(ζ − 1)[
1
1 + β
[st + ε(ζ − 1)wt + (ζ − 1)nt]
+
β
1 + β
[st+1 + ε(ζ − 1)wt+1 + (ζ − 1)nt+1]] (A.28)
wt =
1
2
xt +
1
2
xt−1 (A.29)
nt =
1
σ
yNt (A.30)
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A.2.2 Impossibility of a Partial Disinflation
I show in a first step that X0
X−1
= X2
X1
holds only in the special case of
µD = 1. This implies that in all other cases the economy is not in the post-
disinflation state characterized by perpetual oscillations immediately after
the policy is applied. The second step is to show that there is no convergence
process of the ratio Xt
Xt−1
= Xt+2
Xt+1
to its steady state Xt
Xt−1
= µD thereafter if
1 < µD < µI . The steady state is unstable and the disinflation policy is
infeasible.
Proposition A.2.1. The equality X0
X−1
= X2
X1
holds in the post-disinflation
state only in the special case of µD = 1.
Proof. The ratio of the wage index in period t and its first lag is given by
Wt
Wt−1
=
[1
2
X1−εt +
1
2
X1−εt−1 ]
1
1−ε
[1
2
X1−εt−1 +
1
2
X1−εt−2 ]
1
1−ε
(A.31)
Setting Wt
Wt−1
= µD and manipulating yields
Xt
Xt−1
= (µ1−εD (1 + (
Xt−2
Xt−1
)1−ε)− 1) 11−ε (A.32)
This implies that we have
X0
X−1
= (µ1−εD (1 + µ
ε−1
I )− 1)
1
1−ε (A.33)
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X1
X0
= (µ1−εD (1 + (
X−1
X0
)1−ε)− 1) 11−ε (A.34)
X2
X1
= (µ1−εD (1 + (
X0
X1
)1−ε)− 1) 11−ε (A.35)
etc. I will now show that for a given ε the equality X0
X−1
= X2
X1
only holds
if µD = 1 and/or if µD = µI .
Plugging (A.34) into (A.35), we have
X2
X1
= (µ1−εD (1 + (µ
1−ε
D (1 + (
X−1
X0
)1−ε)− 1)−1)− 1) 11−ε (A.36)
Now using (A.33),
X2
X1
= (µ1−εD (1 + (µ
1−ε
D (1 + (µ
1−ε
D (1 + µ
ε−1
I )− 1)−1)− 1)−1)− 1)
1
1−ε (A.37)
Now I set the RHS of (A.37) equal to the RHS of (A.33). I obtain
µ1−εD (1 + µ
ε−1
I ) = µ
1−ε
D (1 + (µ
1−ε
D (1 + (µ
1−ε
D (1 + µ
ε−1
I )− 1)−1)− 1)−1) (A.38)
and finally after some simplification
µ1−εI + 1 = µ
1−ε
D + (1 + µ
ε−1
I − µε−1D )−1 (A.39)
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For a given ε, there are only two positive real valued solutions to this
equation. These are µD = 1 and µD = µI . This proves the above proposition.
Proposition A.2.2. If 1 < µD < µI , then the steady state
Xt
Xt−1
= µD
is locally unstable and it is impossible to carry out the disinflation policy.
If 0 < µD < 1, then the steady state
Xt
Xt−1
= µD is locally stable and the
disinflation policy can be carried out.
Proof. From equation (A.32) in Proposition A.2.1 we have that
(
Xt
Xt−1
)1−ε = µ1−εD (1 + (
Xt−1
Xt−2
)ε−1)− 1 (A.40)
I define ( Xt
Xt−1
)1−ε = rt. Then we have the first order non-linear difference
equation
rt = µ
1−ε
D − 1 +
µ1−εD
rt−1
(A.41)
This difference equation has a steady state at r = µ1−εD or r = −1. A
negative value of r is economically meaningless. Hence, the only economi-
cally meaningful steady state is r = µ1−εD , which implies that
Xt
Xt−1
= µD.
Furthermore, notice that differentiating rt with respect to its one period lag
and evaluating the derivative at the steady state yields a value of 1
µ1−ε
D
, the
slope of the phase line at the steady state.
Case 1: 1 < µD < µI This case corresponds to a partial disinflation policy.
It is illustrated in figure A.1. I begin by noticing that there is a natural initial
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Figure A.1: Case 1: Unstable Pattern
condition for rt, namely r0, which is predetermined in this setting. Given this
initial value for rt, the time path of rt is divergent as the steady state is not
locally stable. The reason is that the slope of the phase line given by equa-
tion (A.41) is smaller than -1 at the SS. Its horizontal asymptote occurs at a
negative value for rt. This means that eventually rt < 0 which implies that
the disinflation policy cannot be carried out. However, notice that our dis-
cussion here only covers local as opposed to global stability. As the economy
moves farther away from the steady state, and hence nonlinearities become
more important, it is possible that the economy behaves in an unexpected
way. It is for instance possible that it converges on a so-called 2-cycle, i.e.
a path on which fluctuations continue forever at the same amplitude. An
analysis of global stability, however, is not within the scope of this paper.
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Figure A.2: Case 2: Stable Pattern
Case 2: 0 < µD < 1 This case corresponds to disinflation policy to a
negative inflation rate. It is illustrated in figure A.2. Notice that rt is locally
stable. The reason is that the slope of the phase line given by equation (A.41)
is greater than -1 at the SS. Its horizontal asymptote occurs at a positive
value for rt. In contrast to Case 1, this implies that the time path of rt will
follow a stable pattern. The disinflation policy can thus be carried out.2.
Intuitively, the driving factor behind these results is the non(log)linearity
of the wage index Wt in Xt and Xt−1.
3 This non(log)linearity is due to the
fact that labor types are not perfectly complementary but at least partially
2As discussed above, notice that I only consider local stability.
3If the production function were of Cobb-Douglas type, the wage index would be log-
linear and labor types would be less easily substituted than in the present case.
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substitutable in the production function. Simply put, if households in one
sector set a lower wage than households in the other, the resulting wage index
is not given by the simple average of the two wages - as in the linearized
version of the model - but by some value smaller than it. The reason is that
firms will substitute labor types from the low wage sector for labor types
from the high wage sector. Furthermore, firms will find it optimal to engage
more strongly into labor substitution the greater is the wage gap between the
two sectors and the greater is the elasticity of technical substitution between
labor types, ε. This labor substituting behavior of firms is the reason, why
it is not possible to keep wage growth at target throughout future periods
after the disinflation to a positive rate of inflation. In the following, I will
contrast wage setting after (a) a complete disinflation, (b) a disinflation to a
positive rate of wage inflation and (c) a disinflation towards a negative rate
of wage inflation.
µD = 1 is the case of a complete disinflation. I have shown in the main
text that a complete disinflation implies that wages set in the post-disinflation
state are constant through time for each sector of households. Furthermore,
these wages are equal to the respective wage of each sector one period before
disinflation. Therefore, this is the one case in which the policy does not
introduce dynamics into the behavior of sectoral wages.
Let us now consider the case when 1 < µD < µI . Before starting the
discussion, it is helpful to take a quick look at Figure 2.1 in the main text
which illustrates the post-disinflation path of the new wage in the framework
of the linearized version of the model. The question is then, why we do not
observe equivalent patterns when investigating disinflations to positive new
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inflation targets in the framework of the nonlinear model.
Let us assume that we are investigating a disinflation that implies a strong
enough reduction in the rate of wage inflation for the new wage in period
t = 0 to be forced to fall below the prevailing new wage that was set in period
t = −1.4 In the framework of the linearized model, we would be looking at
case 1a in which the new wage set in period zero is lower than in the previous
period.
I have chosen the case in which the new inflation target is attained if X0
takes a value somewhere between X−1 and X−2. Now, for a given X−1 and
X−2, let X0A be the new wage that would attain the new inflation target in
period t = 0 in the absence of labor substitution. Notice that X0A > X−2
implies that sectoral wages are less far apart in period t = 0 than they were
in t = −1. Consequently, if we do allow for labor substitution in period
t = 0, firms substitute less labor away from the high wage sector in period
t = 0 than they did in period t = −1. This implies that the higher wage
gains weight in the wage index in period t = 0 relative to period t = −1 and
thereby exerts additional upward pressure on it. This ’labor substitution
effect’ implies that X0 must lie below X0A , the value it would have taken in
the absence of labor substitution. Therefore, in terms of log deviations from
the reference steady state, the new wage in period zero must be low relative
to its counterpart in the framework of the linearized model.
Moving on to period t = 1, the smaller is X0, the greater must agents
choose X1 in order to keep wage growth constant. Furthermore, the higher
is X1, i.e. the greater is the wage gap, the more do firms engage into labor
4The reasoning is similar for the opposite case.
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substitution away from the higher wage and the higher does X1 have to be
chosen in order to attain the new inflation target. This implies that the
’labor substitution effect’ that put downward pressure on X0 now exerts
upward pressure on X1. And it exerts more upward pressure on X1, the
more downward pressure it exerted on X0. The fluctuations in the new wage
are therefore self-enforcing with the result that the ratio Xt
Xt−1
falls over time
throughout even periods and increases over time throughout odd periods
until the new wage hits its zero lower bound in even periods.
0 < µD < 1 is the rather unrealistic case of a reduction in wage inflation
towards a negative inflation rate. Here, the economy is saddlepath stable.
The ratio Xt
Xt−1
converges towards its post-disinflation steady state Xt
Xt−1
= µD.
Notice that this result follows from the above argument as the magnitude of
the reduction in the inflation rate is so great that firms engage more strongly
into labor substitution in period t = 0 than they did in period t = −1.
A.2.3 Welfare Analysis
In this section, I analytically derive the welfare implications of the disinflation
policy in the special case of a closed economy and constant returns to scale.
The reason why I can do so is that closed form solutions of key variables’
responses to the application of the policy can be obtained.
I derive the individual lifetime utility for households in both sectors in the
CISS, in the POS and in the ZISS without wage dispersion. Social welfare
is then some function of the lifetime utility of households in sector A and
households in sector B. I begin by deriving agent j’s lifetime utility in the ini-
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tial CISS.5 We know that aggregate real variables are constant through time
in the CISS, while nominal variables grow at the constant rate µI . Moreover,
consumption and real money demand are equal between households within a
sector and, by assumption, also across sectors. It follows that the disutility
from work effort ηLζjt is the only component of the utility function that is not
constant through time and across sectors. In fact, work loads of households
in sector A are low in all even periods and high in all odd periods. For sector
B, the reverse holds. Making the appropriate substitutions in (2.4), I find
that the present discounted value of future utility outcomes of household j,
i.e. its lifetime utility, amounts to
Uj =
ln(Y αN ) + (1− δ)ln( 1−δδ(1−β/µI ))− 12η(Lhigh + Llow)
1− β −
1
2
η(Lζlow − Lζhigh)
1 + β
(A.42)
for households in sector A and to
Uj =
ln(Y αN ) + (1− δ)ln( 1−δδ(1−β/µI ))− 12η(Lhigh + Llow)
1− β −
1
2
η(Lζhigh − Lζlow)
1 + β
(A.43)
for households in sector B, where Lhigh is the labor supplied by the high
wage sector and Llow the labor effort of the low wage sector in any given
period and where
Lhigh = Y
1/σ
N (
1
2
+ 1
2
µ1−εI )
ε
1−ε
Llow = Y
1/σ
N (
1
2
+ 1
2
µε−1I )
ε
1−ε
5The ZISS without wage dispersion is a special case of the CISS in which µI = 1
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with YN given by (3.11). Notice that households in the two sectors al-
ternate in setting the higher wage. A relatively high wage guarantees them
a low work effort in that same period. As I have assumed an insurance
scheme that ensures equal consumption and money holdings across sectors,
a household is better off during periods in which its wage is relatively high
and its labor effort is relatively low. As households in sector A are the ones
with the higher wage in the initial time period, their lifetime utility must be
marginally greater than that of households in sector B.6
I now move on to derive the individual lifetime utility for household j in
the post-disinflation POS. Here, wages in both sectors are constant through
time where sector A continuously sets a higher wage than sector B such that
the work load of households in sector B is continuously higher than in sector
A. As consumption and money demand are equal across sectors in every
period of time, this implies that individual lifetime utility must be greater
for households in sector B than for households in sector A. The particular
feature of the POS is that real as well as nominal variables are constant
throughout even and throughout odd periods but differ in between odd and
even periods. The lifetime utility of household j in the POS amounts to
Uj =
ln(Y αNevenY
α
Nodd
) + ln(1−δ
δ
1
1−βF−1
) + ln(1−δ
δ
1
1−βF
)− η(LζHeven + LζHodd)
2(1− β)
+
ln(
Y αNeven
Y α
Nodd
) + (1− δ)ln( 1−βF
1−βF−1
)− η(LζHeven − LζHodd)
2(1 + β)
(A.44)
6Notice that I am considering a CISS that lasts an infinite number of periods. The
initial time period here simply represents the starting point of the welfare calculations.
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for households in sector A, where F = (1−βB
1+ε(ζ−1)
B1+ε(ζ−1)−β
)
1
ζ and
LHeven = Y
1/σ
Neven
(1
2
+ 1
2
µ1−εI )
ε
1−ε
LHodd = Y
1/σ
Nodd
(1
2
+ 1
2
µ1−εI )
ε
1−ε
where LHeven and LHodd is the labor supplied by households in sector A
in even and odd periods respectively. For households in sector B, the same
expression holds, except that we substitute LLeven and LLodd for LHeven and
LHodd , where
LLeven = Y
1/σ
Neven
(1
2
+ 1
2
µε−1I )
ε
1−ε
LLodd = Y
1/σ
Nodd
(1
2
+ 1
2
µε−1I )
ε
1−ε
The first panel of Table A.1 presents the individual lifetime utility of
agents in all states and for different calibrations when excluding real balances
from the utility function.7 The results show that the average individual
lifetime utility of agents is lower in the POS than in the CISS and the ZISS.
In particular, we observe that UPOSAverage < UZISS ≤ UCISSAverage. The
disinflation policy reduces social welfare when computed as a simple average
of the individual lifetime utility of individuals. The individual lifetime utility
of agents is higher in the CISS than in the ZISS. The reason is that output
is higher in the CISS.
The second panel of Table A.1 presents the individual lifetime utility of
households in all states if I do not exclude real balances from the utility
7Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) argue that utility from real balances is neglectable in
welfare comparisons.
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Table A.1: The Welfare Effects of the Disinflation Policy for Different Cali-
brations
Excluding Real Money Balances
Individual Lifetime Utility Cal A* Cal B* Cal C* Cal D*
CISS of Sector A -1,50468 -1,07910 -1,73580 -3,29500
CISS of Sector B -1,50503 -1,07930 -1,73610 -3,29510
CISS avg -1,50486 -1,07920 -1,73595 -3,29508
ZISS -1,50517 -1,07920 -1,73600 -3,29510
Post Disinflation Sector A -1,51988 -1,08820 -1,74370 -3,30030
Post Disinflation Sector B -1,51337 -1,07720 -1,73488 -3,29510
Post Disinflation avg -1,51663 -1,08273 -1,73929 -3,29770
Including Real Money Balances
Individual Lifetime Utility Cal A Cal B Cal C Cal D
CISS of Sector A 2.40120 12.6476 11.4707 23.3531
CISS of Sector B 2.40090 12.6471 11.4705 23.3530
CISS avg 2.40100 12.6474 11.4706 23.3531
ZISS 2.53710 12.7264 11.5159 23.2853
Post Disinflation Sector A 11.2160 17.8407 14.5183 29.9966
Post Disinflation Sector B 11.2225 17.8517 14.5271 30.0019
Post Disinflation avg 11.2193 17.8462 14.5227 29.9993
*Calibrations of Parameter Values as in Table 3.2
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function. I now find that UPOSAverage > UZISS > UCISSAverage. The individual
lifetime utility of agents is higher in the ZISS than in the CISS. The reason
is that real balances are higher in a non-inflationary steady state than in
an inflationary one. This appears to more than offset the fact that output
is higher in the CISS than in the ZISS. A somewhat surprising finding in
Table A.1, however, is that the average individual lifetime utility is higher in
the POS than in all other states. The explanation is strongly related to the
discussion about the second feasibility constraint. I already discussed the
fact that, as the nominal interest rate approaches its lower bound, money
demand in odd periods approaches infinity. This implies that odd periods’
real balances must become very large in the post-disinflation state as the
nominal interest rate moves very close to its lower bound. And the cali-
brations used in Table A.1 are examples in which the economy is close to
violating the feasibility constraint. Moving further away from violating the
feasibility constraint, i.e. choosing lower values of β, ε, ζ and µI , yields
UZISS > UCISSAverage > UPOSAverage.
8 In sum, if we exclude real balances
from the utility function, the disinflation policy unambiguously reduces so-
cial welfare. If we do not exclude real balances, the disinflation policy may
even increase the average individual lifetime utility of households depending
on the calibration. It is, however, common to think of the demand for real
balances to be subject to a satiation point that is set relative to the demand
for consumption goods. The introduction of a satiation point for real bal-
ances might remove the above result as it would restrict odd period’s money
demand to reasonable levels.
8A calibration for which this is true, is β = 0.9, ε = 1.4, ζ = 1.2 and µI = 1.00001
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A.3 Appendix for Chapter 4
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Table A.2: Monetary Policy Committee Meetings, Interest Decisions and
Surprise Measures I
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Table A.3: Monetary Policy Committee Meetings, Interest Decisions and
Surprise Measures II
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Table A.4: Monetary Policy Committee Meetings, Interest Decisions and
Surprise Measures III
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Table A.5: GARCH Model: Surprise if Change in 3 Months Interbank Rate
is Greater Than 9
Table A.6: GARCH Model: Surprise if Change in 3 Months Interbank Rate
is Greater Than 14
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Table A.7: GARCH Model: Surprise if Change in Price of 3 Months Interest
Rate Futures is Greater Than 9
Table A.8: GARCH Model: Surprise if Change in Price of 3 Months Interest
Rate Futures is Greater Than 14
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Table A.9: MS Model: Surprise if Change in 3 Months Interbank Rate is
Greater Than 9
Table A.10: MS Model: Surprise if Change in 3 Months Interbank Rate is
Greater Than 14
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Table A.11: MS Model: Surprise if Change in Price of 3 Months Interest
Rate Futures is Greater Than 9
Table A.12: MS Model: Surprise if Change in Price of 3 Months Interest
Rate Futures is Greater Than 14
193
Figure A.3: Smoothed Unconditional Probability of Being in the Informed
Trading State - Comparison Between Different Types of Days
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Figure A.4: Smoothed Unconditional Probability of Being in the Informed
Trading State on MPC Days with Surprise Announcements - Different Sur-
prise Measures
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A.4 Appendix for Chapter 5
Figure A.5: Decomposition of Net Capital Flows to the United States (in
billions of USD)
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Figure A.6: Robustness Exercise: Fry and Pagan (2007) Critique
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Figure A.7: Equity Parity and Implied Sharpe Ratio
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Figure A.8: Robustness Exercise: No Restriction on Consumption
Consumption Inflation
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Figure A.9: Robustness Exercise: No Restriction on Consumption - Different
Types of Capital Flows
Debt Equity Flows
0 5 10 15 20−10
0
10
20
30
0 5 10 15 20−40
−20
0
20
40
Other Investment Foreign Direct Investment
0 5 10 15 20−20
−10
0
10
20
30
0 5 10 15 20−20
−10
0
10
20
201
Figure A.10: Robustness Exercise - Identifying Multiple Shocks
Debt Equity Flows
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Figure A.11: Robustness Exercise: Equity Prices in Local Currency
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Figure A.12: Robustness Exercise: Equity Prices in Local Currency - Differ-
ent Types of Capital Flows
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Figure A.13: Robustness Exercise: Capital Flows as a Share of GDP
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Figure A.14: Robustness Exercise: Including All Types of Capital Flows
Consumption Inflation
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Figure A.15: Robustness Exercise: Extended Rest of the World Sample
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Figure A.16: Robustness Exercise: Including Long-Run Interest Rates
Consumption Inflation
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